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INTRODUCTION

A fairly recent national study suggested that fourteen percent of the U.S.
population is "literally illiterate." They cannot read or write.' Also, large num1 See Jessica Bliss, Reading Tutor Benefits From Lessons, Too, THE TENNISSEAN, Feb.
28, 2014, at A7 ('Thirty-two million adults in the United States-14 percent of the population-can't read, according to a 2013 report by the U.S. Department of Education and the
National Institute of Literacy.").
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bers of adults are "functionally illiterate."2 They cannot read or write well
enough to deal with everyday requirements. 3 More troubling, among employed
adults, 40% are functionally illiterate. 4 And, among adult consumers, "low literacy" is widespread.5 Numerous low-literate consumers cannot read simple
label instructions or understand simple arithmetic or price differentials.6
Additionally, and even more troubling, 20% of employed adults are financially illiterate.7 Among consumers, financial illiteracy has increased steadily in
the wake of more complex financial services and instruments. 8 As of this writ2 See, e.g., Tracy Jones, Teachers Fear Online Reading Develops Issues With Attention,
FLA. TIMES-UNION, May 11, 2014, at Fl ("According to the National Adult Literacy Survey,

nearly 20 percent of the U.S. population is functionally illiterate.").
3 See Marty Farrell, All of Us Need to Know How to Read, THE ATLANTA J.CONST., Mar.
23, 2014, at 5B ("[Functionally illiterate is] a term defining people whose reading and writing skills are inadequate to meet the everyday needs of modem life."); Neil Bush & Marty
Goossen, If You Can Read This, Please Help, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 28, 2013, at B7
("Functionally illiterate adults can't read a prescription, follow emergency weather alerts or
help a child with homework.").
I See Terianne Petzold, IlliteracyAffects Everyone, STATSMAN J.(Salem, Or.), May 27,
2012, at C5 ("[S]tudies show that as many as 23 percent of the adult population living in the
United States are functionally illiterate. According to the National Adult Literacy Survey,
functionally illiterate means lacking basic skills beyond a fourth-grade level. The survey also
reveals that 40 percent of the work force lacks basic reading and writing skills ....").
I See Madhubalan Viswanathan, Jose Antonio Rosa & Julie A. Ruth, Emerging Lessons-For Multinational Companies, Understanding the Needs of Poorer Consumers Can
Be Profitable and Socially Responsible, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2008, at RI 2 ("Our research
shows that low-literacy consumers process market information and approach purchasing decisions differently than other groups of shoppers. . . .[Low-literacy consumers] tend to
choose products based solely on the lowest posted price or smallest package size, even when
they have sufficient resources for a larger purchase, because they have difficulty estimating
the longevity and savings that come from buying in larger volumes.").
6 See id. ("Like the 14% of Americans estimated to be functionally illiterate in a U.S.
government survey, subsistence consumers have difficulty reading package labels, store
signs or product-use instructions, or subtracting the purchase price of an item from cash on
hand-all of which hampers their ability to put their limited incomes to best use.").
7 Cf MetaFund CEO Tom Loy Makes Pitchfor JuniorAchievement, J. REC. (Oklahoma
City, OK), 2007 WLNR 29557400 (June 1, 2007) ("One in five employees can't do his job
properly because he's worried about his personal financial problems.").
8 See Martha McNeil Hamilton, Ignorance Costs Plenty-Officials Promote Financial
Literacy, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2002, at El ("The United States has a high rate of financial
illiteracy, and consumers are paying for what they don't know[:] [h]igh interest rates on
short-term 'payday' loans ... paid by an estimated 10 million adults who don't have a bank
or credit union[;] [b]etween $3 billion and $4 billion ...[that Latin American immigrants
must pay for] high fees and unfavorable exchange rates to ...send money home[;] [d]oubledigit interest rates on credit card debt, which averages $8,123 per family[;] [and] [m]oney
lost in investment scams on the Internet.").
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ing, between 28% and 50% of American consumers are financially illiterate.'
Unquestionably, it would be a mistake to assume only certain ethnic or lowwage employees and consumers are functionally and financially illiterate. Obviously, professionals, small-business owners, as well as highly skilled individuals are literate enough to earn commensurate salaries. On the other hand, within various professions and industries, one finds all-too-many professionals who
are undisputedly functionally illiterate." In addition, large numbers of upperincome individuals and small-business owners-who purchase goods and services-are financially illiterate." In fact, the greater majority of all consumers
2
do not understand rudimentary principles of finance and investing.'
More importantly, when compared to more powerful and sophisticated employers, merchants and lenders, functionally and financially illiterate employees and consumers are disproportionately more likely to be unsophisticated or
"legally unsophisticated."' 3 Therefore, state and federal legislatures have
passed numerous statutes to prevent powerful employers from violating unsophisticated employees' interests.' 4 States have also enacted statutes which bar
I See Walter Hamilton, HardTime Making Sense Out of Dollars-Study Co-Author Says
Many Americans 'Pretty Clueless' About Personal Finance, CHI. TRn3., Jan. 2, 2014, at I
("A 182-page analysis by the Securities and Exchange Commission... found that 'investors
have a weak grasp of elementary financial concepts and lack critical knowledge of ways to
avoid investment fraud."').
10 See, e.g., Shannon Muchmore, Speaker Highlights Nutrition, TULsA WORLD
(Oklahoma), Nov. 17, 2012, at DI ("American physicians tend to focus more on disease
management than health care and tend to ignore topics such as nutrition .... Changes in diet
can be an effective treatment for many conditions, but American physicians are functionally
).
illiterate in nutrition ....
II See Walter Hamilton, Hard Time Making Sense Out of Dollars-Study Co-Author Says
Many Americans 'Pretty Clueless' About Personal Finance, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2014, at I
("Even well-educated and upper-income Americans often have poor financial literacy .... "); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 12-13 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J.,
concurring) ("Given the sacredness and inviolability of the fundamental right to trial by jury,
any contract provision that openly or subtly causes the forfeiture of the exercise of this right
must be rigorously examined by the courts. This is all the more necessary when such a
contract provision is included in a standard-form contract of adhesion foisted upon unsophisticated and unsuspecting . . . small business people as part of the intercourse of daily life.").
12 See Hamilton, supra note 11, at I ("A survey by the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, a Wall Street-funded watchdog organization, found that only 28 percent of respondents knew what happens to bond prices when interest rates rise.").
13 Cf Alan White and Cathy Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POCY
REV. 233, 234 (2002) (citing numerous literacy studies and concluding that "many, if not
most, consumers are unable to extract critical [contractual] information ... from federally
mandated disclosure documents ... [and, consequently] unable to use the legally-mandated
disclosure documents").
" See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CooE § 1044 (West 1991) ("An employee who reveals a problem
of illiteracy and who satisfactorily performs his or her work shall not be subject to termina-
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powerful and sophisticated business and financial entities from violating the
rights of legally unsophisticated consumers. 15
Even more notably, the Supreme Court has a fairly long history of protecting
unsophisticated consumers' legal rights. For instance, from the late-1970s to
the mid-2000s, the Court issued several significant pro-consumer rulings: (1)
Attorneys may not solicit business directly or in-person from highly stressed
and "unsophisticated" laypersons;' 6 (2) Sellers may not discriminate irrationally by charging "sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers" different prices
for identical goods or services; 17 and (3) The Securities and Exchange Commission may regulate pay-phone "investment contracts," if those instruments offer
highly questionable rates
of return to extremely vulnerable "older and less so8
investors."'
phisticated
The Court also has an extensive history of preventing powerful and more
sophisticated corporate employers from abridging unsophisticated employees'
tion of employment because of the disclosure of illiteracy."). See also Louis v. Department
of Transportation and Development, 819 So. 2d 379, 387 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (citing the
Jones Act, 46 app. U.S.C.A § 688 (1994) and concluding that the negligent employer was
liable for the employee's injuries because the employer ordered the "totally illiterate" employee to operate a dangerously defective winch); Thornton v. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 802 So. 2d 816, 823 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that the employee's functional
illiteracy, age and injuries decreased the employee's employability and awarding damages
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.); Snyder v. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 442 A.2d 300, 303 (Pa. Super. 1982) (embracing the jury's findings that the
employer was liable under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. for
the functionally illiterate employee's job-related injuries).
15 Numerous state statutes protect consumers from unconscionable acts or deceptive trade
practices which take advantage of consumers' "physical infirmity," "ignorance," "illiteracy,"
"inability to understand the language of an agreement," or "similar factor." See CoLo. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 5-6-112(3)(e) (West 2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603C(2)(a) (West 1990);
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-6-111(3)(d) (West 1994); IowA CODE ANN. § 537.5108(4)(e)
(West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-627(b)(1) (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 611 1(3)(E) (West 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.3467, Sec. 17(l)(h) (West 2014);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.092(12) (West 2011); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.031(B)(13) (West 2006); OKL. ST. ANN. 14A, § 6-111(3)(e) (West 1969); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 646.605(9)(a) (West 2014); W. VA. CODE § 46B-8-2(c)(5) (West 1993).
16 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454, 464-65 (1978) ("The detrimental aspects of face-to-face selling even of ordinary consumer products have been recognized and addressed by the Federal Trade Commission, and it hardly need be said that the
potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the
art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.").
"7 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 475 (1992)
("Kodak contends that.., knowledgeable customers will hold down the package price for all
other customers .... [But], if a company is able to price discriminate between sophisticated
and unsophisticated consumers, the sophisticated will be unable to prevent the exploitation
of the uninformed.").
18 See S.E.C. v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394-95 (2004).
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procedural and substantive rights. 9 To illustrate, in DelCostello v. International Brotherhoodof Teamsters,20 three union workers-Philip DelCostello, Donald Flowers and King Jones-sued two employers and two unions. 2' The employees alleged: (1) The employers violated the collective-bargaining
agreements by firing the employees; 22 and (2) The unions breached their duty
of fair representation-by carelessly, arbitrarily and capriciously preparing, investigating and handling the employees' grievances. 3 In respective answers,
the employers and unions raised a statute-of-limitations defense: Allegedly, the
two sets of employees failed to commence their lawsuit within 30 and 90
days-respectively-under Maryland's and New York's statutes of limita24
tions.
The defendants prevailed before the Second and Fourth Circuits, and the
employees appealed. Under §10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
statute of limitations is six months-rather than 30 or 90 days. 26 Accentuating
that "legally unsophisticated employees" must overcome difficult hurdles when
challenging powerful unions and employers' discriminatory practices, Justice
Brennan wrote:
[A]n individual employee may bring [a] suit against his employer for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement ....
[H]owever, an employee
[must] attempt to exhaust any grievance or arbitration remedies provided
in the collective bargaining agreement. . . . [T]his rule works an unaccept19 See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-27 (1953) (considering

whether Ralston Purina offered public securities to its employees and declaring that such
offerings must comply with §5 of the Securities Act, because unsophisticated employees"artist, bakeshop foreman, chow loading foreman, clerical assistant, copywriter, electrician,
stock clerk, mill office clerk, order credit trainee, production trainee, stenographer, and veterinarian"-did not have access to all relevant information to determine if the securities
were reasonable investments).
20 462 U.S. 151, 155-56, 158 (1983). Philip DelCostello joined the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and refused to drive an allegedly unsafe tractor-trailer. Id. Anchor Motor
Freight-his employer-fired him. Id. The other employees-Donald C. Flowers and King
E. Jones-worked for Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Id. They were skilled craft welders and
members of Steelworkers Local 2602 union. Id. Bethlehem Steel assigned certain welding
duties to non-welders-thereby forcing Flowers and Jones to be laid off. Id. DelCostello
filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court of Maryland against both the Anchor and the
Teamsters union. Id. And, after an arbitrator issued an unfavorable award, Flowers and Jones
filed a suit against the ruled in favor of Bethlehem and Steelworkers in the Western District
Court of New York. Id. The Supreme Court consolidated the two lawsuits, which raised the
same statute-of-limitation question. Id.
21

Id.

22

Id. at 156.
Id.
Id. at 156-57.

23
24
25
26

Id.
29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (West 2015).
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able injustice when the union representing the employee in the grievance/
arbitration procedure acts in ... a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or
perfunctory fashion.... [T]he employee will often be unsophisticated in
collective-bargaining matters .

.

. We conclude that state limitations peri-

ods.., fail to provide an aggrieved employee with a satisfactory opportunity to vindicate his rights under [the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, § 301] and the fair representation doctrine.
Certainly, the DelCostello Court's ruling is "progressive": It allows legally
unsophisticated persons to circumvent a powerful common-law affirmative defense and litigate statutory and common-law claims in a court of law. 28 Nonetheless, on several occasions, extremely powerful and more sophisticated employers, merchants and lenders have asked the Supreme Court to interpret § 2
of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925.29 In a long string of cases, the
Court acquiesced and reaffirmed a hardhearted federal policy: Private arbitrators-rather than juries or judges-must resolve "legally unsophisticated" employee and consumer disputes, if the grievances "arise from" written con30
tracts.
In fact, three years after DelCostello, the Court decided Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd.
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. 31 to address disputes surrounding two
relatively new developments: (1) the explosion of standardized contractswhich govern all types of business relationships and industry-wide commercial
transactions; 32 and (2) the widespread inclusion of mandatory-arbitration
clauses in standardized contracts. 33 The Volt Court reaffirmed the view that
when doubt arises, a liberal federal arbitration policy requires courts to enforce
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163-66.
See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
29 9 U.S.C. § 2 (West 2015).
30 See Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 219-220 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) ("[The FAA]
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability."); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n. 12
(1967).
31 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
32 See, e.g., U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Treadwell Corp., 58 F. Supp. 2d 77, 84
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (reporting that the insurance industry began using standard-form comprehensive general liability contracts in the 1960s).
33 Id. See George Watts v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 583 (7th Cir. 2001)
("[Miandatory arbitration clauses are prevalent in a broad collection of contracts, forcing
parties to accept the arbitral rather than judicial forum to adjudicate their rights."); Johnson
v. AT&T Mobility, No. 4:09-CV-4104, 2010 WL 5342825, at *9 n.6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 21,
27
28
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private arbitration agreements. 34 At the same time, citing the FAA § 2's savings
clause,3 5 the Volt Court also reaffirmed unambiguously another principle: The
unconscionability defense as well as other contract-based affirmative defenses
may "invalidate" arbitration provisions in written contracts. 36 Nevertheless, a
common view persists among some jurists and commentators: The Supreme
Court's pro-arbitration declarations are exceedingly "irrationally" and "unconscionably" biased against ordinary consumers and employees. 37 Even more disquieting, in the wake of the Court's assertedly "unconscionably biased" arbitration rulings, rancorous judicial discourse and rulings among state and federal
courts persist over whether 38the doctrine of unconscionability may defeat motions to compel arbitration.
Certainly, commentators have published scholarly articles-raising and critiquing several timely mandatory-arbitration questions: (1) whether the frequency of unconscionability challenges increased or declined during a specific period in state or federal courts; (2) whether unconscionability challenges have
been more or less effective in a particular jurisdiction; (3) whether a specific
state supreme court denied or granted motions to compel arbitration when respondents raised an unconscionability defense; and (4) whether a certain state
court should allow an unconscionability defense. 39 Nevertheless, under com2010) ("The court ... is uncomfortable with the prevalence of arbitration provisions in
consumer agreements, and the consequent forfeiture of the consumer's day in court.").
34 Volt, 489 U.S. at 476.
35 See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685-687 (1996) (reaffirming
that under the FAA savings clause, state laws-which govern "the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally"-also govern arbitration agreements. "Thus, generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening the FAA § 2.").
36 See Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial Services, 907 P.2d 51, 57 (Ariz. 1995). See also
Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 ("[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress,
or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2.") (citing Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987));
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-484 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493, n.9 (1987).
37 See David Korn and David Rosenberg, Concepcion's Pro-Defendant Biasing of The
Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MIcH. J.L. RIirORM 1151, 1151
(2013) ("By mandating that numerous plaintiffs litigate their common question claims separately in individual arbitrations rather than jointly in class action arbitrations, the Supreme
Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion entrenched a potent structural and systemic bias
in favor of defendants."); George A. Bermann, Arbitrability Trouble, 23 AM. REv. INr'L
ARB. 367, 372 n.34 (2012). See also THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, LLC v. Spradlin,
893 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1179 (D.N.M. 2012); Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp.,
376 F. Supp. 2d 334, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
38 See discussion infra Part V.
39 Compare Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
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mon law and equitable principles, the doctrine of unconscionability comprises
two prongs-procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability. 4°
Consequently, an empirical analysis falls extremely short, if a researcher/commentator does not measure the unique, combined, simultaneous and statistically
significant effects of procedural and substantive unconscionability challenges
on the dispositions of arbitration disputes in both state and federal courts.
Therefore, the purpose of this article is to present a more comprehensive and
interdisciplinary analysis-historical, legal, empirical and statistical-of three
divisive and continuing FAA-related questions: (1) whether state or federal
courts are substantially more or less likely to allow a procedural unconscionability defense to defeat motions to compel arbitration; (2) whether state courts
or federal courts are significantly more or less likely to permit a substantive
unconscionability challenge to an arbitration motion; and (3) whether a procedural unconscionability defense is substantially more likely to defeat a motion
to compel arbitration than a substantive unconscionability defense.
Once more, under the FAA's "savings clause," state and federal courts are
not required to enforce mandatory-arbitration agreements, if "grounds ...exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."41 In AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion,42 the Supreme Court cited the language in the FAA § 2 savings
provision and reaffirmed an earlier declaration: Courts may consider or apply
the doctrine of unconscionability to decide whether to grant or deny an arbitration motion."3 But the Concepcion Court was equally adamant about a different
preemption issue: The FAA's savings clause preempts a court's weighing of
Unconscionability,52 Bun-.. L. REV. 185, 196 (2004) (finding an increase in the number of
unconscionability rulings over two years and stating: "[I]ncreased judicial willingness to find
unconscionability in arbitration agreements suggests a latent judicial hostility to arbitration
"),
and
and use of unconscionability contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act's mandate ....
Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine:

How The California Courts Are Circumventing The Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS
Bus. L. J.39, 67 (2006) ("Despite clear direction from Congress and the Supreme Court to
treat arbitration agreements no less favorably than ordinary contractual terms, the California
courts continue to view arbitration agreements as a 'lesser caste' (footnote omitted) of contract provision ...[and] ...have attempted to cloak their bias in the generally applicable
"),with Megan Barnett, There Is Still Hope For
contract defense of unconscionability ....
The Little Guy: Unconscionability Is Still A Defense Against Arbitration Clauses Despite

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 33 WHrrnER L. Ri-v. 651, 670 (2012) ("[S]uccessfully arguing that an arbitration clause is unconscionable may be harder, but it is still possible even
though the Court did not expressly indicate it in Concepcion." (footnote omitted)), and
David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 396 (2012) (outlining
several reasons to explain why "Congress did not exempt arbitration clauses from unconscionability challenges in court").
40 See discussion infra Part II.C.3.

419 U.S.C. § 2 (West 2015).
42 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
43 Id. at 339.
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extralegal variables or applying inconsistent state-law principles to decide motion-to-compel-arbitration disputes.'
Therefore, in light of the Concepcion Court's controversial preemption ruling, two ancillary questions warrant answers: (1) whether a few, some or most
state and federal courts permit preempted state rules and other "legal variables"-litigants' common-law, equitable and statutory claims, theories of recovery, and statutory defenses-to influence the dispositions of mandatory-arbitration; and, (2) whether a few, some or most state and federal courts allow
preempted extralegal factors-litigants' consumer or employment status, geographic location, and levels of economic and financial sophistication-to determine the outcomes in mandatory-arbitration proceedings.
Part H begins the discussion by briefly reviewing common-law principles of
contract-focusing primarily on the formation and enforcement of a valid contract. Necessarily, pertinent equitable doctrines and settled contract-based defenses are also discussed in Part II.
Part III presents a very brief review of arbitration rules and practices in England and in the United States-before the enactment of the Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925. Put simply, arbitration was extremely common before the FAA's
enactment. Therefore, data are presented to challenge the conventional wisdom
regarding the ostensible purpose of the FAA. Later, the discussion focuses on
the language in § 2 of the FAA. As mentioned earlier, § 2 has produced plentiful motion-to-compel-arbitration disputes-between powerful employers and
less dominant employees, as well as between legally unsophisticated consumers
and more sophisticated merchants and lenders. In addition, as discussed more
carefully in Part III, many FAA-related judicial splits occur because federal and
state courts disagree profoundly about the purpose and scope of the FAA § 2.
Generally, Part IV discusses the applicability and effectiveness of contractbased defenses in motion-to-compel-arbitration trials. More specifically, Part
IV.A discusses the procedural unconscionability doctrine and judicial splits
over whether a mental-incapacity defense should prevent state and federal
courts from enforcing mandatory arbitration provisions in contracts. Even more
specifically, Part IV.A addresses the question: whether proof of a consumer's
or an employee's "mental incapacity," "insanity" or "mental retardation" is sufficient to establish a successful procedural-unconscionability defense in a motion-to-compel arbitration trial.
Part IV.B continues and expands the procedural unconscionability discussion-focusing on whether consumers' and employees' levels of sophistication
increase or decrease courts' likelihood of enforcing mandatory arbitration
agreements. More to the point, Part IV.B answers the question: whether a consumer's or an employee's level of illiteracy-literal, functional and/or financial-may establish an effective procedural unconscionability challenge against
a motion to compel arbitration.
44

Id. at 343.
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In contrast, Part V answers two very different and immensely pressing questions: (1) whether an arbitration provision must be "merely asymmetrical," "unreasonably one-sided," "shockingly asymmetrical and harsh," or "unduly oppressive" to establish a persuasive substantive unconscionability challenge; and
(2) whether arbitration costs must be "unduly burdensome" or "completely prohibitive" to establish an effective substantive unconscionability defense and invalidate an arbitration provision.
Finally, in Part VI, the results of a statistical study appear. The reported
findings are based on an analysis of approximately one thousand federal and
state court decisions-those reported between 1800 and 2015. Two previously
identified questions are addressed in Part VI: (1) whether assertedly "unconscionably biased" state and federal courts are statistically and significantly
more or less likely to grant motions to compel arbitration when respondents
raised-jointly or individually-procedural and substantive unconscionability
defenses; and (2) whether state or federal courts are statistically and significantly more or less likely to allow extralegal factors-litigants' consumer or employment status, geographic location, levels of economic and financial sophistication and other factors-to shape the outcomes of arbitration motions.
Citing descriptive statistics in two extremely small and methodologically
challenged studies,45 the Concepcion Court used the simple percentages to
reach a continuing and highly questionable conclusion: State courts are exceedingly likely to undermine the FAA's arbitration policies by allowing "legally
unsophisticated" consumers and employees to abuse the unconscionability defense in motion-to-compel-arbitration proceedings.46 Yet, acknowledging explicitly that the percentages were "not definitive,"47 the Concepcion Court embraced them, barred the consumers' unconscionability defense, and forced the
consumers to resolve their common-law and statutory claims before private arbitrators rather than in a court of law.48
After employing a more appropriate research methodology and powerful statistics, Part VI reveals that a host of extralegal and legal factors influence the
dispositions of motions to compel arbitration in state and federal courts. But
even more importantly, the reported statistics in Part VI reveal that both federal
and state courts are significantly more likely to grant motions to compel arbitration when "legally unsophisticated" consumers and employees raise an unconscionability defense. Stated another way, the Supreme Court will continue to
craft strained federal preemption "policies" which chip away everyday consumers and employees' contract-based defenses under the FAA's savings clause.4 9

48

See discussion infra Part VI.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 342.
Id. at 342.
See discussion infra Part V1.

49

See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Privatized "Justice," 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 541

45
46
47

(2005) ("The Supreme Court... has provided a very strained interpretation of Section 2 of
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Therefore, the article concludes by encouraging Congress to enact one of
several previously proposed bills that would effectively address these concerns.5" Congress should act because the statistically significant findings in this
study strongly suggest: (1) The Supreme Court will increasingly subvert congressional intent and weaken procedural and substantive unconscionability

challenges in mandatory-arbitration hearings; and (2) The Supreme Court as
well as many inferior federal and state courts' accelerating propensity to enforce arbitral provisions in standardized contracts will effectively preclude millions of legally unsophisticated consumers and employees from litigating their
statutory and common-law claims in courts of law.
II.

COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT FORMATION AND
ENFORCEMENT

A.

Contract Formation-Provingthe Existence of a Contract

"A contract is an agreement between two or more parties."5 1 Briefly put,
each party promises to perform or not to perform an activity for each other's
benefit.5" Parties may mutually bind themselves under a negotiated contractwhich may be oral or written. 53 Or, courts may force parties to perform certain
54
legal obligations under an implied-in-fact or an implied-in-law contract. In
addition, a more powerful party may fashion a standardized or an adhesion
contract-which contain draconian or offensive terms-and a less powerful
55
As mentioned earlier,
party may accept or reject the proposed agreement.
the FAA. In a number of decisions interpreting the FAA, it has italicized 'any,' so the final
clause of Section 2 is written as follows: 'save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.' (Footnote omitted). The word 'any' is in italics to emphasize the Court's view that 'any' actually means 'all."').
50 See H.R. Res. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. Res. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R.
Res. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015); S. Res. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); S. Res. 878, 113th Cong.
(2013); S. Res. 1133, 114th Cong. (2015).
51 Gray v. Aiken, 54 S.E.2d 587, 589 (Ga. 1949); see, e. g., Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d
142, 144 (Conn. 1987) ("A contract is an agreement between parties whereby one of them
acquires a right to an act by the other; and the other assumes an obligation to perform the
act."); State v. Atwood, 301 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Haw. 2013) ("A contract is an agreement
between two or more persons which creates an obligation to do or not do something.");
McCraw v. Llewellyn, 123 S.E.2d 575, 578 (N.C. 1962) ("A contract is an agreement between two or more persons upon sufficient consideration to do or to refrain from doing a
particular act.").
52 La Salle Nat'l Bank v. Vega, 520 N.E.2d 1129, 1131 (111.App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1988) ("[A]
contract is an agreement between competent parties . . . to do or not to do a particular
thing.").
13 See Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976).
51 See Legros v. Tarr, 540 N.E.2d 257, 264 (Ohio 1989) (quoting Hummel v. Hummel,
14 N.E.2d 923, 925-926 (Ohio 1938)).
5 See Pyle v. Wells Fargo Fin., No. 04AP-6, 2004 WL 2065652, at *4 (Ohio. Ct. App.
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standardized contracts are widespread across multiple industries. 6 And typically, boilerplate agreements present unilateral offers of products, services and
employment to legally unsophisticated individuals-who may take, accept, or
reject the offers.57
More importantly, to qualify as a negotiated, standardized, express or implied contract, proof of the following elements must be present: (1) one person's offer; (2) the other person's acceptance of the offer; (3) each party's
intent to be bound under the terms of the contract; (4) each person's consent to
be bound; (5) the persons' meeting of the minds regarding the undertaking and
legal obligations; (6) the "execution" of the contract; and (7) the "delivery" of
58
the contract.
B.

Affirmative Defenses and the Enforceability of a Contract

To enforce a contract, a complaining party must prove that each party gave
sufficient consideration. 59 Generally, each party is only required to give a single consideration to enforce an entire contract: A separate consideration for
each contractual promise is not mandatory. 6° Even more relevant, if sufficient
consideration supports or covers an entire contract, all provisions in the agreement-including an arbitration clause-are covered. 6'
Sept. 16, 2004) ("It is well-established that an unconscionable [as well as] ... an adhesive
arbitration provision or an arbitration provision ... may be unenforceable and invalid. An
unconscionable contract clause is one where there is the absence of meaningful choice for
the contracting parties, coupled with draconian contract terms unreasonably favorable to one
party. Similarly, an adhesion contract exists when a party with little or no bargaining power
is required to submit to terms to which he has no realistic choice.").
56 See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) ("Standard form contracts probably account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made. Most persons have
difficulty remembering the last time they contracted other than by standard form .... But if
they are active, they contract by standard form several times a day."); Coil. of Notre Dame
of Md., Inc. v. Morabito Consultants, Inc., 752 A.2d 265, 273-74 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000)
("The standard form contracts drafted by the [American Institute of Architects] are widely
used."); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Treadwell Corp., 58 F. Supp. 2d 77, 84 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (reporting that the insurance industry began using standard-form comprehensive general liability contracts in the 1960s).
17 See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
58 See Copeland v. Alsobrook, 3 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
59 See Staubach Retail Servs. v. H.G. Hill Realty Co., 160 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tenn. 2005).
6 See Dan Ryan Builders v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 552 (W.Va. 2012).
61 Barker v. Golf U.S.A., 154 F.3d 788, 791-92 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Doctor's Assocs. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 451-53 (2d Cir. 1995); W.L. Jorden & Co., Inc. v. Blythe
Industries, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 282, 284 (N.D. Ga. 1988) ("[W]here the agreement to arbitrate
is integrated into a larger unitary contract, the consideration for the contract as a whole
covers the arbitration clause as well."); Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 535 N.E.2d 643,
646 (N.Y. 1989).
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Under the bargained-for-exchange doctrine, a promise in exchange for a
promise is sufficient consideration. 62 Additionally, rights, interests, profits, and
benefits-which are transferred between contractual parties-qualify as bargained-for-exchange consideration. 63 Also, a contractual party may prove bargained-for-exchange consideration by establishing that she refrained from exercising a legal right, incurred a loss, or suffered an inconvenience for the other
party's benefit.'
Courts will not enforce any contractual obligations or terms if the contract is
invalid for another reason. A contract is invalid and unenforceable if: (1) the
contract violates public policy, a civil statute, or a criminal statute;65 (2) one or
both contractual parties do not have the necessary "mental capacity" to contract;66 or (3) 6the
contract evolved from fraud, duress, illegality, or unconscion7
able conduct.
C.

The Origin and Evolution of the Unconscionability Doctrine
1.

The Unconscionability Defense in English Courts of Equity

Well before and during the seventeen century, English courts of equity embraced the doctrine of unconscionability. 6 8 Put simply, courts applied the doc-

trine to protect both powerful and "legally unsophisticated" persons' contractual rights, interests and expectancy.69 More specifically, to prevent injustice,
judges sitting in equity used their considerable power and discretion to thwart
the enforcement of unconscionable contracts, covenants, deeds and other legal
62

See General Electric Capital Corp. v. Transport Logistics Corp., 893 A.2d 467, 471

(Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
63 See Copeland v. Alsobrook, 3 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
64

Id.

65

See Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. United HealthCare Servs., 606 S.E.2d 752, 758 (S.C.

2004). But see Herron v. Century BMW, 693 S.E.2d 394, 400 (S.C. 2011) ("[C]ourts will
attempt to sever an illegal provision in an otherwise valid contract and enforce the remaining
terms.").

66 See Jennings v. Reed, 885 A.2d 482, 488 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). But see
Longley v. McCullough, 27 A.2d 831, 835 (R.I. 1942) ("Mere mental weakness, or inferiority of intellect will not incapacitate a person from making a valid contract; nor is it easy to
define the state of mind which will have this effect.").
67 See Ramirez-Eames v. Hover, 775 P.2d 722, 724 (N.M. 1989).
68 Cf Berney v. Pitt (1686) 23 Eng. Rep. 620, 621 ("[Plaintiff filed this] cause ... to be
reheard .... [B]efore Lord Chancellor Jefferies, it was insisted[:] [T]here was no tre difference in the case of an unconscionable bargain-whether it be for money or for wares[;] and,
... inserting the clause in the defeasance-[stating] that the defendant should lose his money, if the plaintiff died before his father-did not differ ... at all from any other bargain
made by the plaintiff, or, other tenant in tail.. . . [T]herefore, the expressing of it particularly in the defeasance ... made the bargain the worse-[coloring] a bargain [and creating the
appearance of an unconscionable contract].").
69 See, e.g., Collier v. Field, 2 Mont. 205 (Mont. 1874).
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instruments.7" Furthermore, it has been suggested that historically, courts of
equity in England "never developed a clear set of rules for analyzing claims of
unconscionability."7 1 However, although an iron-clad definition of unconscionability never emerged, there is no serious debate regarding one issue: English
courts of equity repeatedly cited some specific factors and weighed the individual and joint effects of those factors to determine whether a legal instrument
was unconscionable.
To illustrate, consider the disputes and declarations in a string of English
cases which were decided between 1740 and 1814. First, in Brooke v. Gaily,7 2
the question was whether the contract was unconscionable. To uncover probative evidence of unconscionability, the court of equity considered: (1)whether
a "legally unsophisticated" minor and a sophisticated person signed a promissory note; and (2) whether the actual business transaction between a "legally unsophisticated" minor and a sophisticated person occurred before the promissory
note was fashioned and executed.73 Answering the question affirmatively, the
Brooke court declared:
The law lays infants under a disability of contracting debts, except for bare
necessaries[;] . . . [E]ven this exemption is merely to prevent them from
perishing ....Neither law nor equity know[s] any difference between an
infant of sixteen or seventeen .... [If] an unconscionable bargain [was]
made with an infant before he comes of age, . . . taking a [hand-written
promissory] note ... from him in two or three days after he [comes] of
age... is a suspicious circumstance ....[A]nd [such conduct] has always
been a material ingredient to direct the conscience of this court.7 4
Eight years after Brooke, a different English equity court decided Pawlet v.
Pawlet.75 Briefly stated, a marriage-settlement contract gave Lord Pawlet the
authority to distribute 30,000f to his children.76 Exercising his discretion to
distribute the money as he saw fit, Pawlet awarded 29,900f to his older son and
distributed equal shares of the remaining 100f to the younger children. 77 An
action was filed in the Court of Chancery-on behalf of the affected children70

Id. at 209-210 ("[W]here an unconscionable advantage has been gained by mere mis-

take and misapprehension, . . . equity will interfere in its discretion to prevent intolerable
injustice. [T]his also seems to be the rule in England [and] supported by ...numerous
English decisions.").
71Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., 907 P.2d 51, 57 (Ariz. 1995) (citing DAN B. Douls, 2
LAW OiFREMEDIES 703 (2d ed. 1993)).
72 (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 417.
73

Id. at 418.

74

Id.

75 (1748) 95 Eng. Rep. 586.
76

Id. at 586.

77 Id.
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to void the grossly unequal distributions. 78 The complaint asserted that Lord
Pawlet's conduct was self-serving and unconscionable. The Chancery identified several factors that a court of equity might consider to find evidence of
unconscionability. Those elements were: (1) whether a particular distribution of
funds is "evasive and illusory"; (2) whether a distribution of money creates
"inequalities" among intended beneficiaries; and (3) whether the distributions
were outwardly "unreasonable." 79
Nearly seventy-five years after Brooke and Pawlet, the House of LordsEngland's highest court-decided Willan v. Willan. 80 The dispute and most
relevant facts in Willan are not complicated. An uncle leased certain premises
from a church.81 In the course of events, the uncle's nephew wanted to lease the
same property; therefore, the uncle fashioned a "fixed rent" sub-lease regarding
the tenancy of the same premises. 81 More importantly, the sub-lease contained
a "covenant for [a] perpetual renewal," which was "renewable on fines at will
of [the] lessors."83 The uncle encouraged his less sophisticated and literate
nephew to sign the lopsided contract. Before the House of Lords, the specific
question was whether the perpetually and undisputedly one-sided covenant was
unconscionable.8 4
At the outset, the House of Lords highlighted one of equity's limitations:
"[I]f... [a] contract [can]not be executed, equity [may] not introduce another
'
On the other hand, the Law Lords stressed: Equity
contract for the parties. "85
may declare whether a contract or a covenant is unconscionable.8 6 And to
achieve justice, the House of Lords concluded that a court may weigh several
factors: (1) whether an allegedly offensive contractual provision "surprises one
or both parties"; (2) whether a party received "proper advice" before executing
a contract; (3) whether a party understood the legal effects of executing a binding contract; and (4) whether "imbecility" precluded one or both parties from
78

Id.

Id.
80 (1814) 3 Eng. Rep. 863.
79

82

Id. at 866.
Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. See also Willis v. Jernegan (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 555, 555.

81

86 Willan, 3 Eng. Rep., at 864-66 ("Lord Redesdale's doubting whether, even if there had

been no evidence of imbecility, such an agreement ...would not be set aside on the ground
of surprise and misapprehension ....And since it was unfit that such an agreement should
be acted upon in equity, it was held unfit to be acted upon at law .... But if the whole was
but one contract which could not be executed, equity could not introduce another contract for
the parties ...[I]t was unconscionable in equity that an agreement should be executed ....
[T]hough equity would not execute the agreement, it would leave the party to his remedy at
law.").
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having the requisite mental capacity to fashion a legally "valid" contract.8 7 Two
years after Willan, another court decided Jones v. Davison.88 The Davison
court cited more probative factors that courts of equity might weigh to determine unconscionability: whether a powerful and sophisticated lender employs
"usurious intent" or willfully corrupt motives to construct a loan contract. 89
2.

The Evolution of the Unconscionability Defense in American Courts

A complete history of pre-American Revolution courts' civil practices and
procedures is absent. 90 Still, historical records reveal several unquestionable
developments: (1) equitable doctrines evolved in England more than seven centuries ago;9 ' (2) English courts of law have an exceptionally lengthy history of
deciding both actions in law and equity;9 2 (3) long before the United States'
liberation from England, American courts of law and equity exercised concurrent jurisdiction over many claims; 93 (4) English courts of equity and law have
an extensive history of employing equitable affirmative defenses to administer
justice quickly and effectively; 94 and (5) American courts of law adopted and
used England's equitable doctrines-fraud, mistake, duress, and unconscionability-to achieve justice.95
Additionally, more than two-and-a-half centuries ago, an English court decided Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen9 6 and declared: A bargain or contract is
unconscionable if "no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on
the one hand and ... no honest and fair man would accept on the other." 97 The
Supreme Court and many state courts have embraced Janssen's awkwardly
worded proposition. 98 Furthermore, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts sec87

Id. ("[This agreement] was set aside on the ground of surprise and misapprehension of

its effect in one or both of the parties ....When he spoke of surprise, he merely meant, that
it was a case where, from imbecility, and the absence of proper advice, the testator did not
understand the effect of what he did, and that it was unconscionable in equity that an agreement should be executed which was a surprise on both parties ....He did not say that here
there was any dishonesty; but if an agreement was obtained by surprise, .... it was against
equity to permit any use to be made of it.").
88

Jones v. Davison (1816) 171 Eng. Rep. 233.

Id. at 235-236.
90 See generally Atkins v. Chilson, 52 Mass. 112, 117-118 (1846).
91Estate of Etkins, 1986 WL 1599, 14 Phila. Co. Rptr. 81, 90 (Pa. Orph. 1986) (Justice
Shoyer, dissenting).
92 Atkins, 52 Mass., at 117-118.
93 Id.
89

94 Id.

95 See, e.g., Griffith v. Townley, 69 Mo. 13, 17-18 (1878).
97

(1739) 38 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch. 1750).
Id. at 100.

98

See, e.g., Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 415 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chester-

96

field v. Janssen, 38 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)). See also Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,
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tion 208 reads in relevant part: "If a contract or term... is unconscionable at
the time the contract is made, a court may refuse to enforce the contract, ...
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or
may ...limit the application of any unconscionable term . . .to avoid any
unconscionable result."9 9 Section 208's comment adopts Janssen's rule-which
actually describes a type of unenforceable contract rather than defining the
meaning of unconscionability.°°
Briefly put, precise definitions of "unconscionable" and "unconscionability"
do not appear in section 208.10' Therefore, given the difficulty of fashioning a
universal definition of unconscionability, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 208, comment d outlines multiple factors that courts might consider to determine whether a bargain, transaction or contract is unconscionable:
Factors which may contribute to a finding of unconscionability in the bargaining process include the following: belief by the stronger party that
there is no reasonable probability that the weaker party will fully perform
the contract; knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker party will be
unable to receive substantial benefits from the contract; knowledge of the
stronger party that the weaker party is unable reasonably to protect his
interests by reason of physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy
or inability to understand the language of the agreement, or similar factors.102
More than 60% of American consumers and employees reside in states and
territories that have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section
208.103 Even more remarkable and relevant, federal courts of appeal'°4 as well
172 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1948) ("[A contract is unconscionable and unenforceable when] the
sum total of its provisions drives too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to assist.");
Casey v. Lupkes, 286 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 1979); State ex rel. State Highway & Transp.
Dep't v. Garley, 806 P.2d 32, 39 (N.M. 1991).
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 208 (1979).
'00 Id. § 208, cmt. b (1979). See also Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So.2d 884, 890 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("[T]he Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 does not even attempt
to define unconscionability in a black letter rule of law, whether in procedural-substantive
terms or otherwise, because the legal concept involved here is so flexible and chameleonlike.").
1o' See Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379, 381 (Alaska 1986) ("The Restatement does
not provide an explicit definition of unconscionability. It does identify factors, however, that
support a finding of unconscionability.").
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O1F CONTRACTS § 208, cmt. d (1981).
103 See Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379, 381-83 (Alaska 1986); Maxwell v. Fidelity
Fin. Servs, 907 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995); IMO Development Corp. v. Dow Coming Corp., 185
Cal. Rptr 341, 345 (1982); Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So.2d 884, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Ahem v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 793 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990); In re Marriage of Shanks,
758 N.W.2d 506, 515 (Iowa 2008); Hosp. of Louisa v. Johnson Cty. Fiscal Court, No. 2009SC-000280-DG, 2011 WL 1103054, *5 (Ky. March 24, 2011); Strong v. Oakwood Hosp.
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as several justices sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court 0 5 have embraced section
208.
3.

The Hybrid Unconscionability Defense and the Defendant's Burden of
Proof

The doctrine of unconscionability comprises two prongs-procedural and
substantive unconscionability.' 6 Generally, a procedurally unconscionable act
occurs when a powerful and sophisticated party uses "convoluted language," a
superior bargaining position, or substantial economic literacy to take advantage
of a less literate and unsophisticated party. 10 7 Conversely, if a contract contains
an oppressively harsh asymmetrical provision, a court is more likely to conclude that the contract is substantively unconscionable. °8
Still, in several respects, state supreme courts are divided over whether a
contract must be procedurally or substantively unconscionable to preclude its
enforcement. For example, the Supreme Courts of Illinois and Missouri have
declared that a contract is unenforceable if it is procedurally or substantively
Corp., 325 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800
A.2d 915, 919-920 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2002); Heen and Flint Associates v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
400 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Rite Color Chemical Co., v. Velvet Textile Co., 411
S.E.2d 645, 648 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); Taylor Bldg. Corp. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12,
22-23 (Ohio 2008); Snyder v. Rogers, 499 A.2d 1369, 1371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Taylor v.
Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 284-85 (Tenn. 2004); Ski River Development, Inc. v. McCalla, 167
S.W.3d 121, 136 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005); Derby v. Derby, 378 S.E.2d 74, 78-79 (Va. Ct. App.
1989); Richardson v. ESS Support Services, No. SX-08-CV-535, 2009 WL 8394881, at * 1
(V.I. July 30, 2009); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 781 (Wash. 2004); Lang v.
Derr, 569 S.E.2d 778, 781-82 (W.Va. 2002); U.S. STATES POPULATION AND RANKINGS,
http://www.enchantedleaming.com/usa/states/population.shtml (last visited: Jan. 2, 2015).
lO See, e.g., Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 59 (1st Cir. 2007);
Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, 341 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2003); Carlson v. General Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 296 (4th Cir. 1989); Sarnoff v. American Home Products Corp.,
798 F.2d 1075, 1081 (7th Cir. 1986); Noecker v. Southern California Lumber Industry Welfare Fund, 522 Fed. Appx. 411, 414 (9th Cir. 2013).
105 See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 81 (2010) (Stevens, J. dissent-

ing) (citing the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 208, Cmt. d (1979)). See also

American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 249 (1995) (O'Connor, J. concurring in
judgment and dissenting in part).
1o See Drink, Inc. v. Martinez, 556 P.2d 348, 351 (N.M. 1976).
107 See C & J Vantage Leasing Co. v. Wolfe, 795 N.W.2d 65, 81 (Iowa 2011). But see
Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 679-80 (N.M. 1985) ("A contract is procedurally
unconscionable ... only where the inequality is so gross that one party's choice is effectively non-existent.").
108 In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 515 (Iowa 2008). But see Guthmann v.
La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 679 (N.M. 1985) (A contract is substantively unconscionable
when the "contract terms.. are illegal, contrary to public policy, or grossly unfair.").
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unconscionable.' 0 9 On the other hand, the Arizona, New York, Utah and Washington Supreme Courts embrace a different view: A contract is invalid and
unenforceable, if it is substantively unconscionable, yet procedurally unsound."
Under Texas law, the unconscionability doctrine is also a two-prong testcontaining elements of both substantive and procedural unconscionability."'
However, it is less clear whether litigants must prove both procedural and substantive unconscionability before Texas courts will invalidate purportedly unconscionable contracts. To illustrate the uncertainty, in 1999, the Texarkana
Court of Appeals only applied a procedural unconscionability analysis and concluded that a contractual provision was unenforceable. 1 2 But, the Texas Supreme Court decided three years later in Halliburton Company" l3 that Texas
courts "may consider both procedural and substantive unconscionability" in
evaluating the validity and enforceability of an arbitration provision. 114 Moreover, seven years after Halliburton, the same Texarkana Appellate Court ruled
that a successful unconscionability defense may be established by proving only
substantive unconscionability." 5
Presently, most state courts require litigants to prove both procedural and
substantive unconscionability before invalidating contracts. 16 Functionally
however, significant divisions continue because state courts of law generally
require different standards for plaintiffs to prove unconscionability: "preponderance of evidence," "clear and convincing evidence," or "circumstantial evidence."' 17 However, only a judge may answer a question of law: whether, say,
109 See Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, 857 N.E.2d 250, 263 (111. 2006); Brewer v. Missouri

Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Mo. 2010), rev'd on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2875
(2011).
l1O See Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995); Gillman v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y. 1988); Resource Management Co.
v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1043 (Utah 1985); Adler v. Fred Lind
Manor, 1103 P.3d 773, 781-82 (Wash. 2004).
11'See In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. 2006).
112 See In re Brookshire Brothers, Ltd., 198 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); In re
Turner Bros. Trucking Co., 8 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
113 See In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002).
114 Id. at 572.
115 Shamrock Foods Co. v. Munn & Associates, Ltd., 392 S.W.3d 839, 847-848 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2013) (citing Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995)).
116 See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000);
Hottle v. BDO Seidman, 846 A.2d 862, 878 (Conn. 2004); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n
ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 994 (N.D. 2005); Deminsky v. Arlington Plastics Mach., 657 N.W.2d
411, 422 (Wis. 2003); Roussalis v. Wyoming Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 209, 246-47 (Wyo. 2000).
117 Compare Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., 706 P.2d
1028, 1043 (Utah 1985) (declaring that in a case involving an unconscionability claim, "a
duly executed written contract should be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence"), and Derby v. Derby, 78 S.E.2d 74, 77 (Va. App. 1989) (reiterating that the one's

UNCONSCIONABLE JUDICIAL DISDAIN

2016]

an arbitration provision is unconscionable." 8 Consequently, to answer a general unconscionability question, both equity and law judges invite, accept and
weigh legal, extralegal and imprecise evidence by asking: (1) whether
some quantum of procedural and substantive unconscionability taints a contract;" 9 (2) whether "there is a certain quantum of procedural plus a certain
quantum of substantive unconscionability"."2 ° (3) whether at least "some small
measure" of procedural and substantive unconscionability pollutes a contract; 12 or (4) whether more substantive unconscionability and less procedural
122
unconscionability-or vice versa-contaminates a contract.
In Part IV of this article, several statistically significant findings reveal that
courts are more likely to grant motions to compel arbitration when respondents
raise a procedural unconscionability defense, 123 and less likely to compel arbitration when respondents raise a substantive unconscionability defense. 24 Furthermore, courts' willingness to consider imprecise evidence or apply conflicting evidentiary standards to determine unconscionability partially explains
courts' likelihood to enforce purportedly unconscionable arbitration provisions
in consumer and employment contracts.
III.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION

Acr

Arbitration clauses appear in all types of consumer and employment contracts. If a contractual party refuses to arbitrate claims, the other party or moclaiming that a contract is unconscionable must prove the allegations by clear and convincing evidence), with Bernina Distributors, Inc. v. Bemina Sewing Mach., 646 F.2d 434, 440
(10th Cir. 1981) (employing circumstantial evidence to establish unconscionability), and
Worman v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 76 Pa. D. & C.4th 292, 300 (2005) ('The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving this allegation of unconscionability, by a preponderance
of the evidence."), and Gladding v. Langrall, Muir & Noppinger, 401 A.2d 662, 665 (Md.
1979) (allowing circumstantial evidence to prove unconscionability).
118 Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 376, 379-380 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).
11" Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 923 (N.D. 2005) ("Most courts
take a balancing approach to the unconscionability question, and to tip the scales in favor of
unconscionability, most courts seem to require a certain quantum of procedural, plus a certain quantum of substantive, unconscionability").
120 See, e.g., Leasefirst v. Hartford Rexall Drugs, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1992); Wisconsin Auto Title Loans v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 165 (Wis. 2006).
121 See, e.g., Dan Ryan Builders v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 558 (W.Va. 2012) ("[Under
our recent case law], [t]o be unenforceable, a contract term must-at least in some small
measure-be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.").
122 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000) ("[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable,
and vice versa.").
123 See Table 3 and accompanying discussion, infra Part VI.C.
124 See Table 3, infra Part VI.C.
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vant may file a motion to compel arbitration. 25 The movant commences a lawsuit "in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. ' 26 Many
commentators as well as federal and state court judges continue to embrace a
centuries-old misconception: English courts of equity disliked and refused to
solely because arbitration undermined courts'
enforce arbitration agreements
27
jurisdictional powers.'
Actually, well before and during the 1700s, English equity courts enforced
arbitration clauses and upheld arbitrators' awards, 128 but did not tolerate arbitrators' capricious rulings or abusive discretionary practices. 129 The increased
"hostility" of courts against arbitrators did not occur until the nineteenth century130 because: (1) courts of equity wanted to retain their power to review and
decide any dispute involving the formation, interpretation and enforceability of
an arbitration contract; and (2) courts increasingly refused to enforce unconscionable arbitration agreements, which forced weaker and unsophisticated par" '
ties into binding arbitration.13
125

See Modesta v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 469 A.2d 1019, 1021

(Pa. 1983).
126 See Wagner Const. Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp., 157 P.3d 1029, 1034 (Cal. 2007)
(reaffirming that an action to compel arbitration "is in essence a suit in equity to compel
specific performance of a contract").
127 Cf American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2308-09 (2013)
("Congress enacted the FAA in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration.").
128 See, e.g., Hicks v. Richardson (1797) 126 Eng. Rep. 796, 796 ("If an arbitrator award
...that each party shall pay a moiety of the costs of the arbitration ... and one party-in
order to get the award out of the hands of the arbitrator-pay[s] the whole, he may have an
attachment against the other party if he refuse to pay his moiety.").
129 See, e.g., Adams v. Buckland (1705) 23 Eng. Rep. 929, 929 ("[P]rivate meetings of
the arbitrators with one of the parties-and admitting him to be heard to induce an alteration
in the award-is partiality.").
130 See In re Unterweser Reederei, Gmbh, 428 F.2d 888, 896 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Not until
the nineteenth century was the revocability of arbitration agreements simply premised on the
courts' opposition to 'ouster' from their jurisdiction.").
131 See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciaryon S. 1005 and H. R. 646 - Bills to Make Valid and
Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitration of Disputes Arising Out of
Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce Among the States or Territories or with
Foreign Nations, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1924) [hereinafter Joint 1924 Hearings on
Federal ArbitrationBills] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Member, Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, American Bar Association and General Counsel for the
New York State Chamber of Commerce) ("There are several reasons [why an arbitration
contract may be unenforceable in a court of equity] .... In a very early case, the Windgard
case, I am sure the decision of Lord Coke was misunderstood.... [One] could make an
arbitration agreement... in the seventeenth century which was binding, but the remedies ...
were limited .

. .

. [1]n those days, [one could insert a] penalty [clause] . . . in [one's]

agreement. [And if one party breached the agreement, the other party could] sue for the
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Undeniably, the "judicial hostility" argument spurred some congressional
members to vote for the Federal Arbitration Act of 1924 (the "FAA")., 32 But,
the congressional record clearly reveals that Congress enacted the FAA for other reasons: (1) to allow equally powerful and sophisticated merchants to fashion voluntary arbitration agreements;' 33 (2) to encourage courts to enforce voluntary arbitration agreements; 3 4 (3) to increase merchants' ability to resolve
trade disputes efficiently by eliminating expensive litigation;' 3 5 and (4) to "pre136
serve business friendships" within and between various trade associations.
Section 2 of the FAA reads in relevant part: "A written provision in any...
contract ...

to settle by arbitration a controversy

. . .

arising out of such con-

tract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable ....- 137
Following the FAA's enactment, financial institutions, corporations and
penalty ....

[But the damages were modest] ....

[Then, there is the] ouster of jurisdiction

[explanation]. [One] could not oust the court of jurisdiction.... [A]t the time this rule was
made, people were not able to take care of themselves in making contracts, and the stronger
men would take advantage of the weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect
them.... A judge.., who is in sympathy with this measure and who approves it... told
me recently-

'Cohen you understand ...

the difficulty in this matter ...

[since] England is

in possession of shipping, .... our people do not want to go over there and arbitrate their
differences over there.').
132 See id. at 13-14.

133 See Joint 1924 Hearings on Federal Arbitration Bills, at 26 (statement of Alexander
Rose representing the Arbitration Society of America) ("Arbitration . . . does not by any
means seek to supplant the courts or work in opposition to the courts, because ... it is a
purely voluntary thing"); Joint 1924 Hearingson FederalArbitrationBills at 2-6 (statement
of Sen. Thomas Sterling, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("The hearing is upon S.
1005 and H.R. 646, being bills to make valid and enforceable written provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce
among the states or territories or with foreign nations.").
13' See id. at 26 (statement of Alexander Rose representing the Arbitration Society of
America) ("[Now], arbitration may ... have the aid of the court to enforce these provisions
which men voluntarily enter into ..
").
135 See id. at 22 (statement of M. L. Toulme, Secretary, National Wholesale Grocers'
Association of United States) ("[We] heartily [endorse] principles involved in [the proposed]
arbitration act. [It encourages] adjustment of trade disputes and [eliminates] expensive litigation. This association for many years has urged commercial arbitration.").
136 See id. at 7 (statement of Charles Bemheimer, Chairman of the Committee on Arbitration-Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York) ("[Arbitration] preserves business
friendships.... Friendliness is preserved in business. It raises business standards. It maintains business honor, [and] prevents unnecessary litigation .... "); Joint 1924 Hearings on
Federal Arbitration Bills at 24 (statement of Samuel M. Forbes, Secretary of Converters'
Association) ("Our association.., most strongly feel that the adoption of a Federal arbitration act such as is now proposed will be one of the most forward steps in commercial life.
Our members have found arbitration to be expeditious, economical, and equitable, conserving business friendships and energy.").
137 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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merchants began inserting involuntary arbitration clauses into consumer and
employment contracts.' 3 8 It is important to stress that the FAA's savings clause
reads in pertinent part: "[An arbitration provision in any contract] shall be valid . . . and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity . *",139 Generally, the savings clause means: "[T]he FAA places arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts ... and requires courts to

enforce them according to their terms."' 4 ° Nevertheless, a variety of contractu-

al, equitable and statutory defenses may invalidate arbitration agreements.41
Furthermore, accompanying the substantial rise in arbitration clauses, exceedingly large numbers of unsophisticated consumers and employees began
filing federal and state statutory claims against employers, merchants and lenders.' 42 Congress did not enact the FAA to force employees or consumers into

binding arbitration.'4 3 Yet, many unsophisticated workers, purchasers and bor138 However, even before the FAA's enactment, arbitration was a popular alternative proceeding for parties to resolve their legal disputes. See Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Payne, 46 P. 315, 318 (Kan. 1896) ("[Arbitration] is a popular, cheap, convenient, and domestic mode of trial ....").Today, nearly a century after the enactment of the FAA § 2,
arbitration agreements are extremely prevalent. See Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 259 P.3d
803, 810-11 (N.M. 2011) ("[Mlillions of arbitration provisions [are] currently in force."). In
fact, financial institutions, corporations and merchants insert regularly involuntary arbitration clauses into consumer and employment contracts. See, e.g., Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v.
Bridge Terminal Transp. Servs., Inc., No. 14 Civ. 6938, 2015 WL 685244, *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 18, 2015) (emphasizing the prevalence of arbitration agreements in the shipping industry); Imptex Int'l Corp. v. Lorprint, Inc., 625 F.Supp. 1572, 1572 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The
New York courts have repeatedly held that, as arbitration clauses are commonly used in the
textile trade, a textile buyer's failure to object to an arbitration clause upon receipt of both
the sales agreement signed by the seller and the initial shipment of goods binds the buyer to
the arbitration clause.").
139 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
140 Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (citing Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); and then citing Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v.
Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
141 Id. (citing Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
142 See generally, Willy E. Rice, Courts Gone "Irrationally Biased" in Favor of the
Federal Arbitration Act?-Enforcing Arbitration Provisions in Standardized Application
Forms and Marginalizing Consumer-Protection,Antidiscrimination, and States' Contract
Laws: A 1925-2014 Legal and Empirical Analysis, 6 WM. & MARY Bus. L. Riiv. 405,
486-487 (2015).
113 See Joint 1924 Hearings on Federal Arbitration Bills at 21 (statement of Herbert
Hoover, Secretary of Commerce) ("My Dear Senator: I have been ... very strongly impressed with the urgent need of a federal commercial arbitration act....If objection appears
to the inclusion of workers' contract in the law's scheme, it might be well amended by
stating 'but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce."); David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 438, 447,
469-78 (2011) (supporting the view that Congress never intended for the FAA to govern
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rowers have been and are being forced continually into binding arbitrationwhere they are substantially less likely to prevail.'"
Are consumers and employees more likely to appear before arbitrators because courts reject those complainants' procedural and substantive unconscionability challenges? Or, are federal courts in particular more likely to reject an
unconscionability defense, grant motions to compel arbitration and force unsophisticated workers and consumers into binding arbitration? The following sections provide some answers.

- IV. PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY AND JUDICIAL CONFLICTS OVER
WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL'S "INFERIOR STATUS" PRECLUDES ENFORCING AN
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT UNDER THE FAA
Under the common law, persons' respective statuses may preclude the formation of valid contracts. 145 Specifically, contracts are invalid as a matter of
law if one party is a minor 146 or mentally incapacitated. 147 Additionally, some
state statutes prevent certain classes of persons from forming valid contractual
relationships. 14' But, even if particular classes have a common-law or statutory
right to fashion and execute a contract, that contract is invalid and unenforceable if it evolves from any of the following activities: illegality or criminality, 149 fraud, collusion, a mistake, an accident, 150 public-policy violations, civil

employment contracts of any sort and that Congress intended the FAA to apply to parties'
arm's-length-bargaining contracts rather than to parties' unequal-bargaining contracts).
I" Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration Arrived In The Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 5, 6-7 (2014) ("Forced arbitration ... has its roots in
the Federal Arbitration Act .... Surveys... indicate that a fast-growing number of employers have adopted . . . forced arbitration [to resolve] workplace claims ....
[A] survey of
senior corporate counsel commissioned by Fulbright & Jaworski LLP reported that [25-27]
percent of U.S. employers responding to the survey required forced arbitration of employment disputes in non-union settings. Assuming this self-reported data is accurate, at least 36
million employees nationwide are subject to forced arbitration.").
141 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.1 at 419-20 (2d ed.
1998).
146 See Tracy v. Brown, 265 Mass. 163, 164-165 (1928).
141 See Martin v. Martin, 270 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C. 1970).
148 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-170 (2015) ("[AII contracts of an insane person are
void .... "); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1918 (2015) ("All persons have capacity to contract,
except unemancipated minors, interdicts, and persons deprived of reason at the time of contracting.").
149 See McCallum v. Mclsaac, 21 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tenn. 1929) ("To invalidate a contract for illegality, the illegality must be inherent, not merely collateral.").
I"o See, e.g., Hallock v. State of New York, 474 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (N.Y. 1984) ("Only
where there is cause sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or
accident, will a party be relieved from the consequences of a stipulation made during litigation.").
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51
statutory violations or unconscionable conduct.1
15 2
Once more, the unconscionability defense evolved in courts of equity.
Hence, only a judge may decide whether a contract or a provision is unconscionable.' 53 Moreover, many courts require a litigant to prove both procedural
and substantive unconscionability before voiding or terminating an arbitration
contract.154 Generally, to decide whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable, judges consider the parties' respective statuses and conduct during the
formation of the contract.155 Courts are more likely to find a contract procedurally unconscionable if: (1) the contract drafter's age, literacy, sophistication,
intelligence and experiences are exceedingly more superior than the nondrafter's attributes;1 56 (2) the absence of a better bargain forced an unwilling
party to accept an offensive contract;' 57 (3) surrounding circumstances decreased an individual's "reasonable opportunity" to understand the contractual

terms; 158 or (4) the drafter of the contract concealed material terms "in a maze

of fine print." 159
On the other hand, courts are more likely to find a contract substantively
unconscionable if: (1) the contract does not contain mutual contractual obligations or "a modicum of bilaterality";' 6 (2) the contract contains unfair, overly
harsh or oppressively one-sided terms producing absurd consequences for one
151 See Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So.2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2005) ("[T]he rights

of access to courts and trial by jury may be contractually relinquished, subject to defenses to
contract enforcement including voidness for violation of the law or public policy, unconscionability, or lack of consideration.").
152 Troy Mining Corp. v. Itmann Coal Co., 346 S.E.2d 749, 752 (W.Va. 1986) ("Unconscionability is an equitable principle.").
153 Id.

154 See discussion supra Part 1I.C.3.

155 See, e.g., McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 777 (W.Va 1984) ("Procedural unconscionability addresses inequities, improprieties, or unfairness in the bargaining process and
the formation of the contract.").
156 See, e.g., High v. Capital Senior Living Properties 2-Heatherwood, Inc., 594
F.Supp.2d 789, 799 (E.D. Mich. 2008) ("[To determine procedural unconscionability, a
court must] focus on the 'real and voluntary meeting of the minds' of the parties at the time
that the contract was executed and consider factors such as: (1) relative bargaining power;
(2) age; (3) education; (4) intelligence; (5) business savvy and experience; (6) the drafter of
the contract; and (7) whether the terms were explained to the 'weaker' party."); Muhammad
v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 912 A.2d 88, 96 (N.J. 2006) (stressing that
procedural unconscionability involves a "variety of inadequacies, such as ...literacy, lack
of sophistication, hidden or unduly complex contract terms, bargaining tactics, and the particular setting existing during the contract formation process").
157 See Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1995).
158 Id.
159 Id.

16 See Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 422, 437-42 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004).
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of the parties; 161 (3) the contract contains a commercially unreasonable term
that binds or affects only one of the parties; 62 (4) the allocation of risks between the parties is grossly imbalanced or unfair;' 63 or 64(5) contractual terms
unreasonably favor or benefit the more powerful party.'
Finally, courts generally have been loath to adopt a bright-line set of considerations to determine whether a contract is procedurally or substantively unconscionable, 165 because fairly often, procedural and substantive unconscionability
occur simultaneously. 66 Moreover, as disclosed above, courts use a variety of
factors to determine the types of unconscionable contracts. Additionally, some
judges occasionally weigh identical factors to establish both procedural and
substantive unconscionability, blurring the purported distinction between the
two concepts. 167 To underscore the difficulty of constructing a bright-line test,
consider the Supreme Court of West Virginia's observation: "[O]verwhelming
bargaining strength against an inexperienced party (procedural unconscionability) may result in an adhesive form contract with terms that are commercially
unreasonable (substantive unconscionability).' 68
Moreover, section 4 of the FAA reads in pertinent part: "[U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration .

.

. is not in issue, the

court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement ....

If the making of the arbitration

161 See Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2010) ("The focus of the
inquiry is whether the [contract] term is one-sided and will have an overly harsh effect on the
disadvantaged party.").
162 See NEC Technologies v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1996). See also Small v.
HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ohio App. 2004) ("Because the determination
of commercial reasonableness varies with the content of the contract terms ... in any given
case, no generally accepted list of factors has been developed for this category of unconscionability.").
163 Altman v. PNC Mortg., 850 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1080-81 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (reiterating
that unconscionability comprises procedural and substantive components and emphasizing
that a contractual term is substantively suspect if it reallocates the risks of the bargain in an
objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner to constitute a one-sided result).
I6I See Estate of Hodges v. Meadows, No. 12-cv-01698, 2013 WL 1294480, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 29, 2013) ("Substantively unconscionable terms are those that are 'unreasonably or
grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored party does not assent.').
165 Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 908 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Ohio 2009).
166 See Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 288 (W.Va.
2011), overruled in part on other grounds by Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown,
132 S.Ct. 1201 (2012).
167 Id. ("Procedural and substantive unconscionability often occur together, and the line
between the two concepts is often blurred."). See also In re Checking Account Overdraft
Litigation, 734 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2010) ("There is no specific formula for
analyzing substantive unconscionability; rather, it is 'a determination to be made in light of a
variety of factors."').
168 Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d at 288.
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agreement . . . [is an] issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the tri-

al

,,169

.

Before the late 1960s, courts generally embraced the proposition:

"Under the FAA § 4, a court rather than an arbitrator must decide whether a
1 70
contract-based affirmative defense invalidates or voids an entire contract."
Consequently, those earlier courts declared that
an arbitration clause is unen17 1
forceable if it appears in an invalid contract.
However, in the late 1960s, the Supreme Court decided PrimaPaint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company' 72 and changed the rule. In Prima
Paint, the Court interpreted the FAA section 4's "making of the arbitration
173
agreement" phrase and fashioned a doctrine of separability out of thin air.
The Court concluded that as a matter of federal law, a contractual arbitration
clause is "separable" from other provisions in the contract.' 74 Therefore, if a
party raises a common-law affirmative defense and challenges the legality of
the contract generally, a private arbitrator rather than a court must determine
the validity of the entire contract.' 75 Without a doubt, the separability doctrine
favors arbitration. The doctrine also governs the disposition
of motion-to-com176
pel-arbitration disputes in both federal and state courts.
Although the Court crafted the doctrine of separability in the late 1960s, the
doctrine continues to be extremely controversial. Many jurists and scholars
have attacked the Supreme Court, asserting that: (1) the Prima Paint Court
purposefully misinterpreted the FAA and created bizarre federal arbitration policies which exceed any reasonable interpretation of congressional intent;1 7 and
(2) the separability doctrine is a foreseeable consequence of the Court's irra169

9 U.S.C. § 4 (2014).

170

See

KATHERINE V.W. STONE

& RICHARD A.

BALFS, ARBITRATION LAW

242 (2d ed.

2010) (citing Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of
Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1330 (1985)).
171

Id.

172

388 U.S. 395 (1967).

173

Id.

at 402-04. See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283

(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining
congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by
case, an edifice of its own creation.").
174 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402 ("[A]rbitration clauses as a matter of federal law are
,separable' from the contracts in which they are embedded, and that where no claim is made
that fraud was directed to the arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause will be held
to encompass arbitration of the claim that the contract itself was induced by fraud.").
175 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006)
("[U]nless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity
is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.").
176 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984) (holding that the FAAmandated federal arbitration laws apply in state courts).
177 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations From Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8
NEV. L. J. 251, 254 n.10 (2007).
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'
tional "judicial activism.
But even more troublesome, the doctrine of separability generates judicial
splits. State and federal courts often grapple with two general questions: (1)
whether a consumer or an employee must arbitrate a dispute if a common-law
procedural defense invalidates the formation of the "entire" contract; and (2)
whether a substantive unconscionability challenge prevents the enforcement of
an offensive arbitration clause in an otherwise valid contract. 179 Below, these
questions are addressed more thoroughly.

Procedural Unconscionabilityand Judicial Clashes Over Whether a
Mental Incapacity Defense Precludes the Enforcement of
Arbitration Contracts Under the FAA

A.

For centuries, English and American courts have embraced the equitable
principle: A contract is procedurally unconscionable, invalid and unenforceable
if a contractual party was insane or a "lunatic" during the formation of the
contract.180 More concisely, a contract is procedurally unconscionable if a contractual party did not have the requisite mental capacity or competency to understand, approve, or accept material terms and conditions when the contract
was made.' 8' Thus, conservative readings of the doctrine of unconscionability
and the FAA section 4 lead to one conclusion: An individual's compromised
mental status prevents a private arbitrator from hearing and deciding the individual's common-law or statutory claims.
Nonetheless, state and federal courts continue to struggle with the question
of whether the FAA requires a consumer or an employee to arbitrate a dispute
if a consumer or an employee's mental capacity was impaired while forming
the arbitration agreement.' 82 To illustrate the severity of the problem, consider
the arbitration dispute in Mason v. Acceptance Loan Co.' 83 Charlie Mason and
178

Id.

179

See discussion infra Part VI.

180 See, e.g., Waters v. Taylor (1813) 35 Eng. Rep. 333, 334 ("[If it has been] clearly

established.., that the [plarty is ...an incurable [lI]unatic ...[he] contracted to be always
actively engaged in [a] [p]artnership, and.., he could not perform his [clontract, there could
be no damages for [a] [b]reach ....[Also] it would be very difficult for a [c]ourt of [e]quity
to hold one [m]an to his [c]ontract, when it was perfectly clear that the other could not
execute his [p]art of it.").
181 See Jones v. Noy (1833) 39 Eng. Rep. 892, 893-894 ("[Tjhe complete incapacity of a
party to an agreement to perform that which was a condition of the agreement is a ground for
determining the contract."). See also Peterson v. Eritsland, 419 P.2d 332, 336 (Wash. 1966)
("The mental competency or capacity of an individual to execute an agreement,. . . presents
a factual issue.., with the test being whether the person in question, at the time of executing
the contract, possessed sufficient mind or reason to enable him to understand the nature, the
terms and the effect of the transaction.").
182 See infra notes 184-203 and accompanying text.

183 850 So.2d 289 (Ala. 2002).
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84
other consumers in Alabama secured loans from Acceptance Loan Company.'
During the application process and before executing the loan agreements, Acceptance failed to disclose critical information in conspicuous print: The consumers were contractually obligated to purchase credit-life and disability insurance from Protective Life, and automobile insurance from CNL Insurance
America, Inc.' 85 Claiming that Acceptance conspired with the insurers and citof recovery,' 86 the plaintiffs sued Acceptance,
ing several common-law theories
87
Life.'
CNL and Protective
Undisputedly, "each plaintiff entered into at least one arbitration agreement
188
and . . . [most] plaintiffs entered into multiple arbitration agreements."'
Therefore, in response to the underlying lawsuit, each defendant filed a motion
to compel arbitration. 8 9 The trial court granted the motions and plaintiffs appealed.' 90
Before the Alabama Supreme Court, the consumers/respondents alleged that
the trial court committed reversible error when it granted the lender and insurers' motions.' 9' According to the consumers, the motions should have been
denied, because (1) many consumers were "mentally retarded" during the formation of the financial-services and insurance contracts; 92 and (2) each consumer's mental retardation was evident when Acceptance, CNL and Protective
Life committed fraud.' 93 To prove "insanity," the Alabama consumers submitted several bits of probative evidence: (1) many consumers were "mildly retarded," given their low IQ scores; (2) many consumers were illiterate; (3) most
consumers received special education rather than an elementary or a secondary
education; and194(4) many consumers "could not understand legal or business
'
terminology."
Alabama's "insanity" statute is unambiguous: "[C]ontracts of insane persons
are wholly and completely void."'' 95 However, the Alabama Supreme Court's
"cognitive understanding test" is equally clear:

"[To] avoid a contract on the ground of insanity, it must be satisfactorily
shown that the party was incapable of transacting the particular business in
'84 Id. at 291.
1s5 Id.

186 Id. at 291 n.2 (Generally, the theories of liability sounded in tort-fraudulent misrep-

resentation and negligence.).
187 Id.
188 Id.

at 292.

189 Id. at 291-92.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 294.
192

Id.

193 Id.
194 Id. at 295-96.

195 Id. at 295 (citing Williamson v. Matthews, 379 So.2d 1245, 1247 (Ala. 1980); and
then citing Ala. Code 1975 § 8-1-170).
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question .... A party cannot avoid a contract free from fraud or undue
influence on the ground of mental incapacity, unless it be shown that his
perception or
insanity.., was of such character that he had no reasonable
1 96
understanding of the nature and terms of the contract."
Applying the "insanity" test to resolve the dispute in Mason, the Alabama
Supreme Court rejected the consumers' mental incapacity defense and ordered
the consumers to arbitrate their claims.' 97 To justify its ruling, the Alabama
Supreme Court stressed: (1) the consumers were merely "mentally weak" rather
than "insane"; 1 98 (2) the "mentally weak" consumers had repeated transactions
with the defendants before the controversial transactions occurred; 199 and (3)
after the lender disclosed the information, the "mentally weak" consumers
knew they were signing "loan papers and insurance papers. '"2°°
Seven years after Mason, the Texas Supreme Court decided In re Morgan
Stanley & Co. 20 1 On September 9, 1999, Helen Taylor, an elderly woman,
owned an estate "worth several million dollars. 2 °2 On the same day, Taylor
completed an application, signed a securities agreement, and "transferred several of her securities accounts to Morgan Stanley. 2 °3 Each of Morgan Stanley's
agreements contained the following arbitration clause:
You agree that all controversies between you or your principals or agents
and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter or its agents (including affiliated corporations) arising out of or concerning any of your accounts, orders or transactions, or the construction, performance, or breach of this or any other
agreement between us ...shall be determined by arbitration only ....
In 1999, Taylor received a dementia diagnosis. The diagnosis occurred either
a few months before or immediately after signing the financial agreements on
September 9th. °5 Moreover, about three years after executing the 1999 agreements with Morgan Stanley, Taylor signed a durable power of attorney agreement and a trust agreement. 20 6 Under the respective agreements, Taylor's
granddaughter Kathryn Albers was the attorney-in-fact and trustee.20 7 In the
Weaver v. Carothers, 153 So. 201, 202 (Ala. 1934) (emphasis added).
Mason, 850 So.2d at 299.
198 Id. at 296 ("[A]s the trial court correctly held, this evidence is not evidence of 'insanity' for purposes § 8-1-170, but is rather ... evidence of 'mental weakness.").
196

197

199

Id. at 296.

200

Id. at 295.
293 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. 2009).
Id. at 183.
Id.
Id. at 183 n.1.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Id.

201

202
203

204
205
206
207

PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:143

course of events, Albers raided the trust and misappropriated funds.20 8 In 2004,
a probate court appointed Nathan Griffin to guard Taylor's significantly depleted financial estate. 0 9
In May 2005, the guardian sued Kathryn Albers and others, asserting that
Taylor's relatives violated the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, committed civil theft, converted funds, and imposed a constructive trust. 210 Approximately one year later, the guardian added Morgan Stanley as a defendant in the
case and claimed that the financial services conglomerate breached the 1999
agreements, breached a fiduciary duty, negligently selected unsuitable investments for Taylor, committed malpractice, and violated the Texas Security
Act. 211 In response, Morgan Stanley filed a motion to compel arbitration of the
underlying claims. The guardian, however, opposed the motion and argued that
Taylor did not have the mental capacity to execute financial contracts in
1999.212

The trial court refused to compel arbitration.2 13 Morgan Stanley appealed.
Both the appellate and supreme courts affirmed the trial court's decision.214
Because Helen Taylor did not have the mental capacity on September 9, 1999
to assent to the terms and conditions in the agreements generally or to those in
the arbitration provisions specifically, the Texas Supreme Court declared that
the financial contracts were procedurally unconscionable.215 Like the Alabama
Supreme Court's analysis in Mason, the Texas Supreme Court's contract-based
analysis and ruling in Morgan Stanley falls short for several different reasons.
First, in many jurisdictions, a procedural unconscionability defense based on
an individual's mental incompetency will preclude the formation of a valid and
enforceable contract. 2 16 In Texas however, a mental incapacity defense simply
challenges the continuing validity of a consummated contract. 217 Stated differently, an insanity-based, procedural unconscionability defense does not terminate a contract at its inception.21 8 If a mentally incompetent individual fashions
208

Id.

209

Id.

210

Id. See also Relator's Appellate Brief on the Merits at 4, In re Morgan Stanley & Co.

Inc., successor to Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 293 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. 2009) (No. 07-0665),
2008 WL 548885 at *4.
211 Id. at 183-184.
212 Id. at 184.
213 Id. at 183.
214

id.

215

Id. at 190.
See 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mentally Impaired Persons § 150 (2006); 17A C.J.S. Contracts

216

§ 145 (database updated June 2015).
217

See, e.g., Neill v. Pure Oil Co., 101 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ("It is the

settled law in this state, we think, that a deed executed by a person of unsound mind is not
void but voidable.").
218 See Bolton v. Stewart, 191 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. Ct. App. 1945 ) ("It is the universal

2016]

UNCONSCIONABLE JUDICIAL DISDAIN

and executes a contract, the contract is valid. 219 But, the individual has an option: "[A]t any time" the mentally incapacitated party or his authorized agent
may void, annul or repudiate the contract. 22' Accordingly, in Texas, all contractual obligations, terms and conditions remain in effect and bind a mentally incompetent individual, unless or until the individual challenges the enforcement
of the contract.22 '
However, in Morgan Stanley, the Texas Supreme Court did not address a
major inconsistency in Taylor's mental incapacity defense. Taylor's guardian
argued that "the entire September 9, 1999 new account agreement, including its
arbitration provision, [was] unenforceable because Ms. Taylor was ...mentally
incompetent at the time she executed that contract." 222 Yet, on June 21, 2006,
the guardian "added Morgan Stanley as a defendant, alleging" that the financial
institution breached a valid contract after recommending "unsuitable investments" to Ms. Taylor. 223 Apparently after Griffin discovered that a major inconsistency appeared in his response to Morgan Stanley's motion, the guardian
"nonsuited [the] breach of contract claim on October 23, 2007 .... 24
Still, the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning is wanting. Texas embraces the
"direct benefits equitable estoppel" doctrine. 225 It states: An individual-who
derives a direct benefit under a contract that contains an arbitration provision
may be compelled to arbitrate a claim, even if the individual did not agree to
arbitrate. 2 6 In Morgan Stanley, the record is clear: Taylor received a dementia
diagnosis in 1999-immediately before or after September 9th. However, Taylor did not challenge the enforceability of the securities contract's arbitration
clause until 2006. Consequently, for nearly seven years, Taylor and her estate
received benefits from Morgan Stanley's investment activities. Simply put, the
Texas Supreme Court failed to explain why those benefits were warranted, in
227
light of Taylor's insanity-based, procedural unconscionability defense.
There is one final observation. The Alabama and Texas Supreme Courts isrule inthis state that contracts made by... persons of unsound mind..
the party becomes competent to do so.").

. may

be ratified if

220

Id.
See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Brazil, 10 S.W.403, 406 (Tex. 1888).

221

Morgan Stanley, 293 S.W.3d at 193 n.14 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (citing 5 Samuel

219

Williston & Richard A. Lord, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10:3 (2009)).
222 See Relator's Brief on the Merits at 11, In re Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., successor to
Morgan Stanley DW Inc., Relator, 293 S.W.3d 182. (Tex. 2009) (No. 07-0665), 2008 WL

548885, at *11.
223 Id. at 4.
224 Id. at 4 n.l.
225 See Morgan Stanley, 293 S.W.3d at 184 n.2 ("[T]he doctrine of direct benefits equitable estoppel may apply to compel the arbitration of ...claims.").
226 Cf In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 741 (Tex. 2005).
227 See Relator's Brief on the Merits, In re Morgan Stanley, 293 S.W.3d 182 (No.070665), at 11, n.3.
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sued conflicting rulings about the efficacy of a mental-incapacity defense in a
motion to compel arbitration trial. Yet, both state supreme courts refused to
apply the Prima Paint Court's controversial doctrine of separability. 228 Although presenting different reasons, both state supreme courts declared:
Courts-rather than private arbitrators-must decide whether an insanity-based
procedural unconscionability defense defeats a motion to compel arbitration. 29
In Spahr v. Secco,23 ° the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected the doctrine of separability.231 From the Tenth Circuit's perspective, the "making" of
the arbitration agreement phrase in section 4 of the FAA allows state and federal courts to determine whether a party's mental incapacity precludes the formation of a valid arbitration agreement. 232 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit
embraced the federal separability doctrine in PrimericaLife Ins. Co. v. Brown
defense, which
and declared that an arbitrator must decide a mental-capacity
2 33
does not specifically relate to an arbitration agreement.
B.

Procedural Unconscionabilityand Judicial Differences Over Whether an
Illiteracy Defense Precludes the Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements Under the FAA
As stressed earlier, literal illiteracy and functional illiteracy are quite preva228 Compare Mason v. Acceptance Loan Co., 850 So.2d 289, 294-295, 295 n.2 (Ala.

2002) ("Generally, a challenge that concerns 'the making of [a] contract in its entirety, rather
than just . . . the arbitration agreement itself' is for an arbitrator, rather than a court, to
resolve. However, a challenge to the very existence of the contract-as is the case when
contracts are challenged as being 'void' as opposed to 'voidable'-is an issue for a court, not
[W]e follow the reasoning of other courts that limit the holding
an arbitrator, to decide ....
in Prima Paint Corp. to 'voidable' contracts"), with In re Morgan Stanley, 293 S.W.3d, at
186 ("[We address] the distinction the [Prima-PaintCourt] drew between issues of validity
and issues of contract formation .... The issue of the contract's validity is different from the
issue whether any agreement between the alleged obligor and obligee was ever concluded.
[We do not address] whether the alleged obligor ever signed the contract ... [and] whether
the signor lacked the mental capacity to assent.").
229 Id.

230 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003).
231 Id. at 1273 (holding "mental incapacity defense naturally [attacks the presumed enforceability of] both the entire contract and the specific agreement to arbitrate in the contract.").
232 id.

233 Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[U]nless a
defense relates specifically to the arbitration agreement, it must be submitted to the arbitrator
as part of the underlying dispute."). But see In re Morgan Stanley, 293 S.W.3d, at 189 ("The
Fifth Circuit's decision in Primerica,that the defense of mental incapacity is an issue for the
arbitrator, not the court, because it is an attack on the whole contract, stands in stark contrast
to [other] authorities. [Primerica] has been roundly criticized, and we [are] aware of no
other court that has followed its reasoning, including the Fifth Circuit.") (emphasis added).
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lent among large percentages of consumers and employees.234 Consequently,
"unsophisticated" workers, borrowers and purchasers are realistically and effectively precluded from (1) reading and comprehending material terms in standardized employment, goods and services contracts; and (2) protecting their
legal rights in boilerplate contracts.2 1 5 Furthermore, large numbers of unsophisticated consumers and employees appear in "deeply conservative red states."23 6
Extremely large numbers of consumers also reside in "quintessentially liberal
blue states. 2 37 Still, other large populations reside in the "swingiest of swing
states"-Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa. 3 8 Thus, given everyday employees and consumers' relatively inferior status, courts in "blue," "swing," and
"red" states have embraced the proposition that written contracts are proceduror illiterate" during the forally unconscionable if one party was 2"uneducated
39
mation and execution of the contract.
See discussion supra notes 1-15.
See Alan White & Cathy Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & Poi-'y
REv. 233, 233-234 (2002) (citing and summarizing empirical studies which confirm that
most consumers and employees cannot read and understand material cash-price, cost of credit, quantity and employment-related terms in standardized contracts, or the material information in "legally mandated disclosure forms").
236 Cf Kirk J. Stark, Rich States, Poor States: Assessing the Design and Effect of A U.S.
Fiscal Equalization Regime, 63 TAx L. REv. 957, 961 (2010) (labeling Alabama, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, West Virginia and other states in the Southeastern
region of the country as conservative "red states").
237 Cf. Bradley A. Smith, Vanity of Vanities: National Popular Vote and the Electoral
College, 7 ELECTION L.J. 196, 210 (2008) (counting Kansas, Virginia and Wyoming among
the "Republican red states" and including Rhode Island, Hawaii and Vermont among the
"quintessentially Democratic blue states"); Martin C. Bryce, Jr., Red State versus Blue State:
Surprisingly Most (But Not All) Courts In Both "Red" and "Blue" States Enforce Express
Class Action Waivers In Consumer ArbitrationAgreements, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
222, 224 n.26 (2005) (listing North Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas as being more conservative "red" states and listing District of Columbia, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New
Jersey, New York, and Washington as being the more liberal "blue" states).
238 Mark Silk, Defining Religious Pluralism In America: A Regional Analysis, 612 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POE. & Soc. Sci. 64, 79 (2007) ("The Midwest is ... a place with the
largest political deviations-from deep-red states like Kansas and Nebraska to the deep-blue
state of Illinois to the swingiest of swing states-Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa.").
239 Compare Razor v. Hyundai Motor America, 854 N.E.2d 607, 622 (111.2006) ("Procedural unconscionability refers to situations where a term is so difficult to find, read, or understand that the plaintiff cannot fairly be said to have been aware he was agreeing to it, and
also takes into account a lack of bargaining power."), and Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank,
Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 96 (N.J. 2006) (reaffirming that procedural unconscionability
"can include a variety of inadequacies, such as . . . literacy [and] lack of sophistication ...
during the contract formation process"), and William v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (stating that one's lack of education and another's use of fine
print are to be considered when applying the procedural unconscionability defense), with
Wille v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 549 P.2d 903, 907 (Kan. 1976) ("[T]here must be
234
235
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Yet, since the FAA's enactment, a major question has evolved: whether an
illiteracy-based, procedural unconscionability defense prevents state and federal courts from enforcing non-negotiated arbitration clauses in contracts. z4 ° Surprisingly, this unlikely question has generated major splits-between and
among courts in the "deeply conservative red states" and those in the "slightly
2'
less conservative swing states. '""
To demonstrate, consider the Ohio and Texas Courts of Appeals' difficult-to-harmonize answers regarding whether an
Alzheimer's-stricken consumer must arbitrate claims if: (1) the incompetent
consumer or her supposedly "authorized legal representative" was illiterate or
functionally illiterate when the contract was signed; (2) the non-negotiated
purchase agreement contains an arbitration clause; and (3) the Alzheimer'sinflicted victim's signature was mandatory, before the seller would deliver the
essential goods or services.24 2
2 43
In 2004, the Texas Court of Appeals in San Antonio decided In re Ledet.
The pertinent facts in the underlying lawsuit are clear. Anselma Garza-an
elderly lady-was admitted to Retama Manor Nursing Center Laredo South
(Retama).2 44 At that time, she had Alzheimer's disease, which precluded her
reading, comprehending, writing, negotiating or signing of any legal document.2 45 Therefore, Alejandro Garza-Anselma's illiterate son-signed
'2 46
Retama's standardized residential contract and "the arbitration agreement.
Seven months after becoming a resident, Anselma fell out of bed. 247 "The fall
caused multiple fractures to Anselma's body and face. ' 248 Ana Bustamante is
Anselma's daughter.2 49 Three months after the fall and on behalf of her mother,
Bustamante filed a negligence
action against Retama and Dan Ledet250
Retama's administrator.
additional factors such as deceptive bargaining conduct as well as unequal bargaining power
to render the contract between the parties unconscionable"), and Taylor Bldg. Corp. of
America. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12, 22-23 (Ohio 2008) (noting that procedural unconscionability focuses on the bargaining process, and the factors considered include "knowledge of
the stronger Party that the weaker Party is unable reasonably to protect his interests by
reason of physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the
language of the agreement, or similar factors").
240 See discussion infra notes 235-96.
241 See id.
242 See infra notes 242-285.
213 In re Dan Ledet and Living Centers of Texas, Inc., No. 04-04-00411, 2004 WL
2945699 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
244

Id. at *3.

245
246

Id.
Id.

247
248

Id.
Id. at *1.

249

Id.
Id.

250
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Reacting to the underlying lawsuit, Retama and Ledet ("Ledet") filed a motion to compel arbitration. 25 ' The trial court denied the motion without giving
an explanation and Ledet appealed. 52 Before the Texas Court of Appeals, Bustamante encouraged the court to affirm the trial court's decision. 213 According
to Bustamante, the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable and
therefore, unenforceable because: (1)Retama's agreement did not list Anselma
as a contractual partner; (2) Anselma never signed the agreement; and (3) Alejandro Garza did not have legal authority to bind his Alzheimer's-stricken and
incompetent mother under an arbitration contract.25 4 The Texas Court of Appeals rejected those defenses. 55
Bustamante also argued that "the arbitration agreement [was] procedurally
unconscionable, because Alejandro Garza [did] not understand, speak, or read
English" when he signed Retama's contract.2 5 6 Even more importantly,
Retama's agents failed to explain the arbitral terms to her illiterate brother, and
Alejandro "felt pressured" to sign the arbitration agreement or else Retama
would not admit his Alzheimer's-afflicted mother. 257 The Texas Court of Appeals also rejected the illiteracy defense. 8 The appellate court declared,
"Whether a party is illiterate or incapable of understanding English is not a
defense to a contract."2'5 9 Although Alejandro Garza could "not speak English"
and "could not read," his signature alone was sufficient to bind his mother
under the arbitration clause. 26
The Texas Court of Appeals strongly implied that Anselma Garza's literally
illiterate son breached several judge-made obligations: (1) schedule and attend
a formal meeting with Retama's arguably more sophisticated administrator; (2)
raise intelligent questions about the legal difference between litigation and arbitration; (3) present educated questions about the legal implications of his mother's acceptance of the terms of a binding arbitration agreement; and (4) demand
timely, uncomplicated, and uncompensated legal answers and explanationspresumably all the while a disease-stricken elderly mother waited to be admitId.
Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at *2.
255 Id. at * 1-4 ("Alejandro Garza signed the admittance papers as the 'responsible party.'
[He also signed an] arbitration agreement as [her] 'legal representative.'. . . Despite the
'resident' not being identified, the agreement is still enforceable .... Given Alejandro Garza's testimony and the statutory authority, Alejandro Garza had actual authority to sign the
arbitration agreement on his mother's behalf.").
256 Id. at *5.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
251

252
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ted to a nursing home. 26' Are such implied obligations rational or easy for an
illiterate or legally unsophisticated consumer to satisfy? Did Congress enact the
FAA in 1924, intending to achieve these types of outcomes? The respective
answer to each question is a resounding yes, if one considers the numerous
mandatory-arbitration rulings that red-state judges have issued in the wake of
the Supreme Court's 1967 Prima Paint decision.262
Now, consider the underlying arbitration disputes in Wascovich v. Personacare of Ohio.263 The underlying material facts in Wascovich are very similar to
those in Ledet. Personacare of Ohio owns and operates LakeMed Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center ("Personacare") in Painesville, Ohio. 264 On April 4, 2008,

Richard Wascovich, Sr. ("Wascovich"), a 73-year-old retired truck driver, was
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease.265 On the same date, Richard Wascovich,
Jr. ("Richard"), Wascovich's son, instructed the local hospital to release and
transfer his father to LakeMed Nursing Home. 26' The elderly Wascovich was
admitted into the Nursing home, after Richard and Jillian Hendrickson, Per261

Id. at *5-6 ("[Alejandro] testified that [a] Retama employee spoke Spanish with him

and 'explained some things but not everything.' According to Alejandro he signed the agreement because the Retama personnel 'didn't explain everything to me as it should be.' However, Alejandro also admitted that he did not ask questions about the agreement or seek an
explanation of the agreement.").
262 See Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So.2d 983, 988-89 (Ala. 2004)
("Owens [argued] that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable because it was 'signed by
[the] daughter of [an] aged widow who had no knowledge of [the] arbitration agreement
when her aged and ill mother was admitted to [the] nursing home after medical treatment.'
However ...

[t]he fact that she did not explain the arbitration agreement to Tucker ...

is

simply not relevant to whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable."); Green Tree
Fin. Corp. v. Lewis, 813 So. 2d 820, 820 (Ala. 2001) (denying an illiterate consumer's
unconscionability challenge against a standardized arbitration clause); Johnnie's Homes, Inc.
v. Holt, 790 So.2d 956, 960 (Ala. 2001) (One who offers a product or a service "is under no
duty to disclose, or explain, an arbitration clause to a buyer."); In re Palm Harbor Homes,
Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. 2006) (granting employer's motion to compel arbitration
after rejecting the employees' assertions: (1) the employees were unsophisticated persons;
(2) the employer never explained the concept of arbitration; (3) the employees "did not
voluntarily waive their right to a jury trial"; and (4) the employees "would not have signed
the arbitration agreements" as a basis for invalidating arbitration agreement if the employees
had been fully informed); Vera v. N. Star Dodge Sales, 989 S.W.2d 13, 17-18 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986) ("It is well settled that illiteracy will not relieve a party of the consequences of a
contract. Every person who has the capacity to enter into a contract, in the absence of fraud,
misrepresentation, or concealment, is held to know what words were used in the contract, to
know their meaning, and to understand their legal effect.").
263 943 N.E.2d 1030 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
264 Id. at 1036.
265 Id.
266 id.
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267
sonacare's authorized agent, executed an arbitration agreement.
Twenty days after becoming a resident at LakeMed, Wascovich fell on the
premises.268 Six days later, Wascovich fell again, fractured his hip, and received surgery. 26 9 Medical complications ensued, causing Wascovich's
death. 270 Richard commenced wrongful-death and survival claims against Personacare. 27 ! In response, "Personacare filed a motion to stay the proceedings"
and compel arbitration.2 2 Challenging the motion, Richard asserted that "the
arbitration
agreement did not control the wrongful-death portion of the con' 273
plaint.
In addition, Richard asserted that Alzheimer's-inflicted Wascovich was legally incompetent or functionally illiterate when the arbitration contract was
signed. 274 Therefore, according to Richard the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because: (1) Wascovich's low literacy precluded his
comprehending the legal implications of signing an arbitration agreement;27 5
(2) he did not have a history of litigating disputes involving the formation,
interpretation and enforcement of arbitration contracts; 27 6 (3) he did not consult
an attorney before signing the contract; 277 and (4) Personacare's agent-Jillian
Hendrickson-failed to explain the legal consequences of signing the arbitration agreement, since she "was not trained to understand the differences between litigation and arbitration. 27 8
The affidavit of Hendrickson stated that "she was not trained to read the
contents of the arbitration agreement to new residents"; "she did not explain to
new residents about the effects of signing the arbitration agreement"; "she was
not trained to understand the differences between litigation and arbitration"; she
told "new residents that the arbitration agreement would enable residents to
resolve disputes 'faster than litigation' "; she never witnessed "a new resident
make changes to the arbitration agreement"; and she never disclosed to residents "that they could make changes to the arbitration agreement. ' 279 Ultimately, the trial court granted in part Personacare's motion and declared that

268

Id. at 1032.
Id.

269

Id.

270

Id.
Id.
Id.

267

271
272
273
274
275

Id.
Id. at 1037.
Id.

Id. at 1036-1037 ("[A]ccording to the affidavit of [Richard], Wascovich did not have
any prior legal experience or expertise ....
277 Id. at 1037.
276

278
279

Id. at 1036.
Id.
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the arbitration agreement was not procedurally unconscionable.2 8 ° Richard
Wascovich appealed.
During its deliberations in Wascovich, the Ohio Court of Appeals cited and
reviewed its rulings in Manley v. Personacareof Ohio. 8 Manley was another
dispute involving the enforceability of an arbitration provision in a nursinghome contract. In Manley, the Ohio Court of Appeals stressed, "[p]rocedural
unconscionability involves those factors bearing on the relative bargaining position of the contracting parties, including their age, education, intelligence,
business acumen and experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the
contract, whether the terms were explained to the weaker party, and whether
28 2
alterations in the printed terms were possible.
Thus, reaffirming the Manley principle, the Wascovich court concluded that
the nursing-home arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because: (1) Personacare presented no probative evidence of Wascovich's expressing both an understanding of and a willingness to sign the arbitration agreement; 283 (2) "multiple signatures [on the contract] reflects . . . some physical
impairment [undermined Wascovich's] ability to sign" a legal document; 284 and
(3) Personacare did not present any evidence of Wascovich's having "the
mental capacity to enter into a contract of any kind, let alone one that Hendrickson ... did not comprehend. 285
To be sure, judicial splits have also developed among Ohio's courts of appeals as well as among courts in the "more prototypically liberal blue states"
over the general question: whether a party's "low literacy" precludes the enforcement an arbitration clause. 286 However, among blue-state courts, one finds
perhaps a more divisive arbitration question: whether an arbitration agreement
is procedurally unconscionable, if the respondent/plaintiff was "highly educated" or "professionally trained"-yet "functionally illiterate" 28 7-when the arbitration agreement was created and signed. A review of two cases will illustrate
how courts in the blue states have addressed this arguably more contentious
question.
280

Id. at 1033.

No. 2005-L-174, 2007 WL 210583 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
282 Id. at * 2. (emphasis added).
283 Wascovich, 943 N.E.2d at 1037.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Compare Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
(declaring that the arbitration clause in the nursing-home contract was procedurally unconscionable and the 69-year-old patient's signature had no effect), with Broughsville v.
OHECC, LLC, No. 05CA008672, 2005 WL 3483777, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (declaring
that an arbitration provision was not procedurally unconscionable, even though the patient
was 85-years-old and her daughter-who signed the contract-was 54-years-old).
287 See discussion supra notes 2-13.
281
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First, consider the controversy in Miller v. Cotter.288 Charles Miller, Jr.
("Miller") had the executed durable power to make binding agreements on behalf of his father, Charles Miller, Sr.,289 and "the younger Miller also held a
valid health care proxy for his father. ' 2 90 On October 10, 2003, Miller transported his ninety-one-year-old father to Birchwood Care Center
("Birchwood")-wanting his father to become a resident.291 During the sixtyto-ninety-minute meeting, Miller and Birchwood's patient-care manager discussed the nursing home's admission policies and procedures.292
A patient could have been admitted to Birchwood without executing an arbitration agreement. 293 Nevertheless, Miller reviewed Birchwood's sixteen-page
admission contract and the arbitration agreement. 294 The latter read in relevant
part:
It is understood and agreed . . . that any and all claims, disputes, and
controversies ... arising out of, or in connection with, or relating in any
way to the Admission Agreement or any service or health care provided
by the [facility to the [r]esident shall be resolved exclusively by binding
arbitration ... and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process.295
Furthermore, "the arbitration agreement did not limit any remedies available
under Federal or State law, but stated that the decisions of the arbitrator 'shall
be determined in accordance with the provisions of the state or federal law
applicable to a comparable civil action.' "296 After Miller signed all necessary
forms and agreements on behalf of his father, the elderly Miller was admitted.297
Twenty-four days later, Miller's father died in the nursing home.298 On January 13, 2005, Miller filed a lawsuit against several Birchwood defendantsBirchwood, its employees and Dr. Eric Cotter who administered care to the
deceased father.299 Miller's claims and/or theories of recovery were negligence,
wrongful death, "wilful, wanton, and reckless conduct," and "failure to obtain
informed consent." 3 °° On April 15, 2005, the Birchwood defendants filed an
answer-generally denying the allegations and advancing various defenses. Al288
289

863 N.E.2d 537 (Mass. 2007).
Id. at 540.

294

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

295

Id. at 540-41.
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Id. at 541.
Id. at 540.
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Id. at 541.
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Id.
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Id.
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so, citing the arbitration agreement, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration. 30 ' A superior court judge denied the motion,
and Cotter and the co-defendants appealed.3 °2
Before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the Birchwood defendants
argued: (1) federal and state statutes required the lower court to enforce the
arbitration agreement; and (2) the Superior Court judge "had no legal basis for
declining to enforce the arbitration agreement."30 3 Miller raised a procedural
unconscionability defense to the motion. 3" While conceding that he received a
signed copy of the arbitration agreement, Miller stated expressly: "[I] did not
read through all of [the] terms, word by word."30 5 Moreover, Miller highlighted
that he received a summary rather than a full explanation of the terms and
conditions in the arbitration agreement. 3" But even more importantly, Miller
impliedly suggested that he was unsophisticated or "functionally illiterate" because he did not fully understand the legal implications of signing a nonmandatory arbitration agreement.30 7
By many measures, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is a fairly
"liberal" tribunal, and is more inclined than most courts to protect the rights
and interests of actual and allegedly unsophisticated individuals. 30 8 However, in
Miller, the state supreme court refused to accept Miller's illiteracy-based, procedural unconscionability defense. 309 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court gave several reasons: (1) During his deposition, Miller revealed that he
understood the contractual terms; (2) he was "an intelligence officer in the
United States Air Force"; (3) he served twenty-seven years as a medical and
disability claims examiner or manager in the insurance industry; (4) he holds a
degree in English from prestigious Tufts University; 3 10 (5) "[He] was not re-

302

Id. at 542.
Id.

303

Id. at 540.

301

Id. at 541.
Id.
306 Id. ("Miller testified that during the admission meeting, [Birchwood's agent] 'summarized' the agreements, explaining to him that the arbitration agreement was not a precondition of admission, and that its purpose was to put disputes before an arbitrator rather than a
court. He further testified that he could not recall any specifics about the provisions of the
agreements ....He also testified that he was under great stress at the time of admission and
'just wanted to make sure that there was no problem getting dad admitted.'").
307 Id.
308 See Mark C. Miller, Lawmaker Attitudes Toward Court Reform In Massachusetts, 77
JUDICATURE 34, 38 (1993) (reporting that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
favorability and prestige ranked fifth among the top-ranked "liberal" and "highly activist
304
305

courts").
309 Miller, 863 N.E.2d at 545 ("Nothing in the setting of its execution suggests that the

agreement was procedurally unconscionable.").
310 Id. at 541.
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quired to sign the [arbitration] agreement as a condition of admission"; 31' and
(6) his failure to read the agreement "word-for-word" was immaterial, sinceabsent fraud-"a party's failure to read or understand a contract provision does
not free him from its obligations. ' 31 2 Ultimately, the Supreme Judicial Court
reversed the lower court's order and forced Miller to arbitrate his underlying
common-law and statutory claims.313
Like the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, California courts have a
long history of interpreting and applying legal principles liberally-insisting on
protecting the rights of "unsophisticated" persons.3 14 Some jurists, however,
have strongly asserted that California courts' mandatory-arbitration rulings are
315
unreasonably biased in favor of "unsophisticated" consumers and employees.
Is this assertion true? Part VI of this article carefully addresses this question.
But, for now, consider how the California Court of Appeals arguably "[split]
the difference" 316 in its decision in Lateral Link Group v. BLA Schwartz.317
The Lateral Link controversy is a classic example of a complex "case within
a case within a case," or a "trial within a trial within a trial."3 8 The relevant
facts in all three controversies, however, are simple. Lateral Link Group ("Lateral Link") is a limited liability company in California that "specializes in legal
311

Id. at 545.

312

Id.

313

Id. at 549.

314

Cf Josh Mulligan, Finding a Forum inthe Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated

Towns, and the Promise of Pruneyard, 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 533, 551 (2004)
("California courts have been highly liberal in finding a right to political speech in shopping
centers."); Diana Lauretta, Protecting the Child's Best Interest: Defending Second-Parent
Adoptions Granted Priorto the 2002 Enactment of CaliforniaAssembly Bill 25, 33 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 173, 200 (2003) (discussing California courts' liberal construction of adoption statutes); Farah Z. Usmani, Inequities in the Resolution of Securities Disputes: Individual or Class Action; Arbitration or Litigation, 7 FORDI AM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 193, 228-29
(2001) (discussing California courts' liberal position regarding class-action claims and the
enforcement of arbitration agreements).
315 See generally Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How The California Courts Are Circumventing The Federal Arbitration
Act, 3 HASTINGs Bus. L. J. 39, 62 (2006) ("Under the California approach, it appears that
[arbitration] agreements are procedurally unconscionable, irrespective of the particular circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement.").
316 Cf J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and Perils of
Split-The-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1970-71 (2006).
317 No. BC520905, 2014 WL 5500382 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2014).
318 See also Hecht, Solberg, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley v. Superior Court, 40
Cal.Rptr.3d 446, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) ("In conducting the 'trial-within-a-trial' of a legal
malpractice case, 'the goal is to decide what the result of the underlying proceeding or matter
should have been, an objective standard."') (quoting RONALD E.MALLEN & JEFFREY M.
SMITH, LEnAL MA!-PRACTICE § 33.1 (West, 2006 ed.)).
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recruiting."3" 9 Michael Allen (Allen) had a majority interest in the company
and T.J. Duane had a "40 percent ownership interest. 32" BLA Schwartz is a
John Komar,
Massachusetts professional legal corporation. 32' Attorneys
322
partners.
BLA's
are
Schwartz
Irwin
and
Cassie
Nicholas
In the course of events, a dispute arose between Allen and Duane (the
"Duane Dispute"), whereby Allen refused to purchase Duane's interest in Lat'
eral Link.323 The parties began to arbitrate an ownership "valuation dispute. "324
Allen hired BLS and Schwartz to represent Allen and the company's interests.12' An arbitration provision also appeared in the law firm and Allen's retainer agreement. It read in pertinent part:
In the event the parties to this agreement are unable, acting in good faith,
to resolve any such question or dispute, they agree to arbitrate the resulting dispute. After exhausting their good faith attempts to resolve their
question or dispute informally . .. the aggrieved party will serve on the
other party within ten (10) days a written demand for arbitration before the
American Arbitration Association (AAA). The parties agree that their disputes will be resolved by binding arbitration . . .in accordance with the
AAA commercial arbitration rules and expedited procedures then in effect,
except that in no event will the parties be entitled to conduct pre-hearing
'
discovery. "326
Ultimately, the private arbitrator-who resolved the Duane Dispute-forced
Lateral Link to purchase Duane's interest.3 27 In the wake of that disappointment, Allen and Lateral Link filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against
Schwartz-asserting that the law firm breached their fiduciary duties (the
"LegalMal Suit").3 28 In reply, BLS and Schwartz filed an action to compel arbitration of the legal-malpractice claim.329 Allen opposed the motion to compel
arbitration, asserting that the arbitration provision was substantively and procedurally unconscionable. 330 The trial court denied the attorneys' motion because:
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326

Lateral Link Group, 2014 WL 5500382, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.

327 Id. at *1 ("The arbitrator also awarded Duane $145,319.57 in attorney fees as a prevailing party against both Lateral Link and Allen.").
328 Id. ("Allen [argued] that he should not have been found personally liable for attorney

fees and that defendants otherwise provided him and Lateral Link with flawed advice
throughout the arbitration.").
329

Id.

Id. at *2 (Allen presented several reasons: "the malpractice claims were not subject to
the arbitration provision"; he signed the retainer agreement, understanding that the agree330
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(1)the retainer agreement was "slightly procedurally unconscionable"; (2) the
arbitration agreement was unenforceable; and (3) the agreement could not be
reformed to eliminate the extensive unconscionability. 33' BLS and Schwartz
appealed.
The California Court of Appeals resolved the dispute, but the analysis and
conclusion were convincing only in part. The AAA rules were not attached to
the signed contract; thus, in light of his ignorance about arbitration rules and
procedures, Allen argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable. 32 The
court of appeal rejected that defense and ruled:
Standing alone, [BLS Schwartz's] failure to attach AAA rules does not
support a procedural unconscionability finding.... [T]he rules are easily
accessible . . . on the Internet ....Furthermore, Allen, who is a Harvardeducated attorney and owns a legal placement firm, certainly... had the
333
ability to locate and retrieve a copy of the AAA rules from the Internet.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals continued its analysis and stressed that
BLS Schwartz's failure to attach a copy of arbitration rules could be an important factor, if the failure produced surprises. 334 Thus, the liberal court declared
that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because Allen
had been surprised. 335 Even so, Allen did not prevail and the California Court
of Appeal granted BLS Schwartz's motion and compelled arbitration.3 36 California Civil Code section 1670.5 (a)(3) permits a court to "limit the application
of any unconscionable clause [in order] to avoid any unconscionable result 3 3 7 - if a contract or any contractual provision was unconscionable at its
inception.338 Stated slightly differently, a trial court may sever or restrict an
unconscionable provision in a contract or may refuse to enforce the entire
agreement. 339 The California Appellate Court reviewed the "pre-hearing discovery" exception in BLS Schwartz's arbitration clause, declared that the exception did not permeate the entirety of the retainer agreement, 340 severed the
unconscionable exception and compelled arbitration. 34 1 However, in
ment "only covered fee disputes"; he was unaware that the arbitration provision covered
malpractice claims; the AAA rules were not attached to the agreement; and the arbitration
clause precluded "pre-hearing discovery.").
331

Id.

332

Id. at *6.

333 Id.
334 Id.at *7.
335

Id.
Id.
337 id. at 8;
336

338

CAl..

CIv.

CODE

§ 1670.5(a)(3) (West 1979).

Lateral Link Group, 2014 WL 5500382, at *8.

339 Id.
340 id. at *9.

Id. at *1 ("[Wle affirm the trial court's finding of unconscionability, but conclude that
the unconscionability may be cured through severance.").
341
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Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, 342 the California Supreme Court refused to sever an unconscionable arbitration provision and compel arbitration.34 3 Furthermore, the state supreme court decided the Armendariz
controversy without even considering or mentioning the employees' levels of
education or sophistication. 34
V.

JUDICIAL SPLITS OVER WHETHER A SUBSTANTIVE UNCONSCIONABILITY
CHALLENGE PRECLUDES ENFORCING ASYMMETRICAL AND
ALLEGEDLY "OVERLY BURDENSOME" COST-SHARING
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

To repeat, if aggrieving consumers or employees cannot prove both substantive and procedural unconscionability, many state supreme courts will enforce
arbitration agreements. 34 5 On the other hand, a sub-population of supreme
courts will invalidate arbitration agreements if unsophisticated consumers and
employees establish that the agreements are only substantively unconscionable.34 6 Additionally, courts weigh a variety of factors to determine whether an
arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable.347 For example, courts
have considered one or a combination of the following factors: (1) the fairness
of contractual terms; 3 4 1 (2) the severity of contractual terms' deviation from
prevailing standards, customs or practices within a particular industry; 349 (3)
the reasonableness of goods-and-services contract prices; 350 (4) "the commercial reasonableness of the contract terms"; 35' (5) "the purpose and effect of the
' 353
terms"; 352 and (6) "the allocation of risks between the parties.
Yet, state and federal courts are divided over three pressing and interrelated
questions: (1) whether "merely," "merely offensive," "unreasonably harsh" or
"shockingly objectionable" asymmetrical arbitration agreements preclude
mandatory arbitration; 354 (2) whether the FAA requires courts to apply a uni6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
Id. at 675, 695-699.
344 Id. at 693 (embracing the trial court's finding that "the arbitration agreement was [a
one-sided] 'adhesion contract'").
345 Id. at 690.
342

343

346
347

See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
See, e.g., Garrett v. Hooters-Toledo, 295 F. Supp. 2d 774, 779-80 (N.D. Ohio 2003)

(embracing the view that "no generally accepted list of factors has been developed [to prove

substantive] unconscionability").
348

Collins v. Click Camera and Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (Ohio Ct. App.

1993).
349 Id.
351

Id.
State ex rel. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Tucker, 729 S.E.2d 808, 812 (W. Va. 2012).

352

Id.

350

353 Id.
354 See discussion infra Part V.A.
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versal or a case-specific evidentiary standard to decide the enforceability of
supposedly "prohibitively expensive" and "unconscionable" costs-sharing
agreements-fee-splitting, cost-splitting, fee-shifting and cost-shifting
clauses;3 5 and (3) whether allegedly "prohibitively expensive" cost-sharing
fees must be "slightly," "moderately" or "shockingly" greater than litigation
costs, employees' annual wages, or consumers' expenditures for non-conforming goods and services. 356 Below, the scope and depth of the conflicts surrounding these questions are discussed.
A.

Judicial Conflict Over the Proper Standardfor Determining Whether
Asymmetrical ArbitrationAgreements Are Substantively
Unconscionable Under the FAA

Briefly, consider three settled common-law principles: (1) judges may not
rewrite contractual parties' obligations or force the parties to embrace judgemade terms;357 (2) judges sitting in equity, however, may reform or rewrite
contracts to state correctly the parties' true agreements and intentions; 358 and
(3) courts of law and equity may refuse to enforce unreasonably or oppressively
one-sided contractual terms.359 In Concepcion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
those principles and stressed that unconscionable arbitration agreements are not
enforceable. 3 °
The Concepcion Court also stressed that the FAA-rather than the Court's
policies-places limitations on the applicability of an unconscionability chal355 See, e.g., Scovill v. WSYX/ABC, 425 F.3d 1012, 1021 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[The controversial] provision.., in Morrison was a cost-splitting provision [which] ... would have...
required [the employees] to pay 3% of his/her salary while the employer would pay ... the
rest of the costs of arbitration. In this case, the provision is a cost-shifting [requirement],
which is arguably more of a deterrent [for] potential litigants [because they] may have to
bear the entire costs if they are unsuccessful. Consequently, we ... [hold] that such a provision would deter a substantial number of litigants in the plaintiff's position." (citing Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003))).
356 See discussion infra Part V.B.
357 See, e.g., Brekken. v. Reader's Digest Special Products, Inc., 353 F.2d 505, 506 (7th
Cir. 1965); Rogers v. First Tennessee Bank Nat. Ass'n., 738 S.W.2d 635, 642 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1987); Wilson v. Scott, 672 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
358 See Maher v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 283, 291 (1876) ("It is in the power of a
court of equity... [to] reform and rewrite the contract .... ").
359 See, e.g., Daley v. People's Building, Loan & Savings Ass'n, 59 N.E. 452, 453 (Mass.
1901) (Holmes, J.) ("Courts are less and less disposed to interfere with parties making ...
contracts as they choose, so long as they interfere with no one's welfare but their own.... It
will be understood that we are speaking of parties standing in an equal position where
neither has any oppressive advantage or power .... ").
360 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 and
reiterating that arbitration agreements may be invalidated "upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract").
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lenge if: (1) state courts apply a facially discriminatory unconscionability rule
to circumvent arbitration; 36 1 or (2) courts apply a facially nondiscriminatory
procedural rule, which seriously interferes with the "fundamental attributes of
arbitration": "lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to
choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes." 362 Put simply, Con-

cepcion prevents unconscionability challenges which disproportionately affect
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.363
Moreover, Concepcion also raises an arguably novel question of whether
state and federal courts may apply unconscionability rules to address an oppressively harsh condition that does not arise "uniquely in the context of arbitration.' 364 For example, both ordinary contracts-like insurance policies-and
arbitration agreements are often asymmetrical.365 The overwhelming majority
of "liberal" and "conservative" courts also embrace the view that contracts generally and arbitration agreements specifically are not substantively unconscionable merely because they are asymmetrical.36 6 Concepcion however, requires
courts to apply state-law principles of contract. Thus, an even more heated
question has evolved: whether plaintiffs/respondents must satisfy a minimumlow, moderate-medium, or a stringent-high evidentiary standard to establish
367
that an asymmetrical arbitral agreement is substantively unconscionable.
This latter debate has emerged in part because the FAA does not identify
the type of probative evidence that a plaintiff/respondent must present to defeat
361
362

Id. at 1748.
Id. at 1748, 1751.

Id. at 1747.
See, e.g., Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 201 (Cal. 2013) ("[S]tatelaw rules that do not 'interfere[ ] with fundamental attributes of arbitration' do not implicate
Concepcion's limits on state unconscionability rules. As our cases have held, such rules may
Moreover, there are other
address issues that arise uniquely in the context of arbitration ....
ways an arbitration agreement may be unconscionable that have nothing to do with fundamental attributes of arbitration.").
365 Compare Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 62 P.3d 69, 80-81
(Cal. 2003) ("An insurance contract is often an asymmetrical relationship: an insured will
have fully performed, paying premiums to the insurer, long before the insurer is called on to
perform at all."), with Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding an unconscionable asymmetrical arbitration agreement because the employer granted to itself powers to unilaterally modify the contract and "proscribes an employee's
[rights]").
366 See, e.g., Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development, 282 P.3d
1217, 1231 (Cal. 2012); Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 174
(Wis. 2003); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000);
Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 457 N.E.2d 1226, 1232 (Il. 1983); Ting v. AT&T,
319 F.3d 1126, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2003); First Family Financial Services, Inc. v. Fairley, 173
F.Supp.2d 565, 572 (S.D. Miss. 2001); Pridgen v. Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp., 88
F.Supp.2d 655, 659 (S.D. Miss. 2000).
367 See discussion infra notes 373-407.
363

364
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a motion to compel arbitration. 368 Clearly, a party may not invalidate an arbitration provision merely by raising a general denial. 369 Furthermore, the defending
party's evidence may not be speculative. 370 Instead, specific evidence is re37
quired to establish a successful substantive unconscionability challenge. '
Moreover, if a challenger's evidence is specific, the central question still remains whether courts must apply a universal standard or a particular test to
determine whether more-than-merely asymmetrical arbitration agreements are
substantively unconscionable.
Courts employ a variety of loosely-defined and contentious equitable doc37 2
trines to determine the enforceability of one-sided arbitration provisions.
Consequently, decidedly conflicting inter-state rules as well as inter-circuit decisions have emerged. For example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina declared that a merely "one-sided" arbitration agreement may be substantively
unconscionable. 373 However, the Supreme Courts of Alabama and West Virginia have adopted stricter standards, concluding-respectively-that only "inherently unfair or oppressive, 374 or unreasonably "one-sided"37 arbitration
368 See Johnson v. Orkin, LLC, 928 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1001 (N.D. II1. 2013) ("The FAA
does not expressly identify the evidentiary standard that a party ... must meet. Most [federal] [c]ourts of [a]ppeals that have examined the issue ...analogized the standard to be
applied when adjudicating the validity of an arbitration agreement to the standard imposed
on a party [who opposes] a motion for summary judgment [under] Rule 56(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."). See, e.g., Control Screening LLC v. Technological Application
& Prod. Co., HCMC-Vietnam, 687 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2012); Hancock v. Am. Tel. &
Tel. Co., Inc., 701 F.3d 1248, 1261 (10th Cir. 2012); Wachovia Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. VCG
Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 661 F.3d 164, 172 (2d Cir. 2011); Mazera v. Varsity Ford Mgmt. Servs., 565 F.3d 997, 1001 (6th Cir. 2009); Aliron Int'l, Inc. v. Cherokee
Nation Indust., Inc., 531 F.3d 863, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d
728, 735 (7th Cir. 2002); Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d
1148, 1154 (5th Cir. 1992).
369 Johnson, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.

370 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000).
371 Johnson, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
372 Cf.Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 212 (Cal. 2013) ('The core of
Justice Chin's dissent is his contention that the arbitration agreement.., is not unconscionable .... Justice Chin says we have improperly relaxed the unconscionability standard by
using the phrase 'unreasonably one-sided' instead of 'so one-sided as to shock the conscience.' . . . But an examination of the case law does not indicate that 'shock the conscience' ... is the one true, authoritative standard for substantive unconscionability, exclusive of all others.").
373 See Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 372 (N.C. 2008) (ruling in favor of borrowers and declaring that the merely one-sided arbitration clause in the
loan agreement was substantively unconscionable because the arbitration clause preserved
lenders' ability "to pursue its claims in court while denying plaintiffs that same option").
374 See ex parte McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592, 597 (Ala. 1998) (implicitly embracing the
proposition that one-sided arbitration clauses are substantively unconscionable only if they
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clauses are substantively unconscionable.
Among federal courts in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the disagreement is
also pronounced. For instance, applying Louisiana's law, a federal district court
ruled in favor of unsophisticated cellular-phone consumers-declaring that
Cingular Wireless's one-sided arbitration agreements were substantively unconscionable because they were less than "good faith" agreements. 376 Applying
California's law, the Ninth Circuit decided in favor of employees, concluding
that an asymmetrical arbitration provision in Circuit City's employment contract was
unconscionable because the provisions were "unduly harsh or oppres7
sive.

, 37

In contrast, applying Alabama's law, the Fifth Circuit decided against unsophisticated borrowers and compelled arbitration-concluding that the lender's
alleged "patently unfair and unreasonable" asymmetrical arbitral agreements
were not substantively unconscionable. 37 8 And, applying Mississippi's law, a
federal district court ruled against a borrower and compelled arbitration. 379 The
are "inherently unfair or oppressive," deciding against the employee, and declaring that the
arbitration agreement-which required the employee to submit employment-related claims

to arbitration, but allowed the employer to choose an arbitral or judicial forum-was not
substantively unconscionable).
375 See Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 553, 558 (W. Va. 2012)
(ruling in favor of the consumers/homeowners who purchased a home that contained an
illegal septic system and declaring that the unreasonably "one-sided" arbitration clause was
substantively unconscionable because the clause barred the homeowners "from initiating any
proceeding or action whatsoever in connection with this Agreement," while allowing DRB
"to seek arbitration or to file an action for damages").
376 See Iberia Credit Bureau Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, 379 F.3d 159, 169-171 (5th Cir.
2004) (deciding in favor of Louisiana cellular-phone consumers and declaring that the onesided arbitration agreements were substantively unconscionable because they were not made
in good faith and they required the wireless customers to arbitrate, without imposing a reciprocal duty on Cingular Wireless).
377 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002) (deciding in
favor of employees, and declaring that Circuit City's "unduly harsh or oppressive" one-sided
arbitration agreements was substantively unconscionable, because the agreement required
employees to submit all claims and disputes to binding arbitration while releasing Circuit
City from a contractual duty to arbitrate any claims against employees (citing Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000))).
378 See Goodwin v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 970 F. Supp. 1007, 1012-1013 (M.D. Ala.
1997) (deciding against consumers, declaring that one-sided arbitration clauses are substantively unconscionable if the clauses are "so patently unfair and unreasonable," and deciding
against borrowers, because the arbitration agreements in the installment sales contractswhich required the borrowers to arbitrate all plausible federal and state claims against Ford
Motor FMCC and allowed Ford to seek judicial remedies-were not substantively unconscionable).
311 See Pridgen v. Green Tree Fin. Serv. Corp., 88 F.Supp.2d 655, 658, 659 (S.D. Miss.
2000) (deciding against the borrower, finding that Green Tree had an option to sue in court
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borrower argued that the one-sided arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable, but' the federal judge rejected that defense because the clause was not
"oppressive. 380

Even more surprising, in large states, purportedly "pro-consumer" and "proemployee" supreme courts have not fashioned a universal or straightforward
standard to decide whether one-sided arbitration provisions are substantively
unconscionable. To illustrate, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin crafted a circular declaration, stating that asymmetrical arbitration agreements are substantively unconscionable if they are unconscionably "one-sided." 38' And, on another occasion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded: one-sided arbitration
clauses are substantively unconscionable if they are "broad and overly one82
sided.

3

Within the span of fifteen years, the California Supreme Court fashioned
three supposedly bright-line evidentiary standards to determine substantive unconscionability. 383 Between 2000 and 2003, the California Supreme Court stated and reaffirmed the principle that arbitration agreements in employment contracts are substantively unconscionable if they are "unfairly one-sided,
[without] a modicum of bilaterality. ' 384 However, in 2012, the Supreme Court
of California crafted a stricter standard-pronouncing that arbitration provisions in services contracts are substantively unconscionable if the clauses are
or to submit a claim to arbitration, finding that the borrower had to arbitrate any claim
arising from the loan contract, and declaring that the one-sided arbitration clause in the loan
agreement was not substantively unconscionable, because the unsophisticated borrower
failed to prove that the clause was "oppressive").
380 Id. at 658.
381 See Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 174 (Wis. 2006)
(ruling in favor of the borrowers and declaring that "[tihe unconscionable one-sidedness of
the arbitration provision [was] sufficient" to establish a substantively unconscionable and
burdensome arbitration provision, which required borrowers to litigate similar, identical or
intertwined claims twice-once before a circuit court and again before an arbitrator).
382 See id. at 175-176 (ruling in favor of an indigent borrower and declaring that the
broad and overly one-sided arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable because the
provision allowed Wisconsin Auto Title Loans to have full access to the courts without
requiring of arbitration, while requiring the borrower to arbitrate).
383 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000) (deciding in favor of employees and declaring that the arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable because it was "unfairly one-sided," without a "modicum of bilaterality"imposing on employees a duty to arbitrate their claims, without imposing a similar duty on
employers when they file claims against employees); Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d
979, 984 (Cal. 2003) (ultimately deciding against an employee, forcing the employee to
arbitrate employment-discrimination claims, but declaring that the ultimately severed arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable because (1) it was "unfairly one-sided, [without a] modicum of bilaterality," and (2) a $50,000 threshold for an arbitration appeal, which
decidedly favored defendants in employment contract disputes).
384 Little, 63 P.3d at 984; Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 692.
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"so one-sided as to shock the conscience ' 385 And, in 2013, the court abandoned
the strict standard and adopted an arguably intermediate standard-declaring
that an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable if it is "unreason3 86
ably one-sided" in favor of an employer.
Historically, and by several measures, the California Supreme Court is a
highly respected judicial powerhouse. 387 Its consistently insightful analyses and
rulings often protect the rights and interests of ordinary consumers and employees. 388 But, even more importantly, the esteemed and highest court in California
has been proactive, seizing opportunities to fashion intelligible legal standards
389
which lend themselves to commonsensical and relatively predictable rulings.
Yet, the Supreme Court of California has not taken advantage of several opportunities to craft a commonsensical universal standard to determine whether an
390
asymmetrical arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable.
Following the California Supreme Court's decisions, other courts have developed competing standards in mandatory-arbitration hearings.3 9' For in385 See Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development, 282 P.3d 1217,

1232-1234 (Cal. 2012) (deciding in favor of a homeowners' association, finding that a onesided arbitration clause required construction disputes to be arbitrated, but precluded the
association's right to fully recover damages, and declaring that the one-sided provision was
substantively unconscionable because it "shocks the conscience.").
386 See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 203, 205, 211 (Cal. 2013)
("[T]he unconscionability doctrine does not mandate the adoption of any particular form of
dispute resolution mechanism, and courts may not decline to enforce an arbitration agreement simply on the ground that it appears to be a bad bargain or that one party could have
done better. The unconscionability doctrine is instead concerned with whether the agreement
is unreasonably favorable to one party, considering in context 'its commercial setting, purpose, and effect."').
387 Cf Robin B. Johansen, The New Federalism: Toward a PrincipledInterpretationof
the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 300-301 (1977) ("[Tihe California Supreme
Court is respected for the quality of its decisions and its leadership in many fields, and
because it has been at the center of much of the independent interpretation debate .....
388 Cf id.

Cf David J. Szwak, Louisiana Premises Liability in the Post-Cates v. Beauregard
Electric Cooperative Era, 53 La. L. R.v. 1935, 1951 (1993) ("The California Supreme
Court [has been] well respected for the creative legal models set forth in their jurisprudence ....").
390 See, e.g., Sonic-Calabasas, 311 P.3d at 213 ("It is enough to observe that courts,
including ours, have used various nonexclusive formulations to capture the notion that unconscionability requires a substantial degree of unfairness beyond 'a simple old-fashioned
bad bargain.' . . . [W]hether 'shock the conscience' has a different meaning than 'unreasonably one-sided,' . . . [whether one or the other] should be the exclusive formulation of substantive unconscionability ... whether these different formulations actually constitute different standards in practice, and whether one is more objective than the other are issues that
have not been briefed and are not before us.").
391 See discussion infra notes 373-383.
389

UNCONSCIONABLE JUDICIAL DISDAIN

2016]

stance, in the span of a ten-year period, some appellate courts applied the
"shock-the-conscience" test.3 92 However, during the same period, other appellate courts in California relied heavily on the "overly harsh or oppressive" standard3 3 to decide whether to enforce or invalidate a one-sided arbitration agreement. Furthermore,
some of the same appellate courts also applied the "unfairly
94
3

one-sided" test.

However, the California Supreme Court concluded in Sonic-Calabasas:
"[C]ase law does not indicate that 'shock the conscience' is a different standard
in practice than other formulations or that it is the one true, authoritative stan'
dard for substantive unconscionability, exclusive of all others."395
But consider
the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District's motion-to-compelarbitration ruling in Kinney v. United HealthCareServices, Inc. 396 A controversial one-sided arbitral agreement forced employees to arbitrate their claimswhile permitting the employer to litigate claims against the employees in courts
of law. 397 Deciding in favor of the employee, the Kinney court declared that the
one-sided arbitration clause398 was substantively unconscionable because it
"[shocked] the conscience.
However, four and nine years after Kinney, the California Court of Appeal
for the Second District decided-respectively-Martinez v. Master Protection
Corporation399 and Roman v. Superior Court.4° ° In both of the latter cases, the
arbitral disputes were essentially identical: An arbitration provision in an employment contract and another one in an employment application permitted employers to litigate common-law and statutory claims in courts of law, while
forcing employees to arbitrate such claims. 41 Like the Kinney employee, the
worker in Martinez prevailed: The Second District Court of Appeals declared
that the arbitration agreement was shockingly "one-sided," and therefore sub392

See, e.g., Bigler v. Harker Sch., 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 78, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); Mission

Viejo Emergency Medical Associates v. Beta Healthcare Group, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 330,
339-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 533,
541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Kinney v. United HealthCare Serv., 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 353-54
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
391 See, e.g., Zullo v. Superior Court, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 461, 467-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011);

Harper v. Ultimo, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 418, 422-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc.,
60 Cal.Rptr.2d 138, 145, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
39 See, e.g., Olvera v. El Polio Loco, Inc., 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 65, 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009);

Martinez v. Master Protection Corp., 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 663, 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
395
396

Sonic-Calabasas,311 P.3d at 212.
83 Cal.Rptr.2d 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).

Id. at 353-54.
Id.
399 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
4o 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 (2009).
401 See Martinez, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d, at 668; Roman, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d at 157.
397

398
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stantively unconscionable.4 ° 2 The worker in Roman did not prevail. 4°3 Yet, in
Roman, the same court reviewed an identical one-sided arbitration clause, refused to declare that the clause "[shocked] the conscience," and granted the
employer's motion to compel arbitration. n
Although the California Court of Appeal referenced and considered the
"shock the conscience" doctrine, the court still declared that the one-sided arbitration provision was not substantively unconscionable.40 5 Intuitively, something is amiss, because the California Supreme Court permits lower courts to
weigh various types of imprecisely defined evidentiary standards-"unfairly
one-sided," "unreasonably one-sided," "harshly one-sided," "oppressively onesided," "shockingly one-sided," and "unconscionably one-sided"-to decide
whether arbitration clauses are substantively unconscionable. 0 6
Substantive Unconscionability and Conflicting Evidentiary Standardsfor
Determining "Prohibitively Expensive" Arbitral Costs Under the FAA

B.

Numerous seasoned practitioners and jurists embrace the view: A "strong
judicial policy" favors arbitration over litigation because (1) "arbitration is
less expensive and more expeditious than litigation";4 7 and (2) arbitration "relieves court congestion.""4 8 Those supposed truths, however, have been challenged. For example, while sitting on the California Supreme Court, the Honorable Associate Justice Marvin R. Baxter made several keen observations. He
wrote:
[I must respond] to the majority's assumption that arbitration is less costly than a judicial proceeding .... Arbitrator's fees for one leading arbitration service in this state are typically in the $350 to $500 per hour range!
In addition, there may be filing or service fees ... ,fees for discovery, and
See Martinez, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d, at 668; Roman, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d at 157.
Roman, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d at 157, 160, 163 (citing Kinney v. United HealthCare Services, Inc., 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 (1999)).
404 Id.
405 Id.
402
403

406

See, e.g., Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 213 (Cal. 2013) ("[Our

lower courts] have used various nonexclusive formulations to capture the notion [of substantive] unconscionability .... [Thus], whether 'shock the conscience' has a different meaning
than 'unreasonably one-sided' . . . [is not before this court].").

407 Hawkins v. Superior Court, 152 Cal.Rptr. 491, 493 (1979). See also Hooters of
America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir.1999) ("The benefits of arbitration are
widely recognized .... The arbitration of disputes enables parties to avoid the costs associated with pursuing a judicial resolution of their grievances. By one estimate, litigating a typical
employment dispute costs at least $50,000 and takes two and one-half years to resolve.");
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1999)
("[A]rbitration is often far more affordable to plaintiffs and defendants alike than is pursuing
a claim in court.").
408 Id.
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fees for written findings and expedited hearings. That expense and the
expenses of the arbitrator or arbitrators ... must be shared by the parties.
The arbitrator's fees ... [also] include prehearing conferences which the
arbitrator or a party may require, mediation or settlement conferences
which may be ordered, and the time devoted to preparation of the
award.4"
Even more importantly, six years after Justice Baxter's observations, the Supreme Court decided Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph.4 10 Chief Justice
Rehnquist-who penned Randolph-was a fairly conservative justice.4 11 Yet,
in Randolph, the Chief Justice echoed Associate Justice Baxter's concerns
about requiring unsophisticated and economically inferior consumers and employees to bear burdensome or excessive arbitration costs. 4 12 Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist declared that an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable and therefore unenforceable, if it generates "large arbitration costs [which] ...preclude a litigant ...from effectively vindicating her
federal statutory rights in [an] arbitral forum."4 '13 On the other hand, the Chief
Justice also cautioned that an employee or consumer must prove the "likelihood
of incurring such costs" to invalidate an arbitration agreement for reasons of
prohibitive expense.4 14
The Randolph Court, however, did not fashion an objective or universal
standard to determine whether arbitral fees and expenses are prohibitively burdensome. 415 This omission is problematic for several important reasons: (1) the
overwhelming majority of arbitration agreements require disgruntled consumers to travel out of state to arbitrate claims against sellers of goods and services;416 (2) in recent years, arbitrators have charged between $1,308 and
409 Moore v. Conliffe, 871 P.2d 204, 225-226 (Cal. 1994) (Baxter, J., dissenting) (citing
Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, Inc., J.A.M.S. RuLES OF

PRACTICE

&

PROCEDURE

(1992), then citing American Arbitration Association, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES
(1992)).
410 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
411 See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, Conservatives' Selective Use of Race In The Law, 19
HARV.

J.L. & PUB. PoL'y 719, 719 (1996) ("[L]eading conservatives, including Chief Justice

Rehnquist and Associate Justices Scalia and Thomas, have been hawks in the war against
affirmative action.").
412 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
413 Id. at 90.
414 Id. at 92.
415 Id. ("How detailed the showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party seeking arbitration must come forward with contrary evidence is a matter we need not discuss.").
James Zimmerman, Restrictions On Forum-Selection Clauses In Franchise Agreements and The FederalArbitration Act: Is State Law Preempted?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 759,
416

760 (1998) ("The use of forum-selection clauses in contracts continues to increase. Emboldened by the Supreme Court's endorsement of forum-selection clauses, large companies now
frequently use these clauses in a variety of contracts.... Often ...a party inserts a forum-
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$1,800 per day in states like Indiana, Colorado, Ohio and Illinois;417 (3) "the
average daily fee does not necessarily reflect the likely cost to arbitrate"; 4 8 and
(4) depending on the complexity of a dispute, arbitrators may set a forum fee
"as high as $3,000 per day [or] tens of thousands of dollars per case. 4 19
In 2014, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported the median weekly earnings
was just $791 for the 106 million full-time, wage-and-salary employees.42 °
Low-level employees-individuals who purchase the bulk of sellers' goods and
services-earned a $41,132 annual salary.42 ' Even more telling, small claims
courts are found in every state.422 California, Illinois, Minnesota, Texas and
seven other states allow consumers and workers to file small claims to collect
damages between $10,000 and $15,000.423 In Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, and New Jersey's small-claims courts, successful
claimants may collect between $2,500 and $4,000 in damages.424 The remaining courts allow plaintiffs to file small claims and secure damages between
$4,000 and $10,000.425
As of this writing, a disgruntled consumer in Texas must pay a $61 filing fee
selection clause to limit liability by increasing the barriers to litigation or arbitration. Typically, . . . the other party to the contract, if seeking redress for a breach of the contract, must
travel to a distant and unfamiliar jurisdiction to have the claim heard, often before the opposing party's 'home court.' When the party seeking redress is unsophisticated and has no
wealth of resources, the costs associated with bringing a suit can be prohibitive. Thus, the
party inserting the forum-selection clause is less likely to be sued or held liable for a
breach.").
417 See Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., 995 F.Supp. 2d 1057, 1063 (E.D. Mo. 2014).
418 Id.
419 See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st
Cir. 1999).
420 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Median Weekly Earnings of Full-Time Wage and Salary
Workers by Detailed Occupation and Sex (2009), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.htm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2015).
421 See FREIE ADvIcE, Small Claims Court Links to Each State, http://
www.freeadvice.com/resources/smallclaimscourts.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). In California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode, South
Dakota, Texas and Utah complainants may file actions in small claims courts to secure damages between $10,000 and $15,000. Id. Depending upon the counties in Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin plaintiffs may also file $10,000 claims. Id. On the other hand, in
Tennessee and depending on the county, a consumer may file a $15,000 or $25,000 action in
a small claims court. Id. In twenty-seven states, disgruntled employees and consumers may
sue to collect between $5,000 and $9,999 in small claims courts. Id. However, in Alabama,
Arizona, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, and New Jersey, claimants may only file
actions in small claims courts to secure damages between $2,500 and $4,000. Id.
422

Id.

423 Id.

424 Id.
425 Id.
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to initiate a $10,000 action in a small claims court.4 26 In Oregon, the filing fee
is $158 to file a $10,000 small-claims complaint.42 In contrast, under its present rules and procedures, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) requires low-compensated consumers to pay a $200 non-refundable filing fee if
the consumers file a $10,000 or less arbitral claim. 28 Additionally, AAA's
rules state: An arbitrator must receive $1,500 per day, if the arbitrator conducts
an "in-person or telephonic hearing. ' 429 The fee drops to $750 per case, if an
arbitrator conducts a "desk arbitration/documents only hearing."4 3 Similarly,
the AAA requires unskilled-to-skilled employees to pay a $200 nonrefundable
filing fee. 431 And, an employer must pay $1,350 and $1,800-respectively-for
single-member and three-member panels, if an employee files a claim against
an employer for, say, $75,000 or $400,000.432
Nevertheless, some corporate executives, financial brokers, business owners
and federal judges insist arbitration is more affordable than litigation for all
parties-mega-corporations, large and profitable vendors, employers, unsophisticated consumers and low-pay employees.43 3 Undeniably, if a financial advisor, a merchant or an employer is a defendant in a mass-tort or class-action
lawsuit, litigation costs would exceed the cost of arbitration.4 34 But, as dissent426 Texas Small Claim Court, http://www.dallascounty.org/department/jpcourts/3-1/
smallclaims.php. (last visited Apr. 30, 2015).
427

See Oregon Judicial Department, Circuit Court Fee Schedule (2015), http://

courts.oregon.gov/OJD/docs/courts/circuitlFeeSchedulePublic.pdf.
428 American Arbitration Association, Costs of Arbitration Including AAA Administrative
Fees, https://www.adr.org/aaa (last visited Apr. 30, 2015).
429
430
431

Id.
Id.
Id.

432 Id. Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, American Arbitration
Association <https://www.adr.org/aaa> (Last visited: May 1, 2015); Costs of Arbitration Including AAA Administrative Fees, American Arbitration Association <https://www.adr.org/
aaa> (Last visited: April 30, 2015).
433 See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1,
15-16 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[Airbitration is ... more affordable [for] plaintiffs and defendants
alike than . . . pursuing a claim in court."); Daisy Maxey, "Public" Arbitration? Brokers
Balk - Given Druthers, Wall Street Says System Was Fine;Anything But the Courts, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 8, 2010, at ClI ("[A representative of] the Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association [stated that] ... the arbitration system is fair, cost-effective and works
to protect investors .... Some lawyers who represent investors are pushing for an end to
mandatory arbitration altogether, and letting wronged investors take their cases directly to
the courts. [Brokers allege that such] a move would mean high litigation costs .... ").
431 Cf NFIB Small Business Legal Center Argues that National Policy Should Trump
State Law on ArbitrationAgreement, TARcI-Mmo NEws Si-Rvicu, Feb. 23, 2015 ("Small business owners don't have the resources to monitor the ever-changing law of arbitration in each
state they do business with .... This is important because arbitration agreements are intended to avoid unnecessary litigation costs.").
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ing Justice Baxter keenly noted, "[arbitration is not less expensive for a] consumer who, but for [an] arbitration clause in a contract, would resolve a claim
in [a] small claims court, or represent himself or herself in [a] municipal or
superior court.

4 35

Furthermore, arbitral costs can exceed litigation costs436 if (1) legally unso-

phisticated employees and consumers retain highly experienced and expensive

attorneys to handle complex employment-related or consumer-protection disputes;4 37 (2) plaintiffs' attorneys hire experts who often charge "$150 to $300
per hour-plus expenses" ;4 3 1 (3) an arbitration agreement contains a "fee-splitting" provision, which requires employees to share or "split" arbitration
costs;

439

or (4) an arbitral "fee-shifting" or "loser-pays" clause requires an un-

successful employee to pay a prevailing employer's arbitration expenses and
431 Moore v. Conliffe, 871 P.2d 204, 225-226 (Cal. 1994) (Baxter, J.dissenting).
436

See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003) (reaffirm-

ing that an alternative to a judicial forum-arbitration-must be accessible as well as effective and noting that "a plaintiff [who has been] forced to arbitrate a typical $60,000 employment discrimination claim will incur costs that range from three to nearly fifty times the
basic costs of litigating in a judicial forum, rather than in an arbitral forums" (citing PUBLIC
CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 40-42 (2002))).
131 See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 267, 272-273 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (declaring that an arbitral cost provision was substantively unconscionable and affirming the trial court's conclusion that complainants would have had to expend more than
$10,000--exclusive of attorney fees-to have a multiple-claims class action arbitrated); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 367-68 (N.C. 2008) (finding that
the plaintiffs and other similarly situated borrowers' limited financial resources precluded
the hiring of an hourly compensated attorney and stressing that the financially strapped complainants' entering forming a contingency fee agreement with lawyers-who were willing to
advance arbitral costs and expenses and assume the risk of no recovery-was the only realistic means for such consumers to arbitrate their claims).
438 See, e.g., Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 368 ("To successfully prosecute a complex case,
including a class action such as this one, a law firm would likely need the assistance of
expert witnesses. The hourly fees of experts in the fields of economics, lending practices,
and credit insurance can [be fairly expensive]."); Seth L. Lipner, Is Arbitration Really
Cheaper?, FORBES, JUL. 14, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/14/lipner-arbitration-litigation-intelligent-investing-cost.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2015) ("The other big expense in
a securities case is retaining the services of an 'expert witness' to analyze the account and
testify on technical matters. The cost of an expert can range from a few thousand dollars to
tens of thousands, depending on the kind of case and the kind of expert. Some attorneys will
advance all these case expenses, while others require their clients to pay the expenses as the
case goes along. Either way, the client is responsible to pay these fees eventually, so these
are real costs. [T]he need to hire an expert witness .. . exists both in arbitration and
court ....").

Cf. Maldonado v. Mattress Firm, Inc., No. 8:13-cv-292-T-33AEP, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 58742, at * 18 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2013) (holding that the fee-splittinG provision in
the arbitration agreement was enforceable even though the employee filed a claim under the
Fair Labor Standards Act).
439
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fees.440
Therefore, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Randolph, some courts
embrace the principle that mandatory arbitration clauses are substantively un4
conscionable per se if they force employees to pay any arbitration costs. 41
Most state and federal courts, however, endorse that an arbitration clause might
be substantively unconscionable if it makes arbitration "prohibitively expensive" for low-wage workers or consumers. 442 Generally, if an individual wants
to avoid "prohibitively expensive" arbitration proceedings, she must prove
three undisputed elements: (1) the total cost of arbitration-presenting specific
evidentiary facts rather assumed or speculative facts;44 3 (2) indigency-offering specific evidence of one's financial hardship, inability to pay arbitration
cost, income, and assets;' and (3) an inability to waive, reduce or defer alleg440 Cf. Hernandez v. Colonial Grocers, Inc., 124 So.3d 408, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2013) (declaring the fee-shifting clause in the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the fee-shifting provision undermined the remedial purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which allows prevailing employees rather than employers to recover attorney's
fees and costs).
441 See, e.g., Cheroti v. Harvey & Madding, Inc., No. HG10500986, 2014 WL 1395564,
at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. April 10, 2014) ("Outside of employment claims, . . . [no] California
decision has found that an arbitration clause requiring a plaintiff to pay arbitration costs is
per se unconscionable."); Holley v. Cochran Firm, No. B201114, 2009 WL 606725, at *9
(Cal. Ct. App. March 11, 2009) (reaffirming the view that "an arbitration provision in the
written employment which requires an employee to bear any costs is per se unconscionable"); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 456 P.3d 669, 765 (Cal. 2000)
("[W]hen an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, the
arbitration agreement or arbitration process cannot generally require the employee to bear
any type of expense that the employee would not be required to bear if he or she were free to
bring the action in court."); Cole v. Bums Intern. Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, t482 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
442 Compare Franco v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc., 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 530, 554 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2012) ("[M]ost courts interpreting [Randolph] have.., arrived at divergent meanings
of the 'prohibitively expensive' standard [established in Randolph]. Some courts have interpreted that term narrowly.... Other courts have held that [Randolph] ...requires a case-bycase analysis based on such factors as the employee's ability to pay the arbitration fees and
the differential between projected arbitration and litigation fees." ), with Brady v. Williams
Capital Group, L.P., 928 N.E.2d 383, 388 (N.Y. 2010) (reiterating that the inquiry should at
minimum consider: "(1) whether the litigant can pay the arbitration fees and costs; (2) what
is the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court; and (3) whether
the cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims in the arbitral forum").
43 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000); Harrington
v. Pulte Home Corp., 119 P.3d 1044, 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
44 See Clark v. Renaissance West, LLC, 307 P.3d 77, 80 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) ("[A]
party must make a specific, individualized showing as to why he or she would be financially
unable to bear the costs of arbitration. This evidence must consist of more than conclusory
allegations stating a person is unable to pay the costs of arbitration. Rather, parties must
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44 5
edly excessive arbitration costs.

The Randolph Court, however, did not fashion precise evidentiary standards
to prove each element of a "prohibitively expensive" defense." 6 In response,
two developments have emerged: (1) state and federal courts continually craft
and apply an inordinate number of divergent evidentiary standards to determine
whether arbitration is "prohibitively expensive,"" 7 and (2) many legally unsophisticated employees and consumers are precluded from satisfying or even
comprehending those bewildering arbitral standards-without purchasing legal
advice.

44 8

To help demonstrate the arguably exorbitant number of competing arbitral
standards, consider the question: What evidentiary proof must complaining
consumers and employees present to prove the "total cost of arbitration"? One
court crafted an arguably bright-line standard and stated: Arbitral costs must be
computed from the vantage point of unsophisticated consumers and less powerful employees-weighing heavily those individuals' daily cost-of-living expenses. 449 Most courts, however, reject an application of a bright-line test. Citing the language in Randolph, these latter courts assess total arbitral costs on a
case-by-case basis.45o
show that based on their specific income/assets, they are unable to pay the likely costs of
arbitration.").
445 Compare id. (finding that the arbitration clause was still substantively unconscionable
even though the movant waived conditionally some of the arbitral fees), with Jones v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 640 F.Supp. 2d 1124, 1134 (D. Ariz. 2009) (finding that arbitration fee was
not substantively unconscionable under Arizona law in part because arbitration rules referenced in arbitration agreement provided for waiver and deferral of fees based on financial
hardship).
446 Randolph, 531 U.S. at 92. See also Harrington, 119 P.3d at 1055 (explaining that the
question-whether arbitration is prohibitively expensive-is a question of fact, requiring an
examination of the unique circumstances of each case).
447 See discussion infra note 450-58.
448 See, e.g., Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 894-895 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (declaring that the terms in arbitral place-and-manner provision are unduly oppressive
when such terms require franchisees-wishing to resolve any dispute-to close their shops,
pay airfare, pay out-of-state accommodations, and pay the cost of hiring an attorney who is
familiar with the laws in an out-of-state forum). See also Colmar, Ltd. v. Fremantlemedia
North America, Inc., 801 N.E.2d 1017, 1029 (I11. App. Ct. 2003) (stating that "there is no
authority which explicitly prohibits an out-of-state attorney from representing a client in
arbitration in Illinois" and concluding that "the arbitrator correctly determined that [the outof-state attorney] could participate").
"9 See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003) (Whether
the cost is prohibitive "must be considered from the vantage point of the potential litigant...
including the fact that the litigant must continue to pay for housing, utilities, transportation,
food and other necessities of life in contemporary society despite losing her primary and
most likely, only source of income.").
450 See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 n.5 (4th
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Still, other state and federal courts apply a variety of competing, multi-pronged rules: (1) consumers who oppose arbitration must make "a reasonable,
good faith effort to estimate costs," '4 5 1 prove "reasonably anticipated costs,

4 52

4 53

or prove "potential arbitral costs",; (2) consumers in motion-to-compel-arbitration hearings need only prove "reasonably certain arbitration costs";4 54 and
(3) an employee in a mandatory-arbitration hearing must prove his "expected or
actual arbitration costs.""' 5 One Texas court of appeals declared: A consumer
who opposes arbitration must prove his exact arbitral costs456 and his "likelihood of incurring [arbitration] costs. 4 57 To be sure, this latter evidentiary stanCir. 2001) ("The cost of arbitration ...cannot be measured in a vacuum .... Rather, an
appropriate case-by-case inquiry must [be made] ....
");Phillips v. Associates Home Equity

Services, Inc., 179 F.Supp. 2d 840, 847 (N.D. I11.
2001) ("We are satisfied that Phillips has
met her burden ...[and proved] that the expense of arbitration would be prohibitive in this
case ....We caution, however, that the cost showing made [in this case] does not create [a]
bright-line rule for future litigants. Instead, the inquiry must be determined on a case-by-case
basis."); Parada v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 765-766 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)
(stressing that the substantive unconscionability of financial agreements must be evaluated
on a "case-by-case basis," focusing on the claimant's the ability to pay, the anticipated costs
of the arbitration, and the amount at issue in the arbitration).
451 See Phillips, 179 F.Supp. at 847 ("Phillips has made a reasonable, good faith effort to
estimate her arbitration costs with assistance from the AAA.").
452 See Cheroti v. Harvey & Madding, Inc., No. HG10500986, 2014 WL 1395564, at *14
(Cal. Ct. App. April 10, 2014) ("Accordingly, to demonstrate substantive unconscionability
on grounds of affordability, Cheroti was required to submit evidence of his own financial

resources, the reasonably anticipated cost of this particular arbitration, and the amount of the
potential award. The record contains no concrete evidence of Cheroti's financial circumstances.").
453 See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 663 (rejecting a strict case-by-case analysis to determine
prohibitive arbitral costs and holding that "potential litigants must be given an opportunity,
prior to arbitration on the merits, to demonstrate that the potential costs of arbitration are
great enough to deter them and similarly situated individuals from seeking to vindicate their

federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum").
454

See, e.g., Harrington v. Pulte Home Corp., 119 P.3d 1044, 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)

(declaring that an opponent of arbitration must present specific facts showing with reasonable certainty the likely costs of arbitration).
455

See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 n.5 (4th

Cir. 2001) ("The cost of arbitration ...

cannot be ...premised upon a claimant's abstract

contention that arbitration costs are 'too high.' Rather, an appropriate case-by-case inquiry
must focus upon a claimant's expected or actual arbitration costs and his ability to pay those

costs, measured against a baseline of the claimant's expected costs for litigation and his
ability to pay those costs.").
456 See Caballero v. Contreras, Nos. 13-10-00125, 13-10-00150, 2010 WL 3420527, at
*10 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug 31, 2010) (stressing that the party who opposes arbitration must
prove the exact costs of arbitration and prove excessive cost without speculating).
457 Id. ("While neither [the Randolph Supreme Court nor the Texas Supreme Court has]
specified how detailed [a] showing of prohibitive expense must be, the party opposing arbi-
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dard is remarkably draconian and needlessly contradictory, given that extremely large populations of legally unsophisticated and functionally illiterate
employees and consumers reside in Texas.458
But consider another timely question: What evidentiary proof must complaining consumers and employees present to prove one's "inability to pay"
arbitration costs? First, courts require respondents in a motion-to-compel-arbitration trial to file an affidavit of indigency. 45 9 Generally, the affidavit must
contain sufficient or probative evidence of one's financial hardship. 46 More
specifically, the affidavit must present a "factual record" which allows a judge
to determine definitively whether respondent's individualized financial circumstances prevent the respondent from paying arbitral fees and expenses. 46' Answering the second question, some courts allow employees and consumers to
present all sorts of evidence to prove one's inability to pay allegedly unconscionable arbitration costs. 462 Many other state and federal courts require retration must prove the likelihood of incurring such costs and produce some specific information substantiating the alleged costs.").
458 See, e.g., Melissa Fletcher Stoeltje, Literacy Hindered by Lack of Funds-State Not
Keeping Pace With Demand, SAN ANTONIo ExPREss-NEWS, Oct. 13, 2013, at Al ("[A]
survey in 2003, revealed that 17 percent of Bexar County residents ... can't read at all or
struggle to read anything beyond basic text in English ....Some areas of Texas deal with
extremely high levels of adult illiteracy ....In Cameron County, 43 percent of adults lack
basic literacy skills ....").But see Duran v. Intex Aviation Services, Inc., No. 95-11180,
1996 U.S.App. LEXIS 42732, at *6-8 (5th Cir. Sept. 13, 1996) ("Texas courts have consistently held that individuals are charged with knowing and understanding the contents of what
they sign" and stressing that under Texas law, an individual's illiteracy of the English language does not void an otherwise acceptable waiver).
459 Cf Patterson v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 563, 566 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) ("Prepayment of hearing fees can be waived for individuals, but only after filing
an affidavit of indigency."); Phillips v. Associates Home Equity Services, Inc., 179 F.Supp.
2001) ("In further support of her argument, Phillips provides an affida2d 840, 847 (N.D. 111.
vit stating that she 'cannot afford to pay' the filing fees and other costs, and that she is in
,severe financial straits."').
160 Cf Cheroti v. Harvey & Madding, Inc., No. HG10500986, 2014 WL 1395564, *14
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2014) ("While in certain circumstances expense of arbitration is a
proper ground for finding substantive unconscionability, Cheroti has failed to create the factual record necessary to prevail under this theory .... Although Cheroti characterized them
as having "limited means," both he and his wife were employed as small business owners,
and he presumably felt sufficiently confident of their financial circumstances to purchase
two new cars that together cost nearly $50,000.").
461 id.
462 See, e.g., Phillips, 179 F.Supp. 2d at 847 ("Defendants further argue that Phillips' cost
showing amounts only to "pure speculation," and that Phillips' "generalized assertions" of
possible costs should not defeat arbitration. We disagree. . . . [W]ithout actually going
through arbitration and receiving a final bill, we see no way for her to provide a more precise
showing of her costs than she has done here.").
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spondents/plaintiffs to present specific evidence-stating precisely and truthfully respondents' total income, assets and expenditures for travel, rentals and
other auxiliary services. 46
On the other hand, several courts have applied ratio tests. For example, an
appellate court in Texas crafted a ratio test that compares one's earnings to
one's arbitral costs.4 " After applying this ratio test, the court of appeals decided in favor of the consumers and declared: (1) the total arbitration costs,
$70,000, were unconscionable because they exceeded nearly three times the
price of the homeowners' service contract, $22,650; (2) the total arbitration
costs were approximately forty-five percent of one consumer's gross yearly
earnings; and (3) the arbitral costs approximated twenty-eight percent of the
homeowners' aggregate-gross-annual income.4 65 In contrast, several state and
federal courts have fashioned a ratio test that compares the cost of arbitration to
litigation costs.4 66 And, after applying the latter test, courts have refused to
463 See Clark v. Renaissance West, LLC, 307 P.3d 77, 80 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) ("[A]

party must make a specific, individualized showing as to why he or she would be financially
unable to bear the costs of arbitration. This evidence must consist of more than conclusory
allegations stating a person is unable to pay the costs of arbitration. Rather, parties must
show that based on their specific income/assets, they are unable to pay the likely costs of
arbitration.").
464 See Olshan Found. Repair Co. v. Ayala, 180 S.W.3d 212, 214-16 & n.4 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2005) petition denied, 2006 LEXIS 1089 (Tex., Oct. 27, 2006) (determining that the
trial court properly denied arbitration where the arbitration costs were almost three times the
amount of the original contract and the claimants' share of the arbitration costs was over
twenty-five percent of the family's annual gross income).
465

Id. at 215.

46 See ACORN v. Household Int'l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2002)

(declaring that the arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable after finding that
the borrowers' cost of arbitration would be approximately 10 times that of bringing an action
in state court); Phillips, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("We see no reason to doubt
Phillips' assertion regarding her financial viability, particularly in light of Phillips' inclusion
in the 'subprime' market targeted by Associates Home Equity. Thus even if we disregard the
filing fee, the cost of pursuing arbitration appears to be prohibitive for Phillips, and it is
likely to be at least twelve times what it currently costs to file a case in federal court.");
Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 606 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (ruling in
favor of the consumer who made a purchase of $12,000 and established that the initial arbitral filing fee of $2,000 was 20 times higher than the fee for filing an action in superior
court-and that he reasonably anticipated additional costs for the arbitrators' fees and expenses); Spence v. Omnibus Indus., 119 Cal.Rptr. 171, 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (declaring
that the arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable because the stipulated arbitration fees were 14 to 50 times greater than the fees the buyer would have paid if dispute taken
to court). See also Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003)
(reaffirming that an alternative to a judicial forum-arbitration-must be accessible as well
as effective-and noting that a plaintiff will incur three to nearly fifty times more costs to
litigate than arbitrate a typical $60,000 employment discrimination claim).
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fees were
compel arbitration because the employees and consumers' arbitration
46 7
10-, 12-, 20-, 30-, and 14-to-50 times greater than litigation costs.
Finally, many courts force consumers and employees to arbitrate commonlaw and statutory claims, even after the complainants establish that the arbitral
costs are "prohibitively expensive. 468 Consider the arbitration agreement in
Livingston v. Associates Finance, Inc.,469 which reads in pertinent part:
If you start arbitration, you agree to pay the initial filing fee and required
deposit required by the American Arbitration Association .. .If you believe you are financially unable to pay such fees, you may ask the American Arbitration Association to defer or reduce such fees... If the American Arbitration Association does not defer or reduce such fees . . . , we
will-upon your written request, pay the fees, subject to later allocation of
the fees and expenses between you and us by the arbitrator. There may be
other costs during the arbitration, such as attorney's fees, expenses of travel to the arbitration, and the costs of the arbitration hearings. The Commercial Arbitration Rules determine who will pay the fees.47
Citing the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules as well as cost-reduction,
cost-deferment and cost-waiver clauses in arbitral agreements, some state and
federal courts have granted motions to compel arbitration, even though employees and consumers prove to be indigent.47 1 However, after considering the same
Commercial Arbitration Rules and pondering whether arbitration costs were
prohibitively or unconscionably expensive, other courts have declared that the
AAA's rules do not control because the rules allow an arbitrator to decide
whether to reduce, waive or defer costs. 4 72 Thus, another judicial split has
evolved.

468

Id.
Id.

469

No. 01 C 1659, 2001 WL 709465 (N.D. Ill. 2001).

470

Id. at *2 n.6.

467

See, e.g., Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1134 (D. Ariz. 2009)
(finding arbitration fee not substantively unconscionable under Arizona law in part because
arbitration rules referenced in arbitration agreement provided for waiver and deferral of fees
based on financial hardship); Universal Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 736 So.2d 564,
570 (Ala. 1999) (noting that the AAA's Commercial Rules allow an arbitrator to apportion,
defer, or reduce the administrative fees); Ex parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales, Inc., 718 So.2d
33, 37-38 (Ala. 1998) (rejecting the argument that an arbitration filing fee might be a financial hardship on the basis because the AAA's Commercial Rules allow administrative fees to
be deferred, reduced, or apportioned between the parties).
472 See, e.g., Phillips v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 840, 846 (N.D.
471

111. 2001).
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MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL STUDY-MEASURING THE DIFFERENTIAL

IMPACTS OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE UNCONSCIONABILITY

CHALLENGES AND OTHER FACTORS ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF MOTIONS TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 1800-2015

Legally unsophisticated consumers and employees commence single, joint
and class actions against various employers, merchants and lenders.473 Generally, in the underlying lawsuits, the plaintiffs allege that the more powerful defendants violated the common law or a mixture of federal and state consumerprotection and anti-discrimination statutes.474 In response, defendants in the underlying lawsuits often file motions to compel the respondents/plaintiffs to arbitrate claims before private arbitrators, or alternatively, file declaratory judgment actions. 475 In other instances, movants/defendants file motions only after
disgruntled employees and consumers commence underlying lawsuits in courts
of law.476
In 2000, Larketta Randolph and a class of disgruntled consumers who purchased mobile homes in Alabama were the plaintiffs in Randolph.477 The defendants were Green Tree Financial Corporation and Green Tree Financial
Corp.-Alabama ("Green Tree"). 47 8 Green Tree financed the mobile-home
purchases and charged the consumers a premium for credit insurance. 479 Discovering the hidden fee, Randolph sued, alleging that: (1) Green Tree violated
the Truth in Lending Act48 by failing to disclose the additional finance
charge; 481 and (2) Green Tree violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 82 by
requiring consumers to arbitrate statutory causes of action.483 Responding to the
underlying class action, Green Tree filed a motion to compel arbitration.48 4 The
respondents/plaintiffs, therefore, commenced a substantive unconscionability
challenge.485
411 See generally Willy E. Rice, Courts Gone "IrrationallyBiased" in Favor of the Federal Arbitration Act?-Enforcing Arbitration Provisions in Standardized Applications and
Marginalizing Consumer Protection, Antidiscrimination, and States' Contract Laws: A
1925-2014 Legal and Empirical Analysis, 6 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 405, 433-45

(2015).
474 Id.
475 Id. at 487.

Id.
477 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S 79, 82 (2000).
476

478

Id. at 82.

479 Id.

480 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq. (West 2015).
481 Randolph, 531 U.S. at 83.
482 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1691-1691f (West 2015).
483 Randolph, 531 U.S. at 83.
484 Id.

485 Id. at 90-92 ("[Randolph] contends instead that the arbitration agreement's silence
[regarding arbitral] costs and fees creates a 'risk' that she will be required to bear prohibitive
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Assuredly, the Randolph Court could not ignore an unconscionability defense.48 6 Why? Between 1987 and 2010, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
following principles: (1) written arbitration agreements are enforceable under
the FAA, if they are enforceable in law and equity; 487 and (2) procedurally and
substantively unconscionable arbitration agreements are not enforceable under
the FAA.488 Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the Court has never fashioned489a
specific test to assess whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable.
Therefore, in Randolph, the Court adopted a case-by-case approach to answer
the question.4 9 °
Like most courts,4 9' state and federal courts in California also employ a caseby-case analysis to decide whether an arbitral provision is procedurally or substantively unconscionable. 492 However, in 2011, the Concepcion Court harshly
criticized the California courts' case-by-case analyses and their practice of accepting unsophisticated consumers and employees' procedural and substantive
unconscionability defenses.49 3 More specifically, writing for the majority in
arbitration costs if she pursues her claims in an arbitral forum, and thereby forces her to
forgo any claims she may have against petitioners.... It may well be that the existence of
large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum .... [A] party [who] seeks to invalidate
an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive...
bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.").
486

Id. at 83-84, 89.

487 Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2011). See also

Rent-A-Ctr., West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) ("Like other contracts, [arbitration agreements] ... may be invalidated [using] 'generally applicable contract defenses, such
as fraud, duress, or unconscionability."); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S.
79, 89 (2000); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
488

489
490

Id.
531 U.S. at 92.
Id.

491 Compare Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding

that the enforceability of a particular class action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement is a case-by-case determination), and Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., 238
F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001) ("We believe that the appropriate inquiry is... a case-by-case
analysis .... "), with Wernett v. Service Phoenix, LLC, No. CIV-09-168-TUC-CKJ, 2009
WL 1955612, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 6, 2009) (reporting that Arizona requires a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether arbitral terms preclude a potential litigant from vindicating
rights), and Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 370 (N.C. 2008)
(reaffirming that "[a] party asserting that a contract is unconscionable must prove both procedural and substantive unconscionability" and stressing that an unconscionability analysis is
fact-intensive, and must be made on a case-by-case basis).
492 See, e.g., Parada v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 765-766 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009); Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 272-273 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
493 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
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Concepcion, Justice Scalia declared: California courts "interfere[ ]with [the]
fundamental attributes of arbitration" and apply the facially neutral unconscionability defense in an offensive manner to discriminate against pro-arbitration
movants.4 94
To reach that conclusion, Justice Scalia cited "trend" percentages from two
extremely small studies, which revealed: (1) consumers and employees' "unconscionability challenges" increased significantly in California courts between
1982 and 2006; 4 95 and (2) the challenges were significantly more likely to be
successful if a dispute concerned the enforceability of written arbitral agreements, rather than the enforceability of written non-arbitration contracts.496 In
fact, after interpreting simple outcome percentages in one of the studies, the
commentator/researcher reached an unexpected and highly debatable conclusion:
California courts are clearly biased against arbitration ....

Their disdain

manifests in unique unconscionability requirements applicable solely
when arbitration agreements are [disputed] .... It is therefore evident that
California's unconscionability jurisprudence violates the basic mandate of
the FAA that arbitration agreements be placed on equal footing with ordinary contractual provisions.497
Countering those pro-arbitration conclusions, a commentator highlighted the
controversial analysis and conclusion in Concepcion and wrote:
[Concepcion] is the latest and most expansive step in the Supreme Court's
ongoing project of transforming the Federal Arbitration Act . . . into a
494 See id. at 333. See also Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 201 (Cal.
2013) ("Concepcion reaffirmed that the FAA 'permits arbitration agreements to be declared
unenforceable [under]... contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability'....
Concepcion goes further to make clear that such rules, even when facially nondiscriminatory, must not disfavor arbitration as applied by imposing procedural requirements that 'interfere[ ] with fundamental attributes of arbitration .... ' (quoting AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011))).
495 Broome, supra note 315, at 44-48; and Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward
Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 Buit.. L. REV. 185, 194-195
(2004) ("Litigants rarely invoked unconscionability prior to the increase in the use of arbitration agreements .... However, as the use of arbitration agreements has increased, claims of
unconscionability have also increased and those claims have been surprisingly successful. A
systematic examination shows that in 2002-2003, litigants raised issues of unconscionability
in 235 cases .... Of those ... 68.5% involved arbitration agreements. Significantly, courts
were much more likely to find arbitration agreements, as opposed to other sorts of contracts,
unconscionable. Courts found 50.3% of the arbitration agreements unconscionable, as opposed to 25.6% of other types of contracts. Although federal and state courts in California
decided a significant number of these cases, a total of seventeen state courts and fifteen
federal courts found provisions in arbitration agreements unconscionable.").
496 Id.
497 Broome, supra note 315, at 41.
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virtually irrebuttable federal preference for arbitration that displaces
states' power to develop... contract law ....After Concepcion .... [state
courts] are essentially powerless to protect [a weaker party by applying]
the doctrine of unconscionability ....The decision is all the more remarkable because the [majority's] disdain for consumer... litigation and individuals' access to courts outweighs any commitment to federalism and
state autonomy.49 8
To be fair, in Concepcion, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the statistical
findings were "not definitive."4 99 Yet, the Concepcion majority weighed these
findings fairly heavily and employed them to defeat the plaintiffs' unconscionability challenges.5 °° Additionally, Concepcion did not provide a definitive answer to an even more pressing question: whether California courts systematically discriminate against corporations and employers by rejecting their
motions to compel arbitration and accepting respondents' unconscionability
challenges. Of course, Justice Scalia and the majority could have, but did not,
answer the latter question by merely analyzing the simple descriptive statistics
or percentages. Why?
Very briefly, consider two findings, which are based on the current author/
researcher's cursory review of numerous cases: (1) In federal courts, corporate
employers are more likely to prevail in motion-to-compel-arbitration trials
when highly paid employees 50' rather than lower level employees advance an
unconscionability defense;50 2 and (2) In federal courts, corporate employers are
498 Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin A Cat: Qui Tam Actions As A State Legislative

Response To Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203, 1204-05 (2013).
499 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 342-43 ("[Allthough these statistics are not definitive, it is
worth noting that California's courts have been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate
unconscionable than other contracts." (citing Broome, supra note 315, at 54, 66; then citing
Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration, 52 BUFFALO L. REV., 185, 186
(2004))).
500 Id. at 352 (concluding that the FAA preempted the lower court's unconscionability
finding under California law).
5o See, e.g., Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 557-59 (4th
Cir. 2001) (finding that a terminated employee-who was earning a base salary of $115,000
and sales incentives averaging $53,000 per year for the prior three years-was a highlycompensated employee, declaring that a fee-splitting clause in the arbitration agreement was
not substantively unconscionable, and forcing the high-level employee to arbitrate his claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Goodman v. ESPE Am., No. 00-CV862, 2001 WL 64749, at *1-4 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2001) (finding that the terminated
president of the company was a high-level employee, who "received $80,000 in compensation upon his termination and over $2,000 for accrued vacation," declaring that the "loser
pays" clause in the arbitration agreement was not substantively unconscionable, and forcing
the terminated president of the company to arbitrate his claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act); Zumpano v. Omnipoint
Commc'ns., No. CIV. A. 00-CV-595, 2001 WL 43781, at *5-11 (E.D. Pa. Jan 18, 2001).
502 See, e.g., Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1286-87 (11th Cir.
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substantially more likely to be successful in motion-to-compel-arbitration trials
when female employees 50 3 rather than male employees raise an unconscionability defense.5" Thus, in light of those findings and applying Justice Scalia's
analysis in Concepcion, are federal courts significantly and statistically biased
against females and prejudiced against "highly paid employees"? Of course the
sensible answer is no.
Without a doubt, the Concepcion ruling began to erode the effectiveness of
unconscionability challenges in mandatory-arbitration trials.5 "5 But even more
importantly, the Concepcion Court's erosion of the unconscionability defense
began without the Court seriously employing sound methodological and statistical tools to answer three pressing questions: (1) whether allegedly "unconscionably biased" state and federal courts are significantly and statistically
more likely to grant motions to compel arbitration when respondents/plaintiffs
raise a procedural unconscionability defense; (2) whether allegedly "unconscionably biased" state and federal courts are significantly and statistically
2001) (finding that an airport security guard was a low-level employee, declaring the feesplitting clause was substantially unconscionable, because it required the employee and employee to share equally arbitral fees and expenses, and declaring that the low-level employee
did not have to arbitrate her sex-discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, because arbitration would be prohibitively expensive); Giordano v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-1281, 2001 WL 484360, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. March 29,
2001) (finding that an automobile mechanic was a low-level employee who received $400
per week, declaring the fee-splitting clause was substantially unconscionable because it required the employee and employer to share equally arbitral fees and expenses, ordering the
employer to pay the arbitration costs, but declaring that the low-level employee had to arbitrate his over-time-pay claim under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act).
503 See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 659-60 (6th Cir. 2003);
Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d 212, 214-215 (3d Cir. 2003); Blair v. Scott Specialty
Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 604-10 (3d Cir. 2002); Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d
752, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1999); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170
F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 366 (7th
Cir. 1999); McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Group, No. 00 C 1543, 2000 WL 875396, at *3-4
(N.D. Il. June 22, 2000); Arakawa v. Japan Network Grp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354-55
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Palmer-Scopetta v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1370
(S.D. Fla. 1999).
504 See, e.g., Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 554 (4th Cir.
2001); Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th
Cir. 1999); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11 th Cir. 1998);
Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re Poly-America,
L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 356 (Tex. 2008).
505 See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 201 (Cal. 2013) ("What is new
is that Concepcion clarifies the limits the FAA places on state unconscionability rules as
they pertain to arbitration agreements .... [S]uch rules must not facially discriminate against
arbitration and must be enforced evenhandedly.").
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more likely to deny motions to compel arbitration when respondents/plaintiffs
advance a substantive unconscionability challenges; and (3) whether state or
federal courts are statistically and significantly more likely to allow extralegal
factors, such as a litigants' consumer or employment status, geographic location, and levels of economic and financial sophistication, to determine the outcome of motions to compel arbitration. Therefore, to help answer these questions, the author conducted an empirical study.
A.

Sources of Data and Sampling Procedures

Two general and uncomplicated null hypotheses appear in this study: (1)
extralegal factors have no statistically significant effect on the dispositions of
motions to compel arbitration in state and federal courts; and (2) procedural and
substantive unconscionability challenges have no statistically significant effect
on the dispositions of motions to compel arbitration in state and federal courts.
To build a database, the author used Westlaw and Lexis's data retrieval systems
as well as regional reporters to locate every "reported" and "unpublished" motion-to-compel-arbitration decision.
Using a broad query, 506 more than 10,000 state and federal court cases were
retrieved for the time period between 1800 and 2015.507 Ultimately, the author
analyzed two proportional stratified random samples of the cases.5 °8 The first
proportional sample contains 285 state-court cases. 5°9 The second sample contains 299 federal-court cases. 51° Therefore, to compare dispositions of cases in
arbitral and judicial forums, the author took several proportional stratified random samples of arbitrators' decisions that were reported in several databases
between 1925 and 2015.511 About 303 private-arbitrator cases are included in
506 The following query was constructed: sy(arbitration/p contract). Executing that expression in Westlaw's ALLSTATES and ALLFEDS databases generated 6,386 and 4,680
cases, respectively.
507 The investigator searched Westlaw's MIN-CS, ALLSTATES, ALLFEDS, CTA and

DCT databases between April 2012 and November 2015. In addition, the author searched
various regional reporters as well as "LExIs ADVANCED" during the same period.
508 See, e.g., Ratanasen v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., 11 F.3d 1467, 1470-72 (9th Cir.
1993) (explaining the differences between and the efficacy of employing "simple random
sampling" and "stratified random sampling"); Bruce M. Price, From Downhill to Slalom: An
Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (And Some Unintended Consequences),

26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 135, 138 (2007) ("Using a proportional, stratified, random sample
of bankruptcy cases from [two twelve-month periods, the author created a] ... database of
cases for every state in the Tenth Circuit.").
509 See infra Table I and the accompanying discussion.
510 See infra Table I and the accompanying discussion.
511 To secure a proportional and stratified sample of arbitrators' decisions, several research queries were executed-respectively-in the following Westlaw and Lexis databases:
(1) AAA

EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION

MENT ARBITRATION

AWARDs-SEARCH: "discrim"; (2) AAA EMPLOY-

AWARDS-SEARCH: "find! for claimant!" "in favor of claimant"; (3)
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this study,5 12 and the entire database comprises 887 cases.513
Finally, after selecting the cases, a content analysis was performed on
each.51 4 Quite simply, the author constructed binary variables, read each case
and coded each case. In the end, the author made comparisons and measured
the statistical effects of numerous variables on the dispositions of arbitration
motions in state and federal courts.515
B.

Simple Comparisons of Arbitral and Judicial ProceedingsDemographic Characteristics,Underlying Claims, Theories of
Recovery, Defenses and Dispositions of Disputes Between
1800-2015

Once more, in a proceeding to compel arbitration, the movant/defendant is
the defendant in the underlying lawsuit. An employee or a consumer is the
respondent/plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit. Table 1 illustrates some attributes of individuals who resolved disputes before private arbitrators.
The table also provides pertinent information about individuals who litigated
disputes in state and federal courts. The first variable in Table 1 is "Respondents/Plaintiffs' Underlying Allegations Against Movants/Defendants." The
findings indicate that large-to-exceedingly-large numbers of plaintiffs in the
underlying state-court lawsuits alleged that defendants committed intentional
torts (82.3%), violated consumer-protection laws (77.8%) and engaged in deceptive practices (42.3%). Conversely, the plaintiffs in the underlying federalcourt lawsuits are slightly more likely to allege that defendants breached contracts (40.9%), practiced employment discrimination (46.3%) and committed
deceptive acts (44.1%). Additionally, in the presence of arbitrators, consumers
and employees alleged that defendants deviated from an ordinary or a professional standard of care (92.4%), practiced racial discrimination (77.8%),
harassed employees (56.4%) and committed securities fraud (62.0%).
FINANCIAL

INDUSTRY

REGULATORY AUTHORITY

(FINRA/NASD) Arbitration Awards-

SEARCH: "breach w/8 stocks" (4) WASHINGTON ARBrTRATION DECISIONs-SEARCH: "injury" (N=2705) and "defense award" (N=2267). Only 60 cases were sampled; (5) WASHINGTON ARBITRATION AWARDS-SEARCH: "injury," plus ("plaintiff award" and Insurance) and
(not "admitted liability"); and (6)

WASHINGTON ARBITRATION

DECISIONs-SEARCH: "inju-

ry" (N=2705) and "plaintiff award" (N=2445). Only 150 cases were sampled.
512 See infra Table I and the accompanying discussion.
513 See infra Table 1 and the accompanying discussion.
514 See generally Robert Edward Mitchell, The Use of Content Analysis for Explanatory
Studies, 31 PuB. OPINION Q. 230, 237 (1967); Daniel Taylor Young, How Do You Measurea
ConstitutionalMoment? Using Algorithmic Topic Modeling to Evaluate Bruce Ackerman's
Theory of Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1990, 2010-13 (2013) ("With technology

making it easier to manipulate larger and larger sets of data, several tools have become
available ....Social scientists engaged in content analysis have long recognized that such
studies often have embedded causal assumptions ....).
515 See Tables 1-4 infra and the accompanying text.
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TABLE

1.

ARBITRATORS'

DISPOSITION OF LITIGANTS' DISAGEEMENTS AND

STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES'

PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DISPOSITIONS

OF MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Allegations, Theories of
Recovery and Dispositions
RESPONDITS/PAINFFS' UNmRINaIG
OEBlmDmS:
ALLmAiONSMamMottVAms/
"Simple & Professional Negligence"
"Defendants Breached Contracts"
"Defendants Torts Were Intentional"
"Age Discrimination"
"Disability Discrimination"
"Employment Discrimination"
"Gender Discrimination"
"Racial Discrimination"
"Workplace Harassment"
"Violated Consumers' Laws"
"Deceptive Trade Practices"
"Violated Financial Laws"
"Securities Fraud & Violations"

1800-2015 (N=887)

Arbitration
(N = 303)

State Courts
(N = 285)

Federal Courts
(N = 299)

TOTAL

Percent

Percent

Percent

(N = 887)

30

40.9

823
-0-0 18.7
17.5
7.4
15.4
Ili
42.3
50.0
11.0

17.7
66.7
42.9
46.
17.5
14.8
28.2
22.2
44.1
50.0
27.0

(N = 53)
(N 303)
(N = 34)
(N =3)
(N = 7)
(N = 80)
(N = 17)
(N = 27)
(N = 39)
(N = 54)
(N = 111)
(N = 22)
(N = 137)

48.5 **
48.0 *11.0

15.1
19.9
81.1*

36.4
31.1
27.3

(N = 198)
(N = 186)
(N = 128)

29.2
5.5
8.0 *

40.1"*
29.6
27.8

30.7
84.0 *
4.2

(N = 212)
(N = 91)
(N =72)

DuEomS
To COMPAIARBIUNION
Federal Preemption
Procedural Unconscionabillft
Substantive Unconscionability

01.
- 0-0-

3.5
58.3
15.2

34.7
411
24.8

(N = 489)
(N = 180)
(N = 218)

OUTCOME-ARamnATOR$'RUINS:
Plaintiffs/Respondents Won
Defendants/Movants Won

47.0
53.0 **

31.8
8 *

1.0
36.4

(N = 336)

RESPoNoErm/PIAJnSW'

7.6

92.4
22.1
- 033.3
57.1
35Ll
65.0
1
50A
- 013.6
- 062.0

-0-

UNDERLYING

ThEORIPSOFREcOVIUY

State & Federal Statutes
Anti-Discrimination & Civil-Rights
Banking, Credit & Securities
Consumer & Deceptive Trade
Common-Law Contract Theory
Breach of Standardized Contracts
Breach of Negotiated Contracts
Common-Law Tort Theories
MOTION
Lns1Am' UNDEnLyImGAR

MOTIONS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION OUTCOMES OUTICOME
- TRALCORI

RespondentsPlaintiffs Won
Movants/Defendants Won

- 0-0-

62.1**
37.9

49.0
51.0**

(N = 585)

- 0-0-

41.0
59.0

39.2
60.8

(N = 578)

-0-0 -

38.7
1.3

14.3
85.1

(N = 175)

OUTCOME-COuTS OFAJPfEAts

Respondents/Plaintiffs Won
MovantsDcfendants Won
OUTCOME-SUPREECOUMR

RespondentsPlaintiffs Won
Movants/Defendants Won

Levels of Statistical Significance for Chi Square tests:

***p<.0001

**p <.001
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Generally, an allegation and a claim are synonymous. 5 6 A theory of recovery and an allegation however, are not synonymous." 7 Therefore, the second
variable in Table 1 is "Respondents/Plaintiffs' Underlying Theories of Recovery." The reported percentages reveal statistically significant findings. Specifically, in arbitral forums, plaintiffs are more likely to commence actions, citing
federal and state antidiscrimination statutes (48.5%), banking and consumercredit statutes (49.0%) and common-law tort-based theories of recovery
(68.0%). On the other hand, in the underlying state-court trials, plaintiffs/respondents are significantly more likely to commence actions under consumerprotection and deceptive trade practices statutes (61.7%). Also, many plaintiffs
(40.1%) filed breach of standardized-contract actions. But, in the underlying
federal-court proceedings, breach of negotiated-contract actions appeared in
abundance (64.9%).
Also, as previously mentioned, some state supreme courts require a contractual party to prove both procedural and substantive unconscionability before
invalidating a contract.5 18 Other state courts will invalidate a contract if a party
establishes procedural or substantive unconscionability. 519 Consider the third
variable in Table 1-"Litigants' Underlying and Motion-to-Compel Arbitration
Defenses." Of 887 cases, unconscionability challenges appeared in nearly half.
And of 180 procedural unconscionability challenges, 58.3% and 41.7% occurred in state and federal courts, respectively. But even more surprising, of
218 substantive unconscionability challenges, the overwhelming majority occurred in state courts rather than in federal courts. The respective percentages
are 75.2% and 24.8%.
The last six rows of simple percentages in Table 1 illustrate the dispositions
of motions to compel arbitration in trial, appellate and supreme courts. Among
the 585 trial-court cases, state-court judges are statistically and significantly
more likely to rule in favor of the respondents/plaintiffs or to deny movantsl
defendants' motions (62.1%). Conversely, judges in federal district courts are
significantly more likely to grant the movants/defendants' motions. Of the 585
trial-court decisions, dissatisfied litigants appealed 578 (51.0%). Among the
appellate cases, the findings are stark: The greater majority of both state and
federal appellate court are likely to grant movants/defendants' arbitration mo516 Cf DiBartolo v. Abbott Labs., 914 F. Supp. 2d 601, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Under
New York law, 'failure to warn claims are identical under strict liability and negligence
theories of recovery."' (quoting Lewis v. Abbott Labs., No. 08 Civ. 7480, 2009 WL
2231701, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2009))).
117 Cf. Snyder v. Yonkers Public Sch. Dist., 315 F. Supp. 2d 499, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(involving two complaints with "identical [factual] allegations," but different legal theories
of recovery).
518 See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
519 See, e.g., Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 922 (N.D. 2005)
("Some courts hold that a showing of either procedural or substantive unconscionability is
sufficient to invalidate a contract.").
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tions. The percentages are 59.0% and 60.8%, respectively. Among state and
federal supreme courts, movants/defendants are still significantly more likely to
prevail-61.3% and 85.7%, respectively.
C.

Bivariate Computations-The Effects of Contractual Parties'
Background Attributes on the Dispositions of ArbitrationMotions
in State and Federal Courts

Under the FAA's "savings clause," state and federal courts may consider and
apply ordinary principles of contract law as well as equitable doctrines to decide whether to enforce arbitration agreements or clauses.52 ° On the other hand,
the savings clause prohibits judges' weighing potentially prejudicial, irrelevant
or extrajudicial factors-i.e. a litigant's social status, geographic origin, gender
or ethnicity-to decide whether to grant or deny a motion to compel arbitration."i
Nevertheless, Table 2 suggests both state and federal judges, intentionally or
unintentionally, allow such impermissible factors to determine whether to grant
or deny arbitration motions. Consider the four columns of win/loss ratios illustrated in Table 2. Now, focus on the two columns of win/loss ratios on the left,
which appear under the subheading: "Motion to Compel Arbitration-Corporations and Financial Institutions' Win/Loss Ratios in State Appeals Courts."

520 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011); Dan Ryan
Builders v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 555 (W. Va. 2012).
521 Cf Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999); Bellemere v. CableDahmer Chevrolet, Inc., 423 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
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First, among corporations that appealed adverse arbitration motions in state
courts, the statistically significant ratios reveal that state courts' geographic locations 522 influenced whether judges granted or denied corporations' motions.
More specifically, state appellate courts in the East, Midwest and South are
significantly more likely to grant mandatory-arbitration motions. The respective ratios are .539/.461, .521/.479 and .697/.303 (the respective percentages
are 53.9%, 52.1% and 69.7%). However, state appellate courts in the Southwest
and West are less likely to grant corporations' motions. The percentages are
29.4% and 48.9%, respectively. On the other hand, within every geographic
region, state appellate courts are overwhelmingly more likely to grant financial
institutions' motions to compel arbitration. The percentages in favor of financial institutions vary from 50% to 87.5%.
Second, among corporations, the statistically significant ratios indicate that
respondents/plaintiffs' underlying theories of recovery influence whether state
appeals courts grant or deny corporations' motions. Precisely, after respondents/plaintiffs commenced breach-of-contract and anti-discrimination actions
in the underlying lawsuits, state courts are more likely to grant corporations'
motions for mandatory arbitration. The statistically significant proportions are
.691 and .524, respectively. Contrarily, after respondents/plaintiffs filed underlying deceptive-trade and consumer-protection actions against corporations,
state appellate courts are less likely to grant corporations' motions. The respective statistically significant percentages are 45.7% and 16.7%. But note: Regardless of respondents/plaintiffs' underlying theories of recovery, state appellate court judges are exceedingly more likely to grant financial institutions'
motions to compel arbitration. The percentages vary from 60.6% to 77.8%, and
they are not statistically significant.
Are federal courts of appeal more or less likely to grant corporations and
financial institutions' mandatory-arbitration motions? The answer is located in
Table 2 under the subheading: "Motion to Compel Arbitration-Corporations
and Financial Institutions' Win/Loss Ratios in Federal Appeals Courts." Examine the two columns of win/loss ratios on the right. Put simply, federal appellate courts in the West are significantly less likely to grant corporations and
522 In Part IV.B, supra, a brief discussion of "blue states" and "red states" appears. Simply stated, those political labels are not good proxies for geographic location. Therefore, in
this study, a "geographic regions" variable was created. The East comprises Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Guam, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island and Vermont. The Midwest includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The South includes Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Virginia. The Southwest comprises Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. The
West includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
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financial institutions' requests-refusing to force consumers and employees to
arbitrate claims (the percentages are 33.3% and 47.1%, respectively).
However, federal appellate courts in the Eastern, Midwestern, Southern and
Southwestern parts of the United States are significantly more likely to grant
both financial institutions and corporations' motions to compel arbitration.
Among the corresponding percentages, the lowest is 57.1% in the South and the
highest is 80.0% in the Southwest. Furthermore, unlike the outcomes in state
appellate courts, respondents/plaintiffs' underlying legal theories of recovery
have no statistically significant effects on the dispositions of arbitration motions in federal appellate courts. Or, regardless of consumers and employees'
underlying causes of action, federal courts of appeal are exceptionally more
likely to grant corporations and financial institutions' motions and compel arbitration. The movants/defendants' probability of winning vary from 51.9% to
75.0%
To reiterate, the FAA's savings clause does not permit courts to weigh any
extra-legal factors when deciding whether to enforce or invalidate arbitration
agreements.5 23 Also, the Court reaffirms the specific policy that "as a matter of
federal law, any doubt concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration ...."' In addition, both state and federal courts
of appeal regularly embrace that policy.5 25 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's
pro-arbitration policies are contradictory.526 And those contradictions differentially influence the dispositions of arbitration motions among, as well as between, state and federal courts.
The statistically significant findings in Table 2 clearly reveal that motions
are granted or denied differently among, as well as between, state and federal
See discussion supra notes 506-507.
524 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
Compare Matter of Brady v. Williams Capital Grp., L.P., 14 N.Y.3d 459, 467-68 (2010)
(noting "strong state policy favoring arbitration agreements" and that any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues be resolved in favor of arbitration), with NCR Corp. v. Korala
Associates, Ltd., 512 F.3d 807, 813 (6th Cir. 2008) ("As a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.").
525 On December 14, 2015, the author searched the State and Federal databases on
Westlaw® using the query (rule): "Any doubt concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration." The search generated more than two thousand
decisions in which courts embraced or applied the rule.
526 Compare Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983) ("[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem ... is the construction
of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."), with Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 209 (1991) (stating
that the presumption of arbitrability does not fully apply in cases where the arbitration agreement is contained in an expired fixed-term contract and also stressing that courts must determine whether the particular dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement).
523
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courts. Likewise, other irrelevant or impermissible factors also influence
whether arbitration motions are granted or denied: Financial institutions are
more likely to prevail than corporations, and corporations are more likely to
prevail in federal courts rather than in state courts. In the West, state courts are
more likely to deny corporations' motions. However, federal courts in the West
are more likely to deny both financial institutions and corporations' motion.
Finally, the last variable in Table 2 is entitled, "Respondents/Plaintiffs' Affirmative Defenses in Motion to Compel Arbitration Proceedings." The proportions in the bottom two rows answer the general question: whether respondents/
plaintiffs' defenses are likely to influence the dispositions of motions to compel
arbitration in state and federal appellate courts. The short answer is yes. First,
state appellate courts are significantly less likely to grant corporations' arbitration motions when respondents/plaintiffs raise an unconscionability defense or
other defenses. The respective percentages are 53.9% and 88.9%. Conversely,
federal courts of appeal are significantly more likely to grant financial institutions' motions and compel arbitration when respondents/plaintiffs raise unconscionability challenges rather than some other defenses. The statistically significant percentages are 76.3% and 55.2%, respectively.
Again, in Concepcion, Justice Scalia chided state and federal courts in California.527 Allegedly, those tribunals allow unsophisticated consumers to raise
an inordinate number of unconscionability challenges and successfully circumvent the Court's pro-arbitration policies. 528 The statistically significant findings
in Table 2, however, are exceedingly clear: Both federal and state courts allow
unconscionability challenges to influence the dispositions of mandatory-arbitration motions. Moreover, unconscionability challenges are likely to be successful or unsuccessful, depending on the movants/defendants' business, legal, or
socioeconomic status. An even more important and related question begs for an
answer: Do procedural and substantive unconscionability challenges have identical effects on the dispositions of motions to compel arbitration in federal and
state courts of appeal? In Concepcion, Justice Scalia did not distinguish between the two defenses when he penned his controversial opinion and rebuked
California courts for increasingly applying the doctrine to bar arbitration. 529 To
address this latter question, consider the statistics in Table 3 entitled, "The Effects of Unconscionability Defenses and Other Variables on the Dispositions of
Arbitration Motions in State Supreme Courts and in Federal Courts of Appeals."

527
528
529

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340-351 (2011).

Id.
Id.
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In the center of Table 3, three (3) columns of statistics appear under the
subheading, "Procedural Unconscionability Defense and Its Effects on the Dispositions of Motions to Compel Arbitration in State Supreme Courts and in
Federal Courts of Appeals." And, on the right side of the table, three (3) additional columns of statistics are illustrated under the subheading, "Substantive
Unconscionability Defense and Its Effects on the Dispositions of Motions to
Compel Arbitration in State Supreme Courts and in Federal Courts of Appeals."
Focusing on the three columns of statistics on the left, the findings reveal
that the Ninth Circuit and its sister state supreme courts are somewhat more
likely to deny arbitration motions when consumers and employees raise a procedural unconscionability challenge (52.8%). This specific finding is marginally congruent with the more general unconscionability finding that Justice Scalia
discussed in Concepcion.530 However, it is important to stress: The current
finding is not statistically significant. Even more revealing, the Fifth, Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits- along with their respective sister state supreme courts and
other federal appellate courts-are significantly more likely to grant mandatory-arbitration motions when respondents/plaintiffs raise a procedural unconscionability defense. The displayed percentages are 63.4%, 70.0%, 64.9%, and
61.6%.
Clearly, when procedural unconscionability challenges are raised, the geographic locations of state supreme courts and their sister federal appellate
courts have no statistically significant impact on the dispositions of arbitration
motions. Furthermore, disregarding the geographic locations of courts, the findings in Table 3 disclose: State supreme courts as well as federal courts of appeal are more likely to grant motions to compel arbitration when respondents/
plaintiffs raise a procedural unconscionability defense. The respective percentages are 64.8% and 56.5%.
But note: About half (45.8%) of the courts are more likely to deny motions
and about half (54.2%) are more likely to grant motions-when the movants/
defendants are "small or large corporations" and respondents/plaintiffs advance
a procedural unconscionability defense. Contrarily, the overwhelming majority
of courts are more likely to grant motions to compel arbitration when the movants/defendants are "financial services institutions" or "insurers," and respondents/plaintiffs raise a procedural unconscionability challenge. The statistically
significant percentages are 71.1% and 71.4%, respectively.
Without a doubt, in this study, the most surprising findings are the statistically significant effects of substantive unconscionability challenges on the dispositions of mandatory-arbitration motions. Examine the three columns of statistics
on the right in Table 3. The unexpected findings are telling. First, along with
their respective sister state supreme courts, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits are
530 Id. at 342 ("California's courts have been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate
unconscionable than other contracts.").

2016]

UNCONSCIONABLE JUDICIAL DISDAIN

more likely to deny mandatory-arbitration motions-when respondents/plaintiffs raise a substantive unconscionability defense. The respective statistically
significant percentages are 54.2% and 61.4%.
In contrast, together with their respective sister state supreme courts, the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits are exceedingly more likely to grant motions to
compel arbitration-when respondents/plaintiffs present a substantive unconscionability challenge. The statistically significant percentages are 63.4% and
74.4%, respectively. Of the remaining federal courts of appeal and their sister
state supreme courts, the statistically significant percentages disclose: Half of
the latter courts are more likely to deny motions and about half are more likely
to grant motions when respondents/plaintiffs advance a substantive unconscionability defense. The corresponding percentages are 52.0% and 48.0%, respectively.
Furthermore, discounting the geographic locations of courts, the findings in
Table 3 unveil a major and bothersome judicial conflict: Federal courts of appeal are statistically and tremendously more likely to grant motions to compel
arbitration when unsophisticated consumers and employees raise a substantive
unconscionability challenge (66.7%). On the other hand, state supreme courts
are statistically and significantly more likely to deny arbitration motions when
respondents/plaintiffs present a substantive unconscionability defense (52.7%).
Why are these unexpected and contradictory substantive-unconscionability
findings-between state supreme courts and federal appellate courts-rather
troublesome? The answer is found in a long string of important and highly cited
Supreme Court decisions.
Briefly, the author crafted and ran a research query in a WESTLAW
database.531 The question generated 52 federal appellate courts cases. And, in
the overwhelming majority of the retrieved cases, federal courts of appeal cited
the Court's strict admonitions in Perry v. Thomas,532 Allied-Bruce Terminix
534
Cos. v. Dobson53 3 and Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto.
In Barker v. Golf
535
U.S.A., Inc., the Eight Circuit presents an excellent summary of the Court's
instructions and the scope of lower federal courts' authority under the FAA:
To decide whether the parties' agreement to arbitrate is valid, we look to
state contract law. '[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is
applicable if [it] arose to govern . . . the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts.. .. ' We may apply state law to arbitration agreements only to the extent that it applies to contracts in general .... [And]
531 The query-ARBITRATION /S (APPLY APPL! /S (STATE /S DEFENSES))-was
submitted between May 24-25, 2015.
532 482 U.S. 483, 493-94 n.9 (1987).
533 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
534 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
535 154 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 1998).
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a state's general contract defenses. 53 6

Stated succinctly, both state supreme courts and federal appellate courts must
perform substantially similar tasks in motion-to-compel-arbitration proceedings: (1) find a negotiated or a standardized arbitration agreement; 53 7 (2) consider, explain, and interpret controversial terms in the arbitral agreement; 538 (3)
consider the movant's motion and weigh the respondent's underlying claims
and theories of recovery;5 39 and (4) apply state-law principles of contract for540
mation and related defenses to decide whether to grant or deny a motion.
However, the statistically significant and gross disparities between outcomes in
state supreme courts and federal courts of appeal strongly suggest: The latter
courts are more likely to apply the Supreme Court's strong pro-arbitration policies and ignore states' common-law defenses-when deciding whether a consumer's or an employee's substantive unconscionability challenge defeats a
motion to compel arbitration.54 '
The last set of bivariate findings in Table 3 should also generate some interest. Movants and respondents have equal likelihoods of prevailing in state-supreme and federal-appellate courts-when the respondents/plaintiffs advance a
substantive unconscionability defense and the movants/defendants are "small
and large corporations" (50.0%). However, the same courts are substantially
and statistically more likely to grant motions to compel arbitration-when consumers and employees file a substantive unconscionability challenge, and the
movants/defendants are financial services institutions (65.8%). The opposite is
Id. at 791 (citing Perry, 482 U.S. at 493-494, n.9).
537 Compare Gorlach v. Sports Club Co., 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 71, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012),
with Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000).
538 Stout, 228 F.3d at 714.
536

539 Compare Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 108

(Ala. 1995), and Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc. v. Regelin, 735 So.2d 454, 457 (Ala.
1999) ("[Alfter a motion to compel arbitration has been made and supported, the burden is
on the non-movant to present evidence that the supposed arbitration agreement is not valid or
does not apply to the dispute in question."), with J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d at 714 (stating that a
federal court must determine whether Congress intended for the non-movant claims to be
arbitrated).
540 See Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2002) ("In
determining the validity of an agreement to arbitrate, federal courts should apply ordinary
state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.").
541 Cf Hawkins v. Region's, 944 F.Supp.2d 528, 531 (N.D. Miss. 2013) ("[This] court
recognizes that the Supreme Court's decision ... might be regarded by some as creating a
legal 'black hole' which inevitably sucks in disputes and sends them to arbitration ....

If

this is true, then the fact nevertheless remains that this court has no choice but to follow this
law. The U.S. Supreme Court has, in recent years, adopted an approach which highly favors
arbitration, including overturning the decisions of state supreme courts when it finds that
they have established laws which are contrary to the pro-arbitration policies behind the
FAA." (citing AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011))).
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true when insurers and various business associations are the movants and the
respondents submit a substantive unconscionability challenge. Federal courts of
appeal and state supreme courts are meaningfully and statistically more likely
to deny arbitration motions (59.3%).
D.

A Multivariate Two-Stage Probit Analysis-Individual and Simultaneous
Effects of Proceduraland Substantive Unconscionability
Challenges and Other Predictors on the Dispositionsof
Motions to Compel Arbitration in State and Federal
Courts of Appeals

Again, in Concepcion, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, embraced the
suppositions: (1) California state courts and their sister federal courts are biased
against arbitration; and (2) those tribunals are more likely to undermine federal
arbitration policies because consumers and employees are substantially more to
raise successful unconscionability challenges in those jurisdictions. 542 First, the
Concepcion Court's conclusions are not well grounded in sound or statistically
significant evidence. Instead, the Court used less-than-definitive percentages to
reach those conclusions.5 43 Standing alone, percentages and other descriptive
statistics' explanatory and predictive powers are extremely weak. 5 14 Consequently, one must employ significantly more powerful and complex statistical
procedures 545 to establish that "California's unconscionability jurisprudence violates the basic mandate of the FAA .... 546
Second, even if simple percentages were powerful predictors, the reported
percentages and statistically significant bivariate relationships in the present
study do not support the Concepcion Court's general conclusion.54 7 Once more,
both state and federal courts are significantly more likely to grant arbitration
motions, when consumers and employees raise procedural unconscionability
challenges, and, depending on the geographic location, federal courts are more
542 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
543 Id.
544 See

Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 215, 228-230 (2008) ("There has been an increase in the rate that the court uses
claim construction in connection with decisions on the doctrine of equivalents ....The
empirical evidence reported in this study comes from the application of several statistical
techniques. Some are simple descriptive statistical techniques, such as ...percentages and
...[the] odds of success with respect to response variables ....The study also employs
more complex statistical arguments, including linear regression, the chi square test, which is
useful for exploring whether there are relationships between certain variables, and logistic
regression, which is a particularly good complement to chi square ... because it is highly
effective at estimating not only the probability that certain variables predict (or explain)
positive outcomes for response variables, but also the strength of the predictive power.").
545 Id.
546

Broome, supra note 315, at 41.

547 See discussion infra Table 4.
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likely to grant arbitration motions-when respondents advance substantive unconscionability challenges. Briefly, in motion to compel arbitration proceedings, state and federal courts' decisions-to apply the unconscionability doctrine and/or to deny motions-are more complex. Therefore, a researcher's
purportedly sound cause-and-effect explanations and conclusions are highly
suspect if they are derived completely from an analysis of descriptive statistics.548
FurtLermore, when using survey data, a researcher should always avoid the
strong temptation to prove a legal theory simply by weighing or stressing the
statistically significant bivariate relationships between certain predictors and
judicial outcomes.54 9 Instead, a conscientious analyst must employ more complex and powerful statistical tools, which can "predict or explain" simultaneously the unique, as well as the multiple effects of certain predictors on: (1)
courts' decisions to apply the procedural or substantive unconscionability doc(2) courts' decisions to grant or deny mandatory-arbitration motrines; and/or
550
tions.
Even more importantly, the same conscientious researcher must address a
serious question: Whether the researcher's sampled survey data-cases in regional law reporters-represent fairly the universe of all persons who have
55
claims and litigated those claims in state and federal courts. 1 Reported cases
5 52
have known problems or limitations. First, reported cases do not reflect the
universe of persons' presenting claims because some persons choose not to
litigate in state or federal courts.553 Second, courts often issue unfavorable rulSee generally Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and JudicialDiscord over Whether
Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds'Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A His548

torical and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts' DeclaratoryJudgments-1900-

1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1194-1214,1208-09 (1998) (presenting a case study of state
and federal courts' disposition of lawsuits involving corporate entities, insurers, and insurance consumers, and discussing statistical problems which are associated with a researcher's
using only reported cases and simple percentages to make "causal" inferences).
"9 See Petherbridge, supra note 544 at 228-30.
at 230.
Cf Thomas J. Campbell, Regression Analysis In Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards,
Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L. REv.
1299, 1300 n.7 (1984) ("Finally, purely from the statistical viewpoint, strict preconditions
must be established for the use of regression analysis. Expert statisticians' testimony frequently concerns whether or not these conditions are met. Chief among these are . . . basic
assumptions about the data, including the bell-shaped, 'normal' distribution of error terms
with a constant variance ... [and] absence of systematic errors in the reporting of sample
data.").
550 See id
551

552

Id.

553 See G.S. Maddala,

LIMITED-DEPENDENT

AND

QUALITATIVE

VARIAnLIS

IN

257-71, 278-83 (1983) (discussing "self-selectivity bias" and "other-selectivity bias" in various settings). See also Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation
of the Insurance Industry: An Empiricaland HistoricalAnalysis of Courts' Ineffectual AtECONOMETRICS,
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ings in mandatory-arbitration trials.554 Also, for a number of competing reasons, some movants and respondents accept the adverse rulings and decide not
to appeal.555 Other litigants, however, appeal the adverse decisions-hoping to
secure more favor rulings.556
Given litigants' different decisions, major differences could exist between
those who appeal adverse rulings and those who do not. To determine whether
a statistically significant difference exists between the two subpopulations, a
careful analyst must test for "selectivity bias" in the sample data.5 7 If the researcher finds significant differences between non-appellants and appellants,
the analyst may reasonably conclude that the appellants' dissimilar background
characteristics-rather than "judicial bias" or extralegal predictors-explain
appellants' likelihood of winning or losing motion-to-compel-arbitration lawsuits in state and federal courts of appeal.558 On the other hand, if meaningful
self-selection or other-selection bias is not present, the researcher may proceed
to measure the individual, multiple, simultaneous and statistical effects ("explanations") of various predictors on the dispositions of motions to compel arbitration. 559

tempts to HarmonizeFederalAntitrust,Arbitration, and Insolvency Statutes with the McCarran-FergusonAct-1941-1993, 43 CATm. U. L. REV. 399, 446-48 (1994) (discussing litigants' choices and how those choices might affect judicial outcome estimates in sample
data).
554 Id.
555 See infra Table 4 and compare the total sample size (N=887) with the number of
litigants (N=578) who decided to appeal adverse decisions to state and federal courts of
appeal. Also, in this study, the reason for focusing on appellate court decision is not complicated. Unlike the decisions in state trial courts or in federal district courts, appellate courts'
decisions are significantly more authoritative. In addition, appellate decisions are significantly more likely to end or resolve the controversy completely.
556 See infra Table 4.
557 The tests for detecting "selectivity bias" in sample data and the accompanying
problems have been discussed in the author's other publications. See Willy E. Rice, Judicial
Bias, The Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection: An EmpiricalAnalysis of State Supreme Courts' Bad-Faith,Breach-of-Contract,Breach-of-Covenant-of-Good-Faithand Excess-Judgment Decisions, 1900-1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 325, 371-76 nn. 157-59 (1992)
(explaining and testing for "selectivity bias" in "choice data").
558

Id.

559 Id.

PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL
TABLE

4.

A

[Vol. 25:143

MULTIVARIATE PROBIT ANALYSIS-THE EFFECTS OF SELECT

PREDICTORS ON THE DECISIOIN TO APPEAL ADVERSE RULINGS
AND ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS,

1800-2015 (N=887)

Arbitration uln to Federl and

Disosfitof Noio to Comq
Ahibttoo Disputes in Federal and

(N=578)
State Courts
of Appeals

State Courts of Appeals (N=578)

Dedso to AppealMoion to Compel
Predictor Variables

Absolute
Z Values

Probit
Values

Robust
Std. Errors

Absolute
Z Values

Probit
Values

Robust
Std. Errors

Types of Respondents/Plaintiffs:
Consumers
Employees

-.0673
-.3306

.2167
.3103

0.31
1.07

0.1665
0.1788

.1113
.1421

1.50
1.26

Types of Movants/Defendants:
Corporations
Financial Institutions

.3377
.1789
-.7043 .4434

0.53
1.59

0.2107
02315

.1939
.2069

4.53

Lawsuits' Origins:
In State Courts, Only
In California State Courts
In Washington State Courts

2.133
-1.641
-.2338

.2401
.5001
.4688

8.88 *
3.28 *
0.50

-. 293
-.2736
.3670

Courts' Jurisdictions:
Within the Fifth Circuit
Within the Ninth Circuit
Within the Eleventh Circuit

.3129
.3471
1.488

.2070
.2038
.1963

1.51
1.70
7.58 *

.2909
-.2521
-.3197

0.25

Respondents/Plaintiffs'
Underlying Legal Theories:
Breach-Standardized Contract
Breach-Negotiated Contract
Antidiscrimination Action
Financial-Services Action
Consumer-Protection Action

.0773
.1813
.4506
.3567
.0979

.2439
.3000
.4081
.2984
.1791

0.32
0.60
1.10
1.20
0.55

-.2255
-.1465
-.
3893
.0134
-.0554

1.64
0.93
2.70 ***
0.11
0.67

Respondents/Plaintiffs'
Affirmative Defenses:
Procedural Unconscionability
Substantive Unconscionability

-. 0109
-. 0101

.3795
.3961

0.03
0.02

.0793
A084

1.09
****

0.79
1.44

3.3

***

0.51
2.68 *

.1558
.1522

UNCONSCIONABILITY DEFENSES'
INTERACTION EFFECTS:

Procedural*Corporations
Procedural*Financial Entities
Substantive*Corporations
Substantive*Financial Entities
CONSTANT

-2.340

.4238

0.92
2.13 *
1.11
524 ****

.2038
-.
6075
-.2251
-12057

-. 2899
.2248
.1594
.6976
5.52-

1.1122

.2875

3.87

*

Wald test for independent equations ("selectivity bias"): Chi square = .9600, p-value = .3281
**** Z statistic is statistically significant atp < .0001

*** Z statistic is statically significant at p <.001
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Consider Table 4. It presents a multivariate, two-stage probit analysis 5' 6 5of
6
the dispositions of arbitration motions in state and federal appellate courts. '
Several distributions of probit values and statistics are displayed in the table.
Again, the sample comprises 887 cases.
Of this number, 65% of the "observed" litigants (578) appealed adverse decisions. The remaining 35% decided not to appeal. Thus, they were "unobserved"
in state and federal courts of appeal.
Reiterating significant differences between "observed" and "unobserved" litigants could suggest the presence of statistically significant "selectivity bias." If
such bias were present, a researcher would be effectively precluded from making the following conclusions: (1) State, rather than federal appellate courts,
are more likely to deny mandatory-arbitration motions, or to be "biased"
against federal arbitration policies; (2) state appellate courts are more likely to
deny arbitration motions-when procedural unconscionability challenges are
raised; (3) state courts of appeal are more likely to deny arbitration motionswhen substantive unconscionability challenge are advanced; and (4) federal and
state courts of appeals are more likely to weigh extrajudicial factors when deciding whether to grant or deny mandatory-arbitration motions.56
In Table 4, multiple predictors or "dummy" variables5 63 appear under four
headings: "Types of Respondents/Plaintiffs," comprising two (2) variables;
"Types of Movants/Defendants," containing two (2) predictors; "Lawsuits' Origins" containing three (3) dummy predictors; "Courts' Jurisdictions," comprising three (3) independent variables; "Respondents/Plaintiffs' Underlying Legal
56 In multiple published law review articles, the author has discussed and employed this
statistical procedure to measure simultaneously independent and multiple effects of "independent variables" on the disposition of court decisions. See Willy E. Rice, Allegedly "Biased," "Intimidating," and "Incompetent" State CourtJudges and the QuestionableRemoval of State Law Class Actions to Purportedly "Impartial"and "Competent" Federal CourtsAn HistoricalPerspectiveand an EmpiricalAnalysis of ClassAction Dispositionsin Federal

and State Courts, 1925-2011, 3 WILLIAM & MARY Bus. L. REV. 419, 544-551 nn.790-838
(2012); Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance Industry: An
Empirical and Historical Analysis of Courts' Ineffectual Attempts to Harmonize Federal
Antitrust, Arbitration and Insolvency Statutes with the McCarran-FergusonAct-1941-1993,
43 CATH. U. L. REV. 399, 445-49 nn.213-19 (1994); and Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Title VI, Title IX, and Section 504: A Pre-and Post-Grove City

Analysis, 5 REV. LrrIG. 219, 287 nn.406-09 (1986) (using StataCorp's Stata Statistical
Software to analyze the data generally and to compute the multivariate-probit coefficients in
particular).
561 A copy of the author's database is available at the Office of the Boston University
Public Interest Law Journal.
562 See discussion supra Tables 3 and 4. See also G.S. Maddala, LIMITED-DEPENDENT
AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS, supra note 553 at 257-71,
563 Put simply, the subcategories or subgroups are individual binary (0,

278-83.

1) or "dummy

variables." See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 116-18 (N.Y.U., 5th ed.
2003) (explaining the purpose and use of dummy variables in regression analysis).
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Theories," consisting of five (5) dummy variables; "Respondents/Plaintiffs' Affirmative Defenses," encompassing two (2) independent variables; and "Unconscionability Defenses-Interaction Effects," consisting of four (4) dummy
predictors. Also, Table 4 illustrates two distributions of probit values-along
with their respective distributions of robust standard errors, z-statistics, and
levels of statistical significance.
On the left, the first distribution of probit values appears under the label
"Decisions to Appeal Motion-to-Compel-Arbitration Rulings to State and Federal Courts of Appeals (N = 578)." Those probit values answer the question:
whether the unique, multiple and simultaneous effects of the dummy variables
are statistically and significantly more or less likely to influence litigants' decisions to appeal. A review of the dummy variables' effects demonstrates: Litigants were significantly more likely to appeal if their underlying lawsuits began
in California state courts, but less likely to appeal is the underlying lawsuit
began in state courts within the Eleventh Circuit. Additionally, two of the dummy variables influenced the decisions to appeal. Thus, a test for "selectivity
bias" is required to determine whether any meaningful similarities exist between the 578 appellants and non-appellants.
At the bottom of Table 4, the results of a Wald test for independent equations
appear. The Chi-square statistic is not statistically significant-suggesting an
absence of bothersome "selectivity bias" in the sample data.5 65 Therefore, that
concern has been removed, the next mission is to assess whether the predictors
are more or less likely to influence appellate courts' dispositions of motions to
enforce arbitration clauses.
Consider the subheading-"Dispositions of Motion to Compel Arbitration
Disputes in State and Federal Courts of Appeals"-that appear on the right in
Table 4. Eight probit values 5 66 appear inbold print, revealing the corresponding
564 See David L. Schwartz and Christopher B. Seaman, Standardsof Proofin Civil Litigation: An Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 429, 460 n. 187 (2013)

("Statistical significance is the probability that an observed relationship is not due to chance.
A p-value of less than 0.05 is usually considered statistically significant. A 5% probability is
equal to a p-value of 0.05 or less. Results with a p-value of less than 0.01 are considered
highly statistically significant."); ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT &
THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 93, 233-234 n.4 (Aspen 2010) ("[W]hen a
result has less than a 5 percent chance of having been observed but is observed anyway, it is
said to be statistically significant," and explaining that a 1% chance "represents a 'higher'
level of significance because it indicates a less probable outcome and hence a more rigorous
statistical test.").
565 See supra TABLE 4.

56 The "positive" and "negative" probit values must be viewed from the perspectives of
the plaintiffs who filed the underlying lawsuits in state trial courts and in federal district
courts. More specifically, the plaintiffs are the respondents/plaintiffs in the motion-to-compel-arbitration trials. But, defendants filed motions to compel arbitration in those same lower
state and federal courts. Therefore, focusing on the motion-to-compel-arbitration litigation,
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predictors' statistically significant individual, multiple and simultaneous effects
on movants and respondents' likelihoods of prevailing in courts of appeal. Generally, barring two exceptions, the predictors are substantially more likely to
decrease unsophisticated employees and consumers' chances of winning in
mandatory-arbitration proceedings.
More specifically, among the background variables or extralegal predictors,
the "Financial Institutions" variable has a positive (.9375) probit value. It
reveals: When financial institutions file motions to compel arbitration, consumers, employees and other respondents/plaintiffs are more likely to prevail and
escape arbitration. In contrast, after controlling for the effects of other factors,
state appellate courts as well as the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits are more likely
to force unsophisticated persons into binding arbitration. The statistically significant and negative probit values are -.8293, -.2521 and -3197, respectively.
Furthermore, as reported earlier, the Concepcion Court concluded: Without
knowing more, California state courts are extremely biased against federal arbitration policies. To be sure, the Ninth Circuit is not. And a close review of the
negative probit value (-.2736) in Table 4 reveals: Although the coefficient is
not statistically significant, California state courts are generally more inclined
to force consumers and employees to arbitrate.
Do respondents/plaintiffs' underlying theories of recovery affect the dispositions of motions to compel arbitration in state and federal courts of appeal?
Yes. Examine Table 4 and focus on the predictor, "Antidiscrimination Actions." The corresponding statistically significant probit value is negative (.3893). It means: Respondents/plaintiffs are substantially less likely to win motion-to-compel-arbitration disputes, when those consumers and employees
commence underlying gender-, race- and age-based discrimination actions
against employers, financial institutions, corporations, and other entities. Very
tellingly, when controlling for all other factors and theories, an antidiscrimination action is the only cause of action that decreases markedly and statistically
consumers and employees' ability to litigate in courts. And this result supports

this question begged for an answer: What was the outcome of each motion-to-compel-arbitration trial? Thus, a dependent "dummy" variable-"OUTCOME-Trial-Court"-was constructed. It comprised two values (0, 1). If an underlying respondent/plaintiff prevailed in a
state trial court or in a federal district court, the value 1 was assigned. Conversely, if the
underlying respondent/plaintiff did not prevail at the trial level, a zero (0) was assigned.
Among cases, which were decided in state and federal appellate courts, a second dependent
"dummy" variable-"OUTCOME-Appellate-Court"-was fashioned. And, the same coding
methodology was employed. Thus, in TABLE 4, a negative probit value means: the corresponding predictor decreased respondents/plaintiffs' likelihood of winning a motion-to-compel-arbitration dispute. Conversely, a positive probit value means: The predictor increased
respondents/plaintiffs' likelihood of winning a mandatory-arbitration dispute in appellate
courts.
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other published empirical findings.567
Finally, an earlier examination of the percentages in Tables 2 and 3 revealed:
Unconscionability challenges influence differentially federal and state courts'
decisions to grant or deny motions to compel arbitration. But, the findings in
Tables 2 and 3 have serious limitations: They do not measure the separate effects of procedural and substantive unconscionability challenges on the dispositions of arbitration motions-after controlling for the separate, multiple and
simultaneous effects of other predictors. Consequently a multivariate probit
analysis is required.
Locate the two dummy variables under the heading, "Respondents/Plaintiffs'
Affirmative Defenses." Near the bottom of Table 4, the probit values answer
several questions. First, consider the "Procedural Unconscionability" predictor.
The corresponding positive probit value (.0793) is not statistically significant
and it does not support the Supreme Court's strongly implied assertion in Concepcion: Procedural unconscionability challenges in state and federal courts undermine liberal federal arbitration policies.
Yet, do substantive unconscionability challenges influence the dispositions
of motions to compel arbitration in state and federal courts of appeal? The
answer is yes. More specifically, unsophisticated consumers and employees are
more likely to prevail when state and federal courts decide motions-to-compelarbitration disputes. The corresponding positive probit value (.4084) is statistically significant. Does this latter statistical finding establish definitively that
state and federal appellate courts are biased against arbitration? Does this result
establish conclusively that state and federal appellate courts frequently abuse
the substantive unconscionability doctrine to undermine the Supreme Court's
"draconian ' arbitration policies?
The short answer to both questions is no, because the multivariate analysis
reveals two powerful and contrary interaction effects. Specifically, federal and
567

This finding is consistent with similar findings that appear in a published article. See

generally Willy E. Rice, supra note 473, at 506-507.
568 See e.g., Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunctions and No-Modification Terms:
Challenging "Anti-Reform" Provisions in Arbitration Clauses, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469,
469 (2015) ("[T]he United States Supreme Court has been on a bit of a pro-arbitration tear
recently, upholding ever-more draconian dispute resolution clauses inserted in standard-form
contracts against all sorts of legal and policy-based challenges."); Paul B. Marrow, Determining If Mandatory Arbitration Is "Fair":Asymmetrically Held Information and the Role

of Mandatory Arbitration in Modulating Uninsurable Contract Risks, 54 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REV. 187, 214 (2009) ("[O]ne noted author warns that '[t]he Supreme Court has created a
monster' [because the Court's policies make] arbitrator's decisions virtually unreviewable
while accepting procedural and substantive results that would be considered unfair in a judicial setting.' . . . The motivation for the imposition of such draconian methods is said to be
the selfish desire to reduce transaction costs, to transfer risk to the party upon whom arbitration is imposed, and to secure a forum where the deck is stacked in favor of the party
imposing the process.").
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state appellate courts are substantially more likely to grant motions to compel
arbitration-when consumers and employees present substantive unconscionability challenges and the movants/defendants are financial institutions. In Table
4, the "Substantive*Financial Entities" predictor's corresponding probit value
(-1.2057) is negative and statistically significant. Even more telling, state and
federal courts of appeal are also markedly more likely to grant motions to compel arbitration-when the movants/defendants are financial institutions and the
employees and consumers raise procedural unconscionability challenges. The
"Procedural*Financial Entities" predictor's corresponding probit value (-.6075)
is negative and statistically significant.
Finally, one major finding in the present study is exceptionally clear: Both
federal and state courts are substantially more likely to force unsophisticated
consumers and employees into binding arbitration. Does this finding comport
with the Concepcion Court's controversial conclusion: Unlike federal courts,
state courts are substantially more likely to be biased against, and have disdain
for, the Court's "draconian" federal arbitration policies? The answer is no.
VII.

SUMMARY -

CONCLUSION

For centuries, English and American courts embraced and applied two highly
compatible contract-based principles: Courts must enforce valid negotiated
contracts and arbitral agreements to protect the parties' intentions and rights.569
On the other hand, courts may not enforce any unconscionable contractwhich unjustly undermines unsophisticated and less powerful contractual parties' rights, privileges or interests."' In fact, fifty years before and after Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act section 2, federal and state courts
applied both principles concurrently to resolve contractual disputes. 571 However, during the mid-to-late twentieth century, powerful corporate employers and
industries flooded the business world with standardized contracts, which contain mandatory arbitration clauses. 72 The latter produced an explosion of motions-to-compel arbitration in state and federal courts. 573 To counter, consumers
and employees filed increasingly more unconscionability challenges to escape
569 See, e.g., Tumlin v. Vanhome, 3 S.E. 264, 266 (Ga. 1887) ("It is unquestionably the
duty of courts to enforce contracts, and protect the rights of parties arising from them.").
570 Cf Kitchen v. Raybum, 86 U.S. 254, 263 (1873) ("The complainants ... come into
court with[out] clean hands. They are seeking the benefit of a contract obtained by their
fraud .... [They] have no standing in a court of equity ... [which will not] enforce an
unconscionable bargain.").

See generally discussion supra Part II.C. 1.
See discussion supra notes 32-33.
573 See Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 SMU L. REV. 247, 252 n.32
(2012) ("[Olne commentator provides statistical analysis that documents a nationwide increase in the number of motions to vacate arbitration awards. A number of factors appear to
be encouraging the increase in such motions, including the increase in the number of arbitrations generally and the ever-higher stakes of commercial arbitration.").
571

572
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arbitration. 57

How has the Supreme Court responded to the avalanche of mandatory-arbitration disputes? Again, under the FAA section 2, courts must apply state-law
principles-which "exist at law or in equity"-to determine whether an arbitration clause is valid and enforceable.575 Has the Court consistently and emphatically encouraged inferior courts to follow all FAA section 2's directives? No.
Between the late-1970s and early-1980, the Supreme Court fashioned and encouraged lower courts to apply a novel and draconian set of liberal federal
arbitration policies 5 76-which weigh heavily 577
against the application of contract
principles in many arbitration-motion trials.
Consequently, the Court's extremely harsh "federal policies" have gradually,
systematically, and significantly eroded consumers and employees' ability to
defend themselves in compulsive-arbitration trials.578 In particular, the Concepcion Court's ruling severely limits the effectiveness of unconscionability challenges in mandatory- arbitration proceedings. Further, the erosive effects of the
Concepcion ruling should generate alarm because the Court did not clearly ex514 See Karen Halverson Cross, Letting the ArbitratorDecide Unconscionability Challenges, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 11-12 (2011) ("Although observers disagree over

whether [the] increase in unconscionability challenges and rulings is desirable as a policy
matter, there is little dispute[:] ... [T]he number of such challenges has increased substantially since the early 1990s ....

[U]nconscionability as a basis for refusing enforcement of

arbitration agreements is increasingly invoked but inconsistently applied.").
175 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
576 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) (stating that the FAA reflects an emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution and "[tihe Arbitration Act establishes ... as a matter of federal law, [that] any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration");
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (reaffirming the "liberal
federal policy [which] favor[s] arbitration agreements"); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (discussing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. and reaffirming
that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration")); Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (reaffirming Mitsubishi Motors Corp. and stressing
that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues ... be resolved in favor of arbitration")).
577 See generally, Willy E. Rice, Courts Gone "Irrationally Biased" in Favor of the
Federal Arbitration Act?-Enforcing Arbitration Provisions in Standardized Application
Forms and Marginalizing Consumer-Protection,Antidiscrimination, and States' Contract
Laws: A 1925-2014 Legal and Empirical Analysis, 6 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV., 405,
450-461 (2015) (establishing that state and federal courts ignore the FAA § 2's "written
contract" requirement, ignore settled contract principles and enforce-contrary to the
FAA-arbitration clauses in applications for goods, services and employment).
578 See Tables 3 and 4 supra Part VI.D and accompanying discussion.
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plain whether the application of both procedural and substantive unconscionability challenges must be restricted.579
For centuries, procedural unconscionability challenges have precluded the
formation and enforcement of an entire contract, if the contract evolved from
duress, illegality or unconscionable conduct.5 ° And substantive unconscionability challenges have prevented state and federal courts from enforcing all
types of "shockingly one-sided" or "oppressively harsh" provisions in valid
contracts. 581 However, under the Court's exceedingly liberal federal "severability" policy, courts may now force unsophisticated consumers and employees to
arbitrate claims-even if an arbitration agreement contains a substantively unconscionable clause.582 Departing from the FAA section 2's exceedingly clear
directives and settled contract principles, the Supreme Court's "severability
policy" requires lower tribunals to sever "unconscionable" arbitral words and
agreements, and
phrases in negotiated as well as in standardized or adhesion
5 83
force consumers and employees into binding arbitration.
More disquieting, the Court's extreme "severability policy" has generated a
set of highly complicated and conflicting "severability" rules among and between state and federal courts.584 Yet, state and federal courts are still exceedingly more likely to compel arbitration, even if a severability clause is substan579 See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct., 1740, 1747 (2011) (embracing two

researchers' statistical findings-which failed to measure the effects of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability defenses on the dispositions of arbitration motions-and fashioning an anti-consumer federal arbitration policy without appreciating or understanding the
differential effects of procedural and substantive unconscionability challenges). See also
Broome, supra note 315 at 54, 66 (failing to investigate and discuss the effects of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability challenges); Susan Randall, JudicialAttitudes
Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 ButF. L. REv. 185,
186-187 (2004) (failing to measure the unique effects of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability defenses in arbitration trials).
580 See generally discussion supra Part II.C. I.
581 See generally discussion supra Part V.A.
582 Compare Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d 212, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
that a substantively unconscionable fee-splitting and attorney fees provisions could be severed from the agreement even in the absence of a severability clause), and Adler v. Fred
Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 791 (Wash. 2004) (holding that "the attorney fees and limitations
provisions of the arbitration agreement are substantively unconscionable [but severable, and
so] the parties' intent to arbitrate [is preserved]"), and Bylund v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., No. B153167, 2002 WL 31744919, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2002), with Paladino v.
Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1058 (11 th Cir. 1998) (refusing to compel arbitration after finding that a substantively unconscionable clause tainted the entire arbitration agreement, and refusing to sever the clause that only authorized an award of damages
for breach of contract); Nino v. Jewelry Exchange, Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 208 (3d Cir. 2010);
Gessa v. Manor Care of Florida, Inc., 86 So.3d 484, 494 (Fla. 2011).
583 See generally discussion supra Part IV.
584 See generally discussion supra Part IV.
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tively unconscionable. 585 Why raise alarm about the Supreme Court's harsh
severability policy, when it applies to the enforcement of an adhesionaryrather than a negotiated 5 86-arbitral agreement? Why raise concerns about the
accelerated erosion of consumers and employees' unconscionability challenges
in both federal and state? In Sosa v. Paulos,587 the Utah Supreme Court penned
an exceptionally perceptive and intelligible answer:
Dr. Paulos contends that . . . procedural unconscionability [did not preclude] the formation of the agreement ... [and] severance of the unconscionable term would not interfere with . . . the arbitration of medical
malpractice disputes. Were we to adopt [this] argument . . . , the doctrine

of procedural unconscionability would be effectively destroyed.... [A]ny
party in a stronger bargaining position would have an incentive to engage
in procedurally unconscionable behavior to induce a weaker party to sign
[A] severance
an agreement containing extremely unfavorable terms ....
clause enforced in this fashion would encourage procedural and substantive overreaching because the stronger party will have nothing to lose by
trying to intimidate.588
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the criticisms of forced arbitration
and the increasing ineffectiveness of unconscionability challenges are "based
on hyperbole, speculation, unsubstantiated assumptions, and anecdotal evidence ...

"589 But, a California court of appeal's insight is worth repeating:

585 Compare In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 344 (Tex. 2008) (declaring that
the arbitration agreement's provisions precluding remedies under the Workers' Compensation Act were substantively unconscionable, citing the severability clause, severing the unconscionable remedial provisions and compelling arbitration), and McKee v. AT&T Corp.,
191 P.3d 845, 861 (Wash. 2008), and Zuver v. Airtouch Communications, Inc., 103 P.3d
753, 769 (Wash. 2004), with State ex rel. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Webster, 752
S.E.2d 372, 394 (W. Va. 2013) (refusing to strike the severability clause in the arbitration
agreement, declaring that the "voluntary" fee-shifting provisions in the consumer-loan contract were not substantively unconscionable and compelling arbitration), and Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1287 (N.D. Ala. 2000), and Etokie v. Carmax
Auto Superstores, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (D. Md. 2000).
586 See, e.g., Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah
1980) (stressing that contract provisions are severable if the parties intended severance "at
the time they entered into the contract," and if the primary purpose of the contract could still
be accomplished following severance). See also Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 364 (Utah
1996).
587 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996).
588 Id. at 363-364.
589 Cf Paul B. Marrow, Determining If Mandatory ArbitrationIs "Fair":Asymmetrically Held Information and the Role of MandatoryArbitration in Modulating UninsurableContract Risks, 54 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 187, 212 (2009/2010) ("So, is mandatory arbitration a
fair process? Resolving this question is potentially impossible if one takes into account nothing other than hyperbole, speculation, unsubstantiated assumptions, and anecdotal evidence.
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While arbitration may be within the reasonable expectations of consumers, a process that builds prohibitively expensive fees into the arbitration
process is not .... [I]t is substantively unconscionable to require a consumer to give up the right to utilize the judicial system, while imposing
arbitral forum fees that are prohibitively high. Whatever preference for
arbitration might exist, it is not served by an adhesive agreement that effectively blocks every forum for the redress of disputes, including arbitration itself.59 °
An exhaustive review of the FAA's legislative history fails to disclose that
Congress enacted the FAA section 2's "savings clause," expecting successful
procedural and substantive unconscionably challenges to turn on whether the
movants are corporations, employers, nursing homes, banks, or other commercial entities. 59' And Congress certainly did not enact the FAA section 2, intending for numerous other extrajudicial variables to influence the dispositions
of arbitration motions in federal and state courts.5 92 Should a twenty-first-century Congress address these offensive judicial realities-which are significantly
eroding contract-based defenses under the FAA, and forcing increasingly large
numbers of unsophisticated consumers and employees into binding arbitration?
The answer is yes.
What must Congress do? Recently, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 59 3-which spawned the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 94 As of this writing, the CFPB has taken
steps to educate consumers about the perils of hidden and complicated arbitration provisions in contracts. 595 But, the CFPB's activities are not enough. Ex...While the results are inconclusive, the cumulative weight of these studies points
toward the conclusion that arbitration is perceived as a fair process ....[F]urther empirical examination may be needed to shed more light on the matter .... ).
590 Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 267, 277 (Cal. App. Ct. 2003).
591 See discussion supra Part III.
592 See discussion supra Part III.
591 12 U.S.C. § 5581 (2010).
51 Under 12 U.S.C. § 5581, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act transferred many functions from multiple federal agencies and departments to the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. In pertinent Part, § 5581(a)(1) reads: "for purposes of this Part,
the term 'consumer financial protection functions' means-(A) all authority to prescribe
rules or issue orders or guidelines pursuant to any Federal consumer financial law, including
performing appropriate functions to promulgate and review such rules, orders, and guidelines; and (B) the examination authority described in subsection (c)(1), with respect to a
person described in section 5515(a) of this title . ..."
595 In addition, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) gives the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau authority to regulate pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumers' financial
products or services contracts. § 5518(b) reads:
The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use
of an agreement between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial
product or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if
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ceedingly large populations of unsophisticated employees also need assistance
because they are increasingly forced to arbitrate state and federal claims.596 In
recent years, numerous bills have been introduced in Congress to address the
concerns raised in this article. 597 Enactment of any one of those proposed acts
would effectively end the Supreme Court's unconscionably biased pro-arbitration policies, and allow unsophisticated employees and consumers to litigate
their contractual and statutory claims in courts of law-before a jury of their
peers rather than before a private arbitrator.
the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in
the public interest and for the protection of consumers. The findings in such rule shall
be consistent with the study conducted under subsection (a).
See also Jonnelle Marte, Firms May Face Limits on Mandatory Arbitration, WASH. POST,
Mar. 4, 2015, at A12 ("The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is expected to issue a
major report next week on what consumer advocates say is one of the leading but most
misunderstood ways that companies limit a customer's rights .... Consumers instead are
steered into arbitration, which critics say is a secretive process that is often stacked in the
company's favor and leads to little benefit for consumers .... In some cases, consumers...
face fees and other restrictions, such as requiring that arbitration take place in a certain
state. ... 'Companies are controlling the system,' said... legislative director for the National Association of Consumer Advocates. 'They're writing the clauses, they decide where the
arbitrator will be and they decide the payment terms.'").
596 See Editorial, Consumers Losing Right to Sue, USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 2000, at 13A
("Buy an item off the popular eBay auction web site, and you've just given away your right
to sue. If you have a beef with eBay, you'll go before a private arbitrator instead of a judge
in court. The Web giant has even picked the place: San Jose, eBay's home, but not exactly
convenient to the vast majority of consumers. A growing number of e-world businesses are
joining the ranks of banks and credit card companies that quietly force customers into arbitration agreements. Customers, simply by making a purchase, often automatically give up
their right to sue.").
597 See Wascovich v. Personacare of Ohio, 943 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010)
("Known as the 'Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act,' H.R. 1237 (which was introduced on February 26, 2009, but was discharged on June 21, 2010) aimed to amend the
Federal Arbitration Act to invalidate predispute arbitration agreements between a long-term
nursing home and a resident."); Joshua T. Mandelbaum, Stuck In A Bind: Can The Arbitration FairnessAct Solve The Problems of Mandatory Binding Arbitration In The Consumer
Context?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1078 (2009) ("Advocates and legislators have rallied
around the Arbitration Fairness Act..." (citing the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S.
1782, 110th Cong. (2007))); The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong.
(2007);The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111 th Cong. (2009). See also the
proposed Fair Arbitration Act of 2013, S. 878 (1st Sess. 2013).

